Attachment to robots and therapeutic efficiency in mental health.

Previous studies in the mental health context have demonstrated that interactions with social robots can improve the mood and cognitive capacities of their users, and enhance their quality of life. In this Perspective article, our goal is to systematize the possible roles of social robots and to point out that different roles require different levels of attachment. We argue that the attachment between the client and the (robot) therapist is a fundamental ingredient of any helping relationship and that the full potential of using social robots in mental health settings can only be realized if the strength of attachment is appropriately correlated with the type of relationship established.

A construct-first approach to consciousness science.

We propose a new approach to consciousness science that instead of comparing complex theoretical positions deconstructs existing theories, takes their central assumptions while disregarding their auxiliary hypotheses, and focuses its investigations on the main constructs that these central assumptions rely on (like global workspace, recurrent processing, metarepresentation). Studying how these main constructs are anchored in lower-level constructs characterizing underlying neural processing will not just offer an alternative to theory comparisons but will also take us one step closer to empirical resolutions. Moreover, exploring the compatibility and possible combinations of the lower-level constructs will allow for new theoretical syntheses. This construct-first approach will improve our ability to understand the commitments of existing theories and pave the way for moving beyond them.

Distribution of Pb, Sr, and U isotopic signature and multielement composition of sediment in Lake Balaton (Hungary) at a sediment trap deep dredged 40 years ago near Balatongyörök-search for routes of recent pollution.

We studied the Pb, Sr, and U isotopic composition and the concentration of toxic metal elements in sediment core samples collected in Lake Balaton at a sediment trap that was deep dredged in 1979, to analyze their changes in the last 40 years. Pb isotopic composition profiles of cores taken from the sediment trap showed different 206Pb/207Pb ratios ranging from 1.206 ± 0.002 at the bottom of the core (phase 1) compared to 1.185 ± 0.002 at the top of the core (phase 2). Phase 2 is the fraction reflecting isotopic signatures of the latest 40 years. At 80-100-cm depth, a transition zone was observed. Pb concentration together with Zn, Sb, Cu, Cd, and Fe showed elevated, 2-4 times higher values in the top phase of the sediment. The calculated Pb isotopic composition of pollutant Pb fraction was 1.177 ± 0.005 in the case of the 206Pb/207Pb and 2.456 ± 0.004 for 208Pb/207Pb, which shows good agreement with literature data for lead ores in Poland and Germany, but it is distinct from literature data for leaded fuel concerning Middle and Eastern Europe. The marked difference in the Pb signatures of phases enabled the construction of a sediment deposition rate map. U and Mo showed a characteristic concentration peak positioned exactly at the depth of the Pb signature transition. The isotopic signature of U based on 234U and 235U also showed a similar pattern. We suggest that the deposition of U and Mo can be related to cyanobacterial blooms in Lake Balaton in the late 1970s and early1980s.

Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis.

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics' performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which - hopefully - will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.

Hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-wandering.

This paper argues for a novel way of thinking about hallucinations as intensified forms of mind-wandering. Starting from the observation that hallucinations are associated with hyperactive sensory areas underlying the content of hallucinatory experiences and a confusion with regard to the reality of the source of these experiences, the paper first reviews the different factors that might contribute to the impairment of reality monitoring. The paper then focuses on the sensory characteristics determining the vividness of an experience, reviews their relationship to the sensory hyperactivity observed in hallucinations, and investigates under what circumstances they can drive reality judgements. Finally, based on these considerations, the paper presents its main proposal according to which hallucinations are intensified forms of mind-wandering that are amplified along their sensory characteristics, and sketches a possible model of what factors might determine if an internally and involuntarily generated perceptual representation is experienced as a hallucination or as an instance of mind-wandering. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Offline perception: an introduction.

Experiences that are self-generated and independent of sensory stimulations permeate our whole life. This theme issue examines their similarities and differences, systematizes the literature from an integrative perspective, critically discusses state-of-the-art empirical findings and proposes new theoretical approaches. The aim of the theme issue is to foster interaction between the different disciplines and research directions involved and to explore the prospects of a unificatory account of offline perception in general. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Dreaming, Mind-Wandering, and Hypnotic Dreams.

Hobson's AIM theory offers a general framework for thinking about states of consciousness like wakefulness, REM dreaming and NREM mentations in terms of a state space defined by the dimensions of the level of brain activity, the source of input, and the type of neurochemical modulation. This account inspired theoretical models of other altered states of consciousness-including hypnosis-claiming that studying REM dreaming can advance our understanding of these phenomena as well. However, recent developments showed that hypnosis is not a sleep like stage, and that the REM-centric attitude toward dreaming is mistaken. At the same time, the advancement of the neuro-cognitive theory claiming that dreaming and mind-wandering are on a continuum both underlain by default-mode network activity called many aspects of the AIM theory into question. Our aim in this paper is to show that certain hypnotic states-hypnotic dreams (experiences that subjects have in a hypnotic state as a result of an explicit suggestion to have a dream)-can, nevertheless, be highly relevant for the neuro-cognitive theory, and that their comparison with dreaming and mind-wandering has the potential to advance the field in unexpected ways.

Perceptual Representations and the Vividness of Stimulus-Triggered and Stimulus-Independent Experiences.

