Is Dignity Still Necessary in Health Care? From Definition to Recognition of Human Dignity.

The concept of dignity is not, as some scholars claim, an unnecessary moral idea, and nor need it have religious overtones or be characterised by speciesism. In this article, I try to show that dignity can be defined and recognised. The starting point for the argumentation is the four typologies of dignity, which show that the term 'dignity' can denote significantly different concepts, and that the different concepts of dignity can have significantly different ontological senses. A unified typology of dignity allows for five categories to be distinguished: inherent dignity, dignity based on changeable qualities, moral dignity, bestowed dignity and comportment dignity. I take the first two categories of dignity as the object of the analysis, with which I seek to formulate a philosophical response to the charge of speciesism and to show on what basis it can be maintained that all human beings possess dignity. To this end, I distinguish between existential dignity, actual dignity, and potential dignity. Distinguishing these types of dignity becomes possible in the light of Aquinas' and Aristotle's views. In the final section, I point to two ways of recognising dignity. The first is based on certain narratives and emotional states ('ecumenical model of dignity'), while the second is related to a specific moral experience developed within ethical personalism.

Is it true that all human beings have dignity?

The discussion around dignity in nursing philosophy has been underway for many years. The literature still lacks philosophical arguments that would justify the thesis that all people have dignity. Scholars who defend dignity as an intrinsic value most often refer to Kant. However, Kant does not seem to be the most suitable candidate to defend the thesis that all human beings possess dignity. In this paper, I attempt to show that Aristotle's and Aquinas's views can help justify this thesis. To this end, I distinguish between actual dignity, potential dignity, and existential dignity. I state that all human beings have existential dignity or potential dignity.

Why the term 'persistent therapy' is not worse than the term 'medical futility'.

The discussion around the use of the term 'medical futility' began in the late 1980s. The Polish Working Group on End-of-Life Ethics (PWG) joined this discussion in 2008. They offered their own approach to the issues regarding medical futility based on the category of persistent therapy. According to the PWG, 'persistent therapy is the use of medical procedures to maintain the life function of the terminally ill in a way that prolongs their dying, introducing excessive suffering or violating their dignity'. In this paper I attempt to show that the term 'persistent therapy' is neither worse nor better than the term 'medical futility', but it captures different aspects and nuances. Additionally, the Polish social and religious background plays a significant role in shaping the category of persistent therapy.

Four philosophical images of man and nursing from Krapiec's perspective.

The article describes Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec's perspective on four classic philosophical images of man and the resulting theoretical and practical implications for the nursing profession. The first three images, namely man as a set of elements, man as a soul imprisoned in the body and man as a rational animal, are regarded by Krapiec as reductionist anthropologies and are thus inadequate for nursing. The first image reduces man to a biological element. The second one reduces man to a soul and treats a body as something an obstacle in personal development. The third image absolutizes reason in man. While the body is not rejected in this image, it is viewed as an indifferent mass. The last image, which regards man as a person, is an adequate image for nursing. The exceptional character of man emphasized in this image is determined by the following personal qualities: the ability for cognition, freedom, love, religiousness, dignity, subjectivity to law and completeness. These characteristics reveal the specificity of personal being in both the body and the spirit. By viewing man as a person, a nurse discovers a wide range of possibilities of providing effective help to the patient.

Albert Mieczyslaw Krapiec's theory of the person for professional nursing practice.

This article presents the works of great Polish philosopher, Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec, whose creative output can be applied to professional nursing practice. Krapiec's philosophical heritage is extensive and encompasses many philosophical fields: metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of law, philosophy of culture, philosophy of politics and philosophy of language. Krapiec created an original philosophical synthesis characterized by a realistic approach. In this paper, I present only one of several original philosophical concepts developed by Krapiec: the theory of the person based on seven essential characteristics, that is the ability for cognition, love, freedom, religion, legal subjectivity, completeness and dignity. I attempt to show how these personal characteristics correspond to various patient needs. I argue that the qualitative deficit of any personal characteristics indicated by Krapiec corresponds to a patient's real need that must be satisfied. I also stress that the skilful diagnosing of all-not only selected-qualitative deficits of characteristics can be defined as holistic care in the nursing profession.