Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games.

Real-world agents, humans as well as animals, observe each other during interactions and choose their own actions taking the partners' ongoing behaviour into account. Yet, classical game theory assumes that players act either strictly sequentially or strictly simultaneously without knowing each other's current choices. To account for action visibility and provide a more realistic model of interactions under time constraints, we introduce a new game-theoretic setting called transparent games, where each player has a certain probability of observing the partner's choice before deciding on its own action. By means of evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that even a small probability of seeing the partner's choice before one's own decision substantially changes the evolutionary successful strategies. Action visibility enhances cooperation in an iterated coordination game, but reduces cooperation in a more competitive iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. In both games, "Win-stay, lose-shift" and "Tit-for-tat" strategies are predominant for moderate transparency, while a "Leader-Follower" strategy emerges for high transparency. Our results have implications for studies of human and animal social behaviour, especially for the analysis of dyadic and group interactions.

Paradoxical effects of coupling infectious livestock populations and imposing transport restrictions.

Spatial heterogeneity of a host population of mobile agents has been shown to be a crucial determinant of many aspects of disease dynamics, ranging from the proliferation of diseases to their persistence and to vaccination strategies. In addition, the importance of regional and structural differences grows in our modern world. Little is known, though, about the consequences when traits of a disease vary regionally. In this paper, we study the effect of a spatially varying per capita infection rate on the behaviour of livestock diseases. We show that the prevalence of an infectious livestock disease in a community of animals can paradoxically decrease owing to transport connections to other communities in which the risk of infection is higher. We study the consequences for the design of livestock transportation restriction measures and establish exact criteria to discriminate those connections that increase the level of infection in the community from those that decrease it.

Distribution of the fittest individuals and the rate of Muller's ratchet in a model with overlapping generations.

Muller's ratchet is a paradigmatic model for the accumulation of deleterious mutations in a population of finite size. A click of the ratchet occurs when all individuals with the least number of deleterious mutations are lost irreversibly due to a stochastic fluctuation. In spite of the simplicity of the model, a quantitative understanding of the process remains an open challenge. In contrast to previous works, we here study a Moran model of the ratchet with overlapping generations. Employing an approximation which describes the fittest individuals as one class and the rest as a second class, we obtain closed analytical expressions of the ratchet rate in the rare clicking regime. As a click in this regime is caused by a rare, large fluctuation from a metastable state, we do not resort to a diffusion approximation but apply an approximation scheme which is especially well suited to describe extinction events from metastable states. This method also allows for a derivation of expressions for the quasi-stationary distribution of the fittest class. Additionally, we confirm numerically that the formulation with overlapping generations leads to the same results as the diffusion approximation and the corresponding Wright-Fisher model with non-overlapping generations.