In recent years, researchers from independent subfields have begun to engage with the idea that the same cortical regions that contribute to on-line perception are recruited during and underlie off-line activities such as information maintenance in working memory, mental imagery, hallucinations, dreaming, and mind wandering. Accumulating evidence suggests that in all of these cases the activity of posterior brain regions provides the contents of experiences. This article is intended to move one step further by exploring specific links between the vividness of experiences, which is a characteristic feature of consciousness regardless of its actual content, and certain properties of the content-specific neural-activity patterns. Investigating the mechanisms that underlie mental imagery and its relation to working memory and the processes responsible for mind wandering and its similarities to dreaming form two clusters of research that are in the forefront of the recent scientific study of mental phenomena, yet communication between these two clusters has been surprisingly sparse. Here our aim is to foster such information exchange by articulating a hypothesis about the fine-grained phenomenological structure determining subjective vividness and its possible neural basis that allows us to shed new light on these mental phenomena by bringing them under a common framework.

White dreams are made of colours: What studying contentless dreams can teach about the neural basis of dreaming and conscious experiences.

Reports of white dreams, the feeling of having had a dream experience without being able to specify this experience any further, make up almost one third of all dream reports, yet this phenomenon-until very recently-had not yet been in the focus of targeted investigations. White dreams are typically interpreted as forgotten dreams, and are sidelined as not being particularly informative with regard to the nature of dreaming. In this review article, we propose a paradigm shift with respect to the status of white dreams arguing that focusing on this phenomenon can reveal fundamental insights about the neural processes that occur in the dreaming brain. As part of this paradigm shift, we propose a novel interpretation of what white dreams are. This new interpretation is made possible by recent advancements in three different though interrelated fields focusing on dreaming, mental imagery, and wakeful perception. In this paper, we bring these different threads together to show how the latest findings from these fields fit together and point towards a general framework regarding the neural underpinnings of conscious experiences that might turn out to be highly relevant not just for dream research but for all aspects of studying consciousness.

Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction.

The problem of perceptual consciousness-the question of how our subjective experiences (colours as we see them; sounds as we hear them; tastes, etc., as we feel them) could be accounted for in terms of brain processes-is often regarded as the greatest unsolved mystery of our times. In recent literature, one of the most pressing questions in this regard is whether the neural basis of perceptual consciousness is independent of the neural basis of cognitive access mechanisms that make reporting and reflecting on conscious experiences possible. The Theme Issue focuses on this central problem of consciousness research and aims to contribute to the field by critically discussing state-of-the-art empirical findings, identifying methodological problems and proposing novel approaches.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Dream experiences and the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness and cognitive access.

This paper approaches the debate whether perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access from the perspective of dream studies, and investigates what kind of findings could support the opposing views of this debate. Two kinds of arguments are discussed, one that claims that the hypoactivity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in rapid eye movement sleep is directly relevant, and another that proposes that locating the neural correlates of dream experiences can indirectly inform the debate. It is argued that under closer reflection, neither the classical claim about dorsolateral prefrontal cortex hypoactivity nor the more recent emphasis on general posterior hot zone activity during dreaming stand up to scrutiny. White dreaming is identified as the phenomenon that, nevertheless, holds the most promise to have an impact on the debate. Going beyond the topic if studying dreams can contribute to this debate, it is argued that cognitive access is not a monolithic phenomenon, and its neural correlates are not well understood. There seems to be a relevant form of cognitive access that can operate in the absence of activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and maybe also in the whole frontal region. If so, then exclusive posterior activation during conscious experiences might very well be compatible with the hypothesis that perceptual consciousness requires cognitive access.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.

Multiple Factors and Multiple Mechanisms Determine the Quality of Conscious Experiences: A Reply to Anzulewicz and Wierzchon.

In this Letter to the Editor, we seize the opportunity to respond to the recent comments by Anzulewicz and Wierzchon, and further clarify and extend the scope of our original paper. We re-emphasize that conscious experiences come in degrees, and that there are several factors that determine this degree. Endorsing the suggestions of Anzulewicz and Wierzchon, we discuss that besides low-level attentional mechanisms, high-level attentional and non-attentional mechanisms might also modulate the quality of conscious experiences.

A Multi-Factor Account of Degrees of Awareness.

In this paper we argue that awareness comes in degrees, and we propose a novel multi-factor account that spans both subjective experiences and perceptual representations. At the subjective level, we argue that conscious experiences can be degraded by being fragmented, less salient, too generic, or flash-like. At the representational level, we identify corresponding features of perceptual representations-their availability for working memory, intensity, precision, and stability-and argue that the mechanisms that affect these features are what ultimately modulate the degree of awareness. We conclude the paper by demonstrating why the original interpretations of certain empirical findings that apparently pose problems for our account are, in fact, flawed.

[Splenic vein aneurysm -- a case report]. / Lépvéna-aneurysma operált esete.

Authors report a very rare case of splenic vein aneurysm in a 34-year-old female patient. She underwent investigation for upper abdominal pain which was not related to eating. Diagnostic workup revealed a thin wall saccular splenic vein aneurysm of 40 mm in diameter which caused an indentation of the posterior wall of the pancreas. She underwent surgery, a tangential resection was carried out preserving the continuity of the splenic vein and spleen. The patient had an uneventful postoperative course and she was discharged on the 5th postoperative day.