Trust in the Food and Drug Administration: A National Survey Study.

Building trust in public health agencies like the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has become a key government priority. Understanding the roots of FDA mistrust is important if the agency is to develop targeted messaging and reforms aimed at building confidence in the agency. We conducted a survey of 2,021 respondents in the US probing attitudes toward the FDA. The primary outcome was FDA trust, defined as the mean score that each respondent assigned to the FDA across four prespecified axes: (1) competence and effectiveness; (2) commitment to acting in the best interests of the American public; (3) abiding by the rules and regulations set forth by policy or law; and (4) expertise in health, science, and medicine. On multivariable ordinal logistic regression, FDA mistrust was associated with female gender (odds ratio [OR] = 0.74, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.62-0.88), rural community (OR 0.85, 95% CI 0.75-0.96), conservative political views (OR 0.77, 95% CI 0.74-0.81), worse self-reported health (OR 0.89, 95% CI 0.80-0.98), lower satisfaction with health care received (OR 0.63, 95% CI 0.56-0.71), less attention to health and science news (OR 0.72, 95% CI 0.64-0.80), and not having children under the age of 18 (OR 0.72, 95% CI 0.60-0.86). These findings underscore the challenges faced by US political leaders in convincing a heterogeneous American public to trust the FDA. The FDA should develop and deploy targeted outreach strategies to populations with lower levels of trust and strengthen internal processes that minimize biases and ensure sound decision-making.

Leah Z. Rand, Daniel P. Carpenter, Aaron S. Kesselheim, Anushka Bhaskar, Jonathan J. Darrow, and William B. Feldman Reply.

The authors respond to a letter by Mitchell Berger in the March-April 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report concerning their essay "Securing the Trustworthiness of the FDA to Build Public Trust in Vaccines."

Delivery Device Patents on GLP-1 Receptor Agonists.

This study analyzed the US Food and Drug Administration­listed patents on glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists to determine their claim characteristics and the potential barriers they pose to generic entry.

Estimated Spending on Beremagene Geperpavec for Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa.

Importance: New gene therapies can offer substantial benefits to patients, particularly those with rare diseases who have few therapeutic options. In May 2023, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first topical gene therapy, beremagene geperpavec (B-VEC), for treating both autosomal recessive and autosomal dominant dystrophic epidermolysis bullosa (DEB). However, FDA approval was based on limited data in patients with autosomal dominant disease, even though they comprise approximately 50% of all DEB cases. Objective: To estimate projected spending in the US on B-VEC therapy for treating autosomal recessive and autosomal dominant DEB. Design, Setting, and Participants: This economic evaluation used data from the National Epidermolysis Bullosa Registry to estimate the current population of US patients with autosomal dominant and autosomal recessive DEB, with the aim of estimating US spending on B-VEC therapy from an all-payers perspective during 1- and 3-year periods after FDA approval. A base-case cost of $300 000 per patient per year was assumed based on a report from the manufacturer (Krystal Biotech). Exposure: Treatment with B-VEC. Main Outcomes and Measures: Estimated overall spending on B-VEC in the first year and over a 3-year period after FDA approval. Several prespecified sensitivity analyses with different assumptions about the eligible patient population and the cost of therapy were performed, and lifetime total costs of treatment per patient were estimated. Results: The estimated number of US patients with DEB who were eligible for treatment with B-VEC in the first year after FDA approval was 894. The estimated total expenditure for B-VEC therapy was $268 million (range, $179 million-$357 million). Over a 3-year period, estimated spending was $805 million (range, $537 million-$1.1 billion). Estimated lifetime total costs per patient were $15 million (range, $10 million-$20 million) per patient with autosomal recessive DEB and $17 million (range, $11 million-$22 million) for patients with autosomal dominant DEB. Conclusions and Relevance: Results of this economic evaluation suggest that the FDA's broad indication for the use of B-VEC in treating both autosomal recessive and autosomal dominant DEB will have significant implications for payers.

Biologic Patent Thickets and Terminal Disclaimers.

This study analyzes the use and timing of terminal disclaimers in all biologic patents involved in litigation from 2010 to 2023.

Cost of Exempting Sole Orphan Drugs From Medicare Negotiation.

Importance: The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) requires Medicare to negotiate prices for some high-spending drugs but exempts drugs approved solely for the treatment of a single rare disease. Objective: To estimate Medicare spending and global revenues for drugs that might have been exempt from negotiation from 2012 to 2021. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study analyzed drugs that met the IRA threshold for price negotiation (Medicare spending >$200 million/y) in any year from 2012 to 2021 and had an Orphan Drug Act designation. We stratified drugs into 4 mutually exclusive categories: approved for a single rare disease (sole orphan), approved for multiple rare diseases (multiorphan), initially approved for a rare disease and subsequently approved for a nonrare disease (orphan first), and initially approved for a nonrare disease and subsequently approved for a rare disease (non-orphan first). Outcomes: The primary outcomes were the number of sole orphan drugs, estimated Medicare spending on those drugs from 2012 to 2021, and global revenue since launch. Results: Among 282 drugs, 95 (34%) were approved to treat at least 1 rare disease, including 25 sole orphan drugs (26%), 20 multiorphan drugs (21%), 13 orphan first drugs (14%), and 37 non-orphan first drugs (39%). From 2012 to 2021, Medicare spending on sole orphan drugs increased from $3.4 billion to $10.0 billion. Each year, a median (IQR) of $2.5 ($1.9-$2.6) billion in Medicare spending would have been excluded from price negotiation because of the sole orphan exemption. The cumulative global revenue of the median (IQR) sole orphan drug was $11 ($6.6-$19.2) billion. Conclusions and Relevance: The sole orphan exemption will exclude billions of dollars of Medicare drug spending from price negotiation. The high level of global revenues achieved by these drugs, however, suggests that special exemption is unnecessary for them to achieve financial success. Congress could consider removing the sole orphan exemption to obtain additional savings for patients and taxpayers and to eliminate any potential disincentive for developing additional indications for these drugs.

Securing the Trustworthiness of the FDA to Build Public Trust in Vaccines.

The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the need to examine public trust in the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) vaccine approval process and the role of political influence in the FDA's decisions. Ensuring that the FDA is itself trustworthy is important for justifying public trust in its actions, like vaccine approvals, thereby promoting public health. We propose five conditions of trustworthiness that the FDA should meet when it reviews vaccines, even during emergencies: consistency with rules, proper expert or political decision-makers, proper decision-making and noninterference, connection to public preference, and transparency of both reasons and procedures. The five conditions provide a road map of procedural and substantive requirements, which the FDA has variably implemented, focused on ensuring appropriate influence of political interests. While being a trustworthy agency cannot guarantee the public's trust, implementing these conditions builds a groundwork for public trust.

Outcomes of the 340B Drug Pricing Program: A Scoping Review.

Importance: The 340B Drug Pricing Program requires manufacturers to offer discounted drug prices to support safety net hospitals and clinics (covered entities) providing care to low-income populations. Amid expansion, the program has received criticism and calls for reform. Objective: To assess the literature on the foundations of and outcomes associated with the 340B program. Evidence Review: The databases searched in this scoping review included PubMed, Embase, EconLit, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Westlaw, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (HHS-OIG) website, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) website, and Google in February 2023 for peer-reviewed literature, legal publications, opinion pieces, and government agency and committee reports related to the 340B program. Findings: Among a collected 900 documents, 289 met inclusion criteria: 83 articles from PubMed, 12 articles from Embase, 2 articles from EconLit, 1 article from NBER, 28 articles from Westlaw, 23 legislative history documents, 103 documents from Google, 11 GAO reports, and 26 HHS-OIG reports. Included literature pertained to 4 stakeholders in the 340B program: covered entities, pharmacies, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and patients. This literature showed that hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies generated revenue and manufacturers have forgone revenue from 340B discounted drugs. Audits of covered entities found low rates of compliance with 340B program requirements, whereas mixed evidence was uncovered on how covered entities used their 340B revenue, with some studies suggesting use to expand health care services for low-income populations and others to acquire physician practices and open sites in higher-income neighborhoods. These studies were hampered by a lack of transparency and reporting on the use of 340B revenue. Studies revealed patient benefits from access to expanded health care services, but there was mixed evidence on patient cost savings. Although the review identified considerable research on 340B hospitals, pharmacies, and patients, less research was found evaluating the 340B program's effect on nonhospital covered entities, drug pricing, and racial and ethnic minority groups. Conclusions and Relevance: In this scoping review of the 340B program, we found that the 340B program was associated with financial benefits for hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies; improved access to health care services for patients; and substantial costs to manufacturers. Increased transparency regarding the use of 340B program revenue and strengthened rulemaking and enforcement authority for the Health Resources and Services Administration would support compliance and help ensure the 340B program achieves its intended purposes.

Ancillary Product Patents to Extend Biologic Patent Life.

This study examines all patents associated with biologic litigation to understand how manufacturers use ancillary product patents to delay biosimilar market entry.

Patents and regulatory exclusivities on FDA-approved insulin products: A longitudinal database study, 1986-2019.

BACKGROUND: Insulin is the primary treatment for type 1 and some type 2 diabetes but remains costly in the United States, even though it was discovered more than a century ago. High prices can lead to nonadherence and are often sustained by patents and regulatory exclusivities that limit competition on brand-name products. We sought to examine how manufacturers have used patents and regulatory exclusivities on insulin products approved from 1986 to 2019 to extend periods of market exclusivity. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We used the publicly available Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) to identify all approved biosynthetic insulin products. Individual products approved under the same New Drug Application (NDA)-e.g., a vial and pen-were considered as separate products for the purposes of analysis. We recorded all patents and regulatory exclusivities listed in the Orange Book on each product and used Google Patents to extract the timing of patent application and whether patents were obtained on delivery devices or others aspects of the product. The primary outcome was the duration of expected protection, which was determined by subtracting the FDA approval date for each product from its last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity (whichever occurred later). We performed a secondary analysis that considered overall protection on insulin lines-defined as groups of products approved under the same NDA with the same active ingredients manufactured by the same company. We also examined competition from follow-on insulin products-defined as products approved with the same active ingredients as originators but manufactured by different companies (approved via a specific drug approval pathway under section 505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). During the study period, the FDA approved 56 individual products across 25 different insulin lines and 5 follow-ons across 3 different insulin lines. Thirty-three (59%) of the 56 products were drug-device combinations. Manufacturers of 9 products approved during the study period obtained patents filed after FDA approval that extended their duration of expected protection (by a median of 6 years). Approximately 63% of all patents on drug-device combinations approved during the study period were related to delivery devices. The median duration of expected protection on insulin products was 16.0 years, and the median protection on insulin lines was 17.6 years. An important limitation of our analysis is that manufacturers may continue to add patents on existing insulin products while competitors may challenge patents; therefore, periods of protection may change over time. CONCLUSIONS: Among several strategies that insulin manufacturers have employed to extend periods of market exclusivity on brand-name insulin products are filing patents after FDA approval and obtaining a large number of patents on delivery devices. Policy reforms are needed to promote timely competition in the pharmaceutical market and ensure that patients have access to low-cost drugs.

The Problem of Limited-Supply Agreements for Medicare Price Negotiation.

This Viewpoint discusses how limited-supply agreements (introduction of generic products in reduced volumes) might thwart efforts to negotiate lower prices on prescription drugs in the US.

Changes in the Number of Continuation Patents on Drugs Approved by the FDA.

This study assesses the frequency of continuation patents on brand-name drugs approved by the US Food and Drug Administration from 2000 to 2015.

Comparative Effectiveness and Safety of Generic Versus Brand-Name Fluticasone-Salmeterol to Treat Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease.

BACKGROUND: In 2019, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first generic maintenance inhaler for asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The inhaler, Wixela Inhub (fluticasone-salmeterol; Viatris), is a substitutable version of the dry powder inhaler Advair Diskus (fluticasone-salmeterol; GlaxoSmithKline). When approving complex generic products like inhalers, the FDA applies a special "weight-of-evidence" approach. In this case, manufacturers were required to perform a randomized controlled trial in patients with asthma but not COPD, although the product received approval for both indications. OBJECTIVE: To compare the effectiveness and safety of generic (Wixela Inhub) and brand-name (Advair Diskus) fluticasone-salmeterol among patients with COPD treated in routine care. DESIGN: A 1:1 propensity score-matched cohort study. SETTING: A large, longitudinal health care database. PATIENTS: Adults older than 40 years with a diagnosis of COPD. MEASUREMENTS: Incidence of first moderate or severe COPD exacerbation (effectiveness outcome) and incidence of first pneumonia hospitalization (safety outcome) in the 365 days after cohort entry. RESULTS: Among 45 369 patients (27 305 Advair Diskus users and 18 064 Wixela Inhub users), 10 012 matched pairs were identified for the primary analysis. Compared with Advair Diskus use, Wixela Inhub use was associated with a nearly identical incidence of first moderate or severe COPD exacerbation (hazard ratio [HR], 0.97 [95% CI, 0.90 to 1.04]) and first pneumonia hospitalization (HR, 0.99 [CI, 0.86 to 1.15]). LIMITATIONS: Follow-up times were short, reflecting real-world clinical practice. The possibility of residual confounding cannot be completely excluded. CONCLUSION: Use of generic and brand-name fluticasone-salmeterol was associated with similar outcomes among patients with COPD treated in routine practice. PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE: National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.

Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities on GLP-1 Receptor Agonists.

Importance: Glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP-1) receptor agonists were first approved for the treatment of type 2 diabetes in 2005. Demand for these drugs has increased rapidly in recent years, as indications have expanded, but they remain expensive. Objective: To analyze how manufacturers of brand-name GLP-1 receptor agonists have used the patent and regulatory systems to extend periods of market exclusivity. Evidence Review: The annual US Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations was used to identify GLP-1 receptor agonists approved from 2005 to 2021 and to record patents and nonpatent statutory exclusivities listed for each product. Google Patents was used to extract additional data on patents, including whether each was obtained on the delivery device or another aspect of the product. The primary outcome was the duration of expected protection from generic competition, defined as the time elapsed from FDA approval until expiration of the last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity. Findings: On the 10 GLP-1 receptor agonists included in the cohort, drug manufacturers listed with the FDA a median of 19.5 patents (IQR, 9.0-25.8) per product, including a median of 17 patents (IQR, 8.3-22.8) filed before FDA approval and 1.5 (IQR, 0-2.8) filed after FDA approval. Fifty-four percent of all patents listed on GLP-1 receptor agonists were on the delivery devices rather than active ingredients. Manufacturers augmented patent protection with a median of 2 regulatory exclusivities (IQR, 0-3) obtained at approval and 1 (IQR, 0.3-4.3) added after approval. The median total duration of expected protection after FDA approval, when accounting for both preapproval and postapproval patents and regulatory exclusivities, was 18.3 years (IQR, 16.0-19.4). No generic firm has successfully challenged patents on GLP-1 receptor agonists to gain FDA approval. Conclusions and Relevance: Patent and regulatory reform is needed to ensure timely generic entry of GLP-1 receptor agonists to the market.

High Cost of Chimeric Antigen Receptor T-Cells: Challenges and Solutions.

Chimeric antigen receptor (CAR) T-cells are a cellular immunotherapy with remarkable efficacy in treating multiple hematologic malignancies but they are associated with extremely high prices that are, for many countries, prohibitively expensive. As their use increases both for hematologic malignancies and other indications, and large numbers of new cellular therapies are developed, novel approaches will be needed both to reduce the cost of therapy, and to pay for them. We review the many factors that lead to the high cost of CAR T-cells and offer proposals for reform.