The role of affect in determining the attributional weight of immoral behaviors.

Theories about why immoral behaviors carry a large amount of attributional weight tend to emphasize traditional cognitive variables. In contrast, the authors propose that the degree of negative affect that these behaviors induce in observers is largely responsible for their attributional weight. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate an association between the amount of negative affect induced by immoral behaviors and their attributional weight. Studies 3 and 4 provide causal evidence for this idea by either "adding in" or "taking away" the negative affect associated with immoral behaviors to influence their attributional weight. Finally, Study 5 demonstrates that negative affect can be induced through a variety of negative emotions (disgust, sadness, and fear), with similar results. It is argued that it is difficult to account for these data solely on the basis of traditional cognitive variables, and so a theory that includes an emphasis on affect as a causal variable is desirable.

Affective and cognitive control of persons and behaviours.

Three studies assessed the relative contribution of affect and cognition to determining behavioural intentions for a variety of behaviours using both between-participants and within-participants analyses. The between-participants analyses showed that affect tends to make more of a contribution than does cognition for more behaviours. However, the within-participants analyses indicated that there are strong individual differences among people. Some people are more under affective control, across behaviours, whereas other people are more under cognitive control. The most interesting finding was that, despite the potential independence of between-participants and within-participants analyses (Mischela, 1990), between-participants analyses on subsamples created from the within-participants analyses showed significant dependence. The predictive validity of affect vs. cognition depended upon whether participants were affectively or cognitively controlled.

Evidence that the type of person affects the strength of the perceived behavioural control-intention relationship.

This study examined the role of person type in explaining the relationship between perceived behavioural control and behavioural intentions. Participants (N = 187) completed measures of the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) variables regarding 30 behaviours. Within-participants analyses demonstrated that intentions were more strongly predicted by perceived behavioural control (PBC) than a combination of attitudes and subjective norms among a minority of the sample. When these 'PBC controlled' participants were considered separately, the effects for perceived behavioural control obtained in previous between-participants analyses were augmented. Conversely, when these participants were excluded from the sample, the effects of perceived behavioural control were reduced. PBC control was also modestly associated with dispositional measures of perceived controllability. Overall, the findings indicate that the strength of the perceived behavioural control-intention relationship depends not only on the type of behaviour but also on the type of person.

The prediction of attitudes from beliefs and evaluations: the logic of the double negative.

One of the most intriguing aspects of Fishbein's (e.g. 1980) theory of reasoned action is the logic of the double negative: if a behaviour is thought to be unlikely to result in a negatively evaluated consequence, then the product of the two negatives (an unlikely consequence that is negatively valued) is thought to provide an impetus for the formation of a positive attitude towards the behaviour. The present experiment tested two derivations from the logic of the double negative. First, according to this logic, whether beliefs and evaluations are positively or negatively framed should not affect their ability to predict attitudes. Second, the multiplicative assumption of this logic (a negative x negative = a positive) suggests that a multiplicative model should be a superior predictor of attitudes compared to an additive model that does not allow for the logic of the double negative. The obtained findings contradicted both of these predictions.

Evidence that perceived behavioural control is a multidimensional construct: perceived control and perceived difficulty.

Four studies were performed to test whether Ajzen's (1988, 1991) concept of perceived behavioural control is really an amalgamation of two variables, which we term 'perceived control' and 'perceived difficulty'. Perceived control refers to the extent to which people consider the performance of a behaviour to be under their voluntary control. Perceived difficulty refers to whether people consider a behaviour to be easy or difficult to perform, Findings from Studies 1 to 4 demonstrate that it is possible to perform manipulations that affect perceived control more than perceived difficulty, or that affect perceived difficulty more than perceived control. Studies 2-4 used a variety of paradigms to show that people distinguish between beliefs that are presumed to underlie perceived control and perceived difficulty. Finally, we performed a meta-analysis in Study 5 to determine whether perceived control or perceived difficulty is more important for predicting behavioural intentions and behaviours. Taken together, the findings support the distinction between perceived control and perceived difficulty, and also suggest that perceived difficulty is a better predictor of most behavioural intentions and behaviours than is perceived control.