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1.
Synthese ; 198(2): 1287-1307, 2021.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-33707800

ABSTRACT

We suggest that philosophical accounts of epistemic effects of diversity have given insufficient attention to the relationship between demographic diversity and information elaboration (IE), the process whereby knowledge dispersed in a group is elicited and examined. We propose an analysis of IE that clarifies hypotheses proposed in the empirical literature and their relationship to philosophical accounts of diversity effects. Philosophical accounts have largely overlooked the possibility that demographic diversity may improve group performance by enhancing IE, and sometimes fail to explore the relationship between diversity and IE altogether. We claim these omissions are significant from both a practical and theoretical perspective. Moreover, we explain how the overlooked explanations suggest that epistemic benefits of diversity can depend on epistemically unjust social dynamics.

2.
Cognition ; 203: 104370, 2020 10.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32593013

ABSTRACT

In this paper we argue that predictive processing (PP) theory cannot account for the phenomenon of affect-biased attention - prioritized attention to stimuli that are affectively salient because of their associations with reward or punishment. Specifically, the PP hypothesis that selective attention can be analyzed in terms of the optimization of precision expectations cannot accommodate affect-biased attention; affectively salient stimuli can capture our attention even when precision expectations are low. We review the prospects of three recent attempts to accommodate affect with tools internal to PP theory: Miller and Clark's (2018) embodied inference; Seth's (2013) interoceptive inference; and Joffily and Coricelli's (2013) rate of change of free energy. In each case we argue that the account does not resolve the challenge from affect-biased attention. For this reason, we conclude that prediction error minimization is not sufficient to explain all mental phenomena, contrary to the claim that the PP framework provides a unified theory of all mental phenomena or the brain's cognitive functioning. Nevertheless, we suggest that empirical investigation of the interaction between affective salience and precision expectations should prove helpful in understanding the limits of PP theory, and may provide new directions for the application of a Bayesian perspective to perception.


Subject(s)
Attentional Bias , Bayes Theorem , Cognition , Entropy , Humans
3.
Eur J Philos Sci ; 8(3): 761-780, 2018.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-30956737

ABSTRACT

A concept of diversity is an understanding of what makes a group diverse that may be applicable in a variety of contexts. We distinguish three diversity concepts, show that each can be found in discussions of diversity in science, and explain how they tend to be associated with distinct epistemic and ethical rationales. Yet philosophical literature on diversity among scientists has given little attention to distinct concepts of diversity. This is significant because the unappreciated existence of multiple diversity concepts can generate unclarity about the meaning of "diversity," lead to problematic inferences from empirical research, and obscure complex ethical-epistemic questions about how to define diversity in specific cases. We illustrate some ethical-epistemic implications of our proposal by reference to an example of deliberative mini-publics on human tissue biobanking.

4.
Conscious Cogn ; 47: 99-112, 2017 01.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-27388979

ABSTRACT

It has recently become popular to suggest that cognition can be explained as a process of Bayesian prediction error minimization. Some advocates of this view propose that attention should be understood as the optimization of expected precisions in the prediction-error signal (Clark, 2013, 2016; Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012, 2013). This proposal successfully accounts for several attention-related phenomena. We claim that it cannot account for all of them, since there are certain forms of voluntary attention that it cannot accommodate. We therefore suggest that, although the theory of Bayesian prediction error minimization introduces some powerful tools for the explanation of mental phenomena, its advocates have been wrong to claim that Bayesian prediction error minimization is 'all the brain ever does'.


Subject(s)
Attention/physiology , Bayes Theorem , Cognition/physiology , Perception/physiology , Psychological Theory , Humans
5.
Curr Opin Neurobiol ; 31: 223-9, 2015 Apr.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-25544058

ABSTRACT

Current research on spontaneous, self-generated brain rhythms and dynamic neural network coordination cast new light on Immanuel Kant's idea of the 'spontaneity' of cognition, that is, the mind's capacity to organize and synthesize sensory stimuli in novel, unprecedented ways. Nevertheless, determining the precise nature of the brain-cognition mapping remains an outstanding challenge. Neurophenomenology, which uses phenomenological information about the variability of subjective experience in order to illuminate the variability of brain dynamics, offers a promising method for addressing this challenge.


Subject(s)
Brain/physiology , Cognition/physiology , Nonlinear Dynamics , Philosophy , Aged, 80 and over , Brain Mapping , History, 18th Century , History, 19th Century , Humans , Male , Philosophy/history
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