A systematic review of the ambivalent sexism literature: Hostile sexism protects men's power; benevolent sexism guards traditional gender roles.

According to ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996), the coexistence of gendered power differences and mutual interdependence creates two apparently opposing but complementary sexist ideologies: hostile sexism (HS; viewing women as manipulative competitors who seek to gain power over men) coincides with benevolent sexism (BS; a chivalrous view of women as pure and moral, yet weak and passive, deserving men's protection and admiration, as long as they conform). The research on these ideologies employs the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, used extensively in psychology and allied disciplines, often to understand the roles sexist attitudes play in reinforcing gender inequality. Following contemporary guidelines, this systematic review utilizes a principled approach to synthesize the multidisciplinary empirical literature on ambivalent sexism. After screening 1,870 potentially relevant articles and fully reviewing 654 eligible articles, five main domains emerge in ambivalent sexism research (social ideologies, violence, workplace, stereotypes, intimate relationships). The accumulating evidence across domains offers bottom-up empirical support for ambivalent sexism as a coordinated system to maintain control over women (and sometimes men). Hostile sexism acts through the direct and diverse paths of envious/resentful prejudices, being more sensitive to power and sexuality cues; Benevolent sexism acts through prejudices related to interdependence (primarily gender-based paternalism and gender-role differentiation), enforcing traditional gender relations and being more sensitive to role-related cues. Discussion points to common methodological limitations, suggests guidelines, and finds future avenues for ambivalent sexism research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Erratum: Humans perceive warmth and competence in artificial intelligence.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.107256.].

Humans perceive warmth and competence in artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence (A.I.) increasingly suffuses everyday life. However, people are frequently reluctant to interact with A.I. systems. This challenges both the deployment of beneficial A.I. technology and the development of deep learning systems that depend on humans for oversight, direction, and regulation. Nine studies (N = 3,300) demonstrate that social-cognitive processes guide human interactions across a diverse range of real-world A.I. systems. Across studies, perceived warmth and competence emerge prominently in participants' impressions of A.I. systems. Judgments of warmth and competence systematically depend on human-A.I. interdependence and autonomy. In particular, participants perceive systems that optimize interests aligned with human interests as warmer and systems that operate independently from human direction as more competent. Finally, a prisoner's dilemma game shows that warmth and competence judgments predict participants' willingness to cooperate with a deep-learning system. These results underscore the generality of intent detection to perceptions of a broad array of algorithmic actors.

Valence biases and emergence in the stereotype content of intersecting social categories.

People belong to multiple social groups simultaneously. However, much remains to be learned about the rich semantic perceptions of multiply-categorized targets. Two pretests and three main studies (n = 1,116) compare perceptions of single social categories to perceptions of two intersecting social categories. Unlike previous research focusing on specific social categories (e.g., race and age), our studies involve intersections from a large sample of salient societal groups. Study 1 provides evidence for biased information integration (vs. averaging), such that ratings of intersecting categories were more similar to the constituent with more negative and more extreme (either very positive or very negative) stereotypes. Study 2 indicates that negativity and extremity also bias spontaneous perceptions of intersectional targets, including dimensions beyond Warmth and Competence. Study 3 shows that the prevalence of emergent properties (i.e., traits attributed to intersecting categories but not the constituents) is greater for novel targets and targets with incongruent constituent stereotypes (e.g., one constituent is stereotyped as high Status and the other as low Status). Finally, Study 3 suggests that emergent (vs. present in constituents) perceptions are more negative and tend to be more about Morality and idiosyncratic content and less about Competence or Sociability. Our findings advance understanding about perceptions of multiply-categorized targets, information integration, and the connection between theories of process (e.g., individuation) and content. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A spontaneous stereotype content model: Taxonomy, properties, and prediction.

The spontaneous stereotype content model (SSCM) describes a comprehensive taxonomy, with associated properties and predictive value, of social-group beliefs that perceivers report in open-ended responses. Four studies (N = 1,470) show the utility of spontaneous stereotypes, compared to traditional, prompted, scale-based stereotypes. Using natural language processing text analyses, Study 1 shows the most common spontaneous stereotype dimensions for salient social groups. Our results confirm existing stereotype models' dimensions, while uncovering a significant prevalence of dimensions that these models do not cover, such as Health, Appearance, and Deviance. The SSCM also characterizes the valence, direction, and accessibility of reported dimensions (e.g., Ability stereotypes are mostly positive, but Morality stereotypes are mostly negative; Sociability stereotypes are provided later than Ability stereotypes in a sequence of open-ended responses). Studies 2 and 3 check the robustness of these findings by: using a larger sample of social groups, varying time pressure, and diversifying analytical strategies. Study 3 also establishes the value of spontaneous stereotypes: compared to scales alone, open-ended measures improve predictions of attitudes toward social groups. Improvement in attitude prediction results partially from a more comprehensive taxonomy as well as a construct we refer to as stereotype representativeness: the prevalence of a stereotype dimension in perceivers' spontaneous beliefs about a social group. Finally, Study 4 examines how the taxonomy provides additional insight into stereotypes' influence on decision-making in socially relevant scenarios. Overall, spontaneous content broