EXPRESS: Revisiting representativeness heuristic classic paradigms: Replication and extensions of nine experiments in Kahneman and Tversky (1972).

Kahneman and Tversky (1972) showed that when people make probability judgments, they tend to ignore relevant statistical information (e.g., sample size) and instead rely on a representativeness heuristic, whereby subjective probabilities are influenced by the degree to which a target is perceived as similar to (representative of) a typical example of the relevant population, class or category. Their paper has become a cornerstone in many lines of research and has been used to account for various biases in judgment and decision-making. Despite the impact this article has had on theory and practice, there have been no direct replications. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 623; Amazon MTurk on CloudResearch), we conducted a replication and extensions of nine problems from Kahneman and Tversky (1972). We successfully replicated eight out of the nine problems. We extended the replication by examining the consistency of heuristic responses across problems and by examining decision style as a predictor of participants' use of the representativeness heuristic. Materials, data, and code are available on: https://osf.io/nhqc4/.

Increasing the transparency of systematic reviews: presenting a generalized registration form.

This paper presents a generalized registration form for systematic reviews that can be used when currently available forms are not adequate. The form is designed to be applicable across disciplines (i.e., psychology, economics, law, physics, or any other field) and across review types (i.e., scoping review, review of qualitative studies, meta-analysis, or any other type of review). That means that the reviewed records may include research reports as well as archive documents, case law, books, poems, etc. Items were selected and formulated to optimize broad applicability instead of specificity, forgoing some benefits afforded by a tighter focus. This PRISMA 2020 compliant form is a fallback for more specialized forms and can be used if no specialized form or registration platform is available. When accessing this form on the Open Science Framework website, users will therefore first be guided to specialized forms when they exist. In addition to this use case, the form can also serve as a starting point for creating registration forms that cater to specific fields or review types.

Action and Inaction in Moral Judgments and Decisions: Meta-Analysis of Omission Bias Omission-Commission Asymmetries.

Omission bias is people's tendency to evaluate harm done through omission as less morally wrong and less blameworthy than commission when there is harm. However, findings are inconsistent. We conducted a preregistered meta-analysis, with 21 samples (13 articles, 49 effects) on omission-commission asymmetries in judgments and decisions. We found an overall effect of g = 0.45, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.14, 0.77], with stronger effects for morality and blame than for decisions. Publication bias tests produced mixed results with some indication for publication bias, though effects persisted even after most publication bias adjustments. The small sample of studies included limited our ability to draw definite conclusions regarding moderators, with inconclusive findings when applying different models. After compensating for low power, we found indication for moderation by role responsibility, perspective (self vs. others), outcome type, and study design. We hope this meta-analysis will inspire research on this phenomenon and applications to real-life, especially given the raging pandemic. Materials, data, and code are available on https://osf.io/9fcqm/.

Impact of past behaviour normality: meta-analysis of exceptionality effect.

Exceptionality effect is the phenomenon that people associate stronger negative affect with a negative outcome when it is a result of an exception (abnormal behaviour) compared to when it is a result of routine (normal behaviour). In this pre-registered meta-analysis, we examined exceptionality effect in 48 studies (N = 4212). An analysis of 35 experimental studies (n = 3332) showed medium to strong effect (g = 0.60, 95% confidence intervals (CI) [0.41, 0.79]) for past behaviour across several measures (regret/affect: g = 0.66, counterfactual thought: g = 0.39, self-blame: g = 0.44, victim compensation: g = 0.39, offender punishment: g = 0.51). An analysis of 13 one-sample studies presenting a comparison of exceptional and routine behaviours simultaneously (n = 1217) revealed a very strong exceptionality effect (converted g = 1.98, CI [1.57, 2.38]). We tested several theoretical moderators: norm strength, event controllability, outcome rarity, action versus inaction, and status quo. We found that exceptionality effect was stronger when the routine was aligned with the status quo option and with action rather than for inaction. All materials are available on: https://osf.io/542c7/.

What is normal? Dimensions of action-inaction normality and their impact on regret in the action-effect.

The widely-replicated action-effect describes a phenomenon in which negative outcomes are associated with higher regret when they are a result of action compared to inaction. The highly influential norm-theory theorised that the effect could be explained using the concept of normality, arguing that inaction is more "normal". I aimed to clarify the concept of normality and examine the impact on regret in the action-effect by contrasting three identified categories: past-behaviour normality, expectations normality, and social-norms normality. In three exploratory experiments (N1 = 213, N2 = 300, N3 = 303) and one concluding pre-registered combined experiment (N = 403) I found that the three normality categories had distinct effects with consistent medium to strong impact on regret in the action-effect (d = .51 to d = .85) and no interactions. Action-effect was significantly weakened into an inaction-effect in the joint effects of any two types of the three normality categories (d = 1.56-1.61) and with all three combined (d = 2.75). In total, I concluded three replications for effects of each of the normality dimensions, overall nine successful replications of previous findings. All materials, data, and code are available on https://osf.io/wmkpe/.

The impact of past behaviour normality on regret: replication and extension of three experiments of the exceptionality effect.

Norm theory (Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136-153) described a tendency for people to associate stronger regret with a negative outcome when it is a result of an exception (abnormal behaviour) compared to when it is a result of routine (normal behaviour). In two pre-registered studies, we conducted a replication and extension of three classic experiments on past behaviour exception/routine contrasts (N = 684). We successfully replicated Kahneman and Miller's (1986) experiments with the classic hitchhiker-scenario (Part 1) and car accident-scenario (Part 2). In both cases, participants examined negative outcomes and tended to indicate a protagonist who deviated from own past behaviour as more regretful than another who followed routine. Pre-registered extensions also showed effects for ratings of social norms, negative affect, and perceived luck. We did not find support for the Miller, D. T., and McFarland, C. [(1986). Counterfactual thinking and victim compensation: A test of norm theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 513-519] experiment robbery scenario (Part 3) using a compensation measure, in that compensation to a victim of a robbery was not significantly different comparing exceptional and routine circumstances. However, a pre-registered extension showed that robbery under exceptional circumstances was perceived as more regretful than robbery under routine circumstances. We discuss implications for current and future research.

Laypersons' Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism: New Insights Linking the Social Psychology and Experimental Philosophy Paradigms.

We linked between the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms for the study of folk intuitions and beliefs regarding the concept of free will to answer three questions: (1) What intuitions do people have about free will and determinism? (2) Do free will beliefs predict differences in free will and determinism intuitions? and (3) Is there more to free will and determinism than experiencing certainty or uncertainty about the nature of the universe? Overall, laypersons viewed the universe as allowing for human indeterminism, and they did so with certainty. Examining intuitions of prosociality, future orientation, learning, meaningfulness, human uniqueness, and well-being, ratings were highest in the indeterministic universe condition and lowest in the deterministic universe condition, both significantly different from the uncertain universe condition. Participants' free will beliefs had only weak impact on realism, happiness, and learning intuitions but did not reverse the general intuition favoring indeterminism and showed no impact on other intuitions.

When Action-Inaction Framing Leads to Higher Escalation of Commitment: A New Inaction-Effect Perspective on the Sunk-Cost Fallacy.

Escalation of commitment to a failing course of action occurs in the presence of (a) sunk costs, (b) negative feedback that things are deviating from expectations, and (c) a decision between escalation and de-escalation. Most of the literature to date has focused on sunk costs, yet we offer a new perspective on the classic escalation-of-commitment phenomenon by focusing on the impact of negative feedback. On the basis of the inaction-effect bias, we theorized that negative feedback results in the tendency to take action, regardless of what that action may be. In four experiments, we demonstrated that people facing escalation-decision situations were indeed action oriented and that framing escalation as action and de-escalation as inaction resulted in a stronger tendency to escalate than framing de-escalation as action and escalation as inaction (mini-meta-analysis effect d = 0.37, 95% confidence interval = [0.21, 0.53]).

Agency Beliefs Over Time and Across Cultures: Free Will Beliefs Predict Higher Job Satisfaction.

In three studies, we examined the relationship between free will beliefs and job satisfaction over time and across cultures. Study 1 examined 252 Taiwanese real-estate agents over a 3-months period. Study 2 examined job satisfaction for 137 American workers on an online labor market over a 6-months period. Study 3 extended to a large sample of 14,062 employees from 16 countries and examined country-level moderators. We found a consistent positive relationship between the belief in free will and job satisfaction. The relationship was above and beyond other agency constructs (Study 2), mediated by perceived autonomy (Studies 2-3), and stronger in countries with a higher national endorsement of the belief in free will (Study 3). We conclude that free-will beliefs predict outcomes over time and across cultures beyond other agency constructs. We call for more cross-cultural and longitudinal studies examining free-will beliefs as predictors of real-life outcomes.

Frankly, We Do Give a Damn: The Relationship Between Profanity and Honesty.

There are two conflicting perspectives regarding the relationship between profanity and dishonesty. These two forms of norm-violating behavior share common causes and are often considered to be positively related. On the other hand, however, profanity is often used to express one's genuine feelings and could therefore be negatively related to dishonesty. In three studies, we explored the relationship between profanity and honesty. We examined profanity and honesty first with profanity behavior and lying on a scale in the lab (Study 1; N = 276), then with a linguistic analysis of real-life social interactions on Facebook (Study 2; N = 73,789), and finally with profanity and integrity indexes for the aggregate level of U.S. states (Study 3; N = 50 states). We found a consistent positive relationship between profanity and honesty; profanity was associated with less lying and deception at the individual level and with higher integrity at the society level.

Norm theory and the action-effect: The role of social norms in regret following action and inaction.

The action-effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) is one of the most widely cited and replicated effects in the regret literature, showing that negative outcomes are regretted more when they are a result of action compared to inaction. Building on theoretical arguments by norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and the concept of normality, we examine the role of social norms for action and inaction in affecting regret. In four experiments we manipulated social norms and action-effect scenarios and found that social norms matter. For decisions resulting in negative outcomes, action is regretted more than inaction when social norms are for inaction, but when social norms are for action the effect is significantly weakened (Experiments 1 and 4) or reversed (Experiments 2 and 3).

Bad is freer than good: Positive-negative asymmetry in attributions of free will.

Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and others. In recalling everyday life situations and in classical decision making paradigms, negative actions, negatives outcomes, and negative framing were attributed higher free will than positive ones. Free will attributions were mainly driven by action or outcome valence, but not intent. These findings show consistent support for the idea that free will underlies laypersons' sense-making for accountability and change under negative circumstances.

Personality traits and personal values: a meta-analysis.

Personality traits and personal values are important psychological characteristics, serving as important predictors of many outcomes. Yet, they are frequently studied separately, leaving the field with a limited understanding of their relationships. We review existing perspectives regarding the nature of the relationships between traits and values and provide a conceptual underpinning for understanding the strength of these relationships. Using 60 studies, we present a meta-analysis of the relationships between the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality traits and the Schwartz values, and demonstrate consistent and theoretically meaningful relationships. However, these relationships were not generally large, demonstrating that traits and values are distinct constructs. We find support for our premise that more cognitively based traits are more strongly related to values and more emotionally based traits are less strongly related to values. Findings also suggest that controlling for personal scale-use tendencies in values is advisable.