Guerrilla Hospital Design and Lessons Learned.

The author discusses the lessons that can be learned from older sources when engaging in guerilla warfare medicine and surgery.

Causes of death in U.S. Special Operations Forces in the global war on terrorism: 2001-2004.

BACKGROUND: Effective combat trauma management strategies depend upon an understanding of the epidemiology of death on the battlefield. METHODS: A panel of military medical experts reviewed photographs and autopsy and treatment records for all Special Operations Forces (SOF) who died between October 2001 and November 2004 (n = 82). Fatal wounds were classified as nonsurvivable or potentially survivable. Training and equipment available at the time of injury were taken into consideration. A structured analysis was conducted to identify equipment, training, or research requirements for improved future outcomes. RESULTS: Five (6%) of 82 casualties had died in an aircraft crash, and their bodies were lost at sea; autopsies had been performed on all other 77 soldiers. Nineteen deaths, including the deaths at sea were noncombat; all others were combat related. Deaths were caused by explosions (43%), gunshot wounds (28%), aircraft accidents (23%), and blunt trauma (6%). Seventy of 82 deaths (85%) were classified as nonsurvivable; 12 deaths (15%) were classified as potentially survivable. Of those with potentially survivable injuries, 16 causes of death were identified: 8 (50%) truncal hemorrhage, 3 (19%) compressible hemorrhage, 2 (13%) hemorrhage amenable to tourniquet, and 1 (6%) each from tension pneumothorax, airway obstruction, and sepsis. The population with nonsurvivable injuries was more severely injured than the population with potentially survivable injuries. Structured analysis identified improved methods of truncal hemorrhage control as a principal research requirement. CONCLUSIONS: The majority of deaths on the modern battlefield are nonsurvivable. Improved methods of intravenous or intracavitary, noncompressible hemostasis combined with rapid evacuation to surgery may increase survival.

Causes of death in US Special Operations Forces in the global war on terrorism: 2001-2004.

INTRODUCTION: Effective combat trauma management strategies depend on an understanding of the epidemiology of death on the battlefield, resulting in evidence-based equipment, training, and research requirements. METHODS: All Special Operations Forces (SOF) fatalities (combat and noncombat) in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF/OIF) from October 2001 until November 2004 were reviewed. All available autopsy and treatment records and photographs were used. In most cases, the immediate tactical situation was unknown. The review was performed by a multidisciplinary group including forensic pathologists, an SOF combat medic, and trauma surgeons. Fatalities were classified as having wounds that were either nonsurvivable or potentially survivable with existing training, equipment, and expertise on the battlefield. A structured review was performed evaluating the need for new equipment, training, or research requirements. Results were compared to autopsy data from Vietnam and modern civilian trauma center data. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the US Army Institute of Surgical Research. RESULTS: During the study period, 82 SOF fatalities were identified. Autopsies were performed on 77 Soldiers. Five casualties died secondary to aircraft crash, their bodies were not recovered from the ocean. For the purposes of this study they were considered nonsurvivable. Eighty-five percent (n = 70) of the fatalities sustained wounds that were nonsurvivable, while the remaining 15% (n = 12) had wounds that were potentially survivable. Injury Severity Score (ISS) was higher in the nonsurvivable group (p < 0.05). Truncal hemorrhage accounted for 47% of deaths while extremity hemorrhage accounted for 33%. One casualty was noted at autopsy to have a tension pneumothorax as well as multiple sources of internal hemorrhage, one suffered an airway death, while another died of sepsis 56 days after injury. Of those casualties deemed to be nonsurvivable, there were 31 patients with 40 Abbreviated Injury Score (AIS) 6 injuries (p = .0011), and 53 patients with 104 AIS 5 injuries. Among the 12 deaths deemed to be potentially survivable, there were only 8 AIS 5 injuries. Deaths were largely caused by explosions (n = 35), gunshot wounds (n = 23), and aircraft accidents (n = 19). No new training or equipment needs were identified for 53% of the potentially survivable deaths while improved methods of truncal hemorrhage control need to be developed for the remainder. The review panel concluded that 85% of the deaths would not have been prevented at a civilian Level I facility. Available records, in most cases, did not contain information about the use of body armor, time to death after injury, or the ongoing tactical situation. CONCLUSIONS: The majority of deaths on the modern battlefield are nonsurvivable. Current results are not different from previous conflicts. In Vietnam, reported potentially preventable death rates range from 5% to 35% and civilian data reports potentially preventable death rates ranging from 12% to 22%. Military munitions cause multiple lethal injuries. Current trauma training and equipment is sufficient to care for 53% of the potentially survivable deaths. Improved methods of intravenous or intracavitary noncompressible hemostasis combined with rapid surgery are required for the remaining 47% of the decedents.

Survey of U.S. Army commanders' experiences with brigade/battalion surgeons at Fort Hood, Texas.

This anonymous survey sent to every battalion and brigade commander at Fort Hood, Texas assessed the new concept of residency-trained operational physicians that had completed military unique curriculum series training. Commanders provided anonymous professional information about themselves and their assigned physicians and evaluated their physicians in 22 areas of medical and military competence using a linear scoring method from 2 (indicating poor) to 6 (indicating outstanding). Main effects and interaction effects were analyzed using multiple analysis of variance. The commanders' overall confidence in their physicians was 5.4, suggesting general satisfaction. Prior-service physicians were rated higher on several factors if the commander had combat experience. Non-prior-service physicians were rated the same on nearly all variables regardless of the commander's experience. Commanders with combat experience rated their assigned physicians significantly higher than did commanders without combat experience. Despite high ratings, several candid remarks suggest there is still room for improvement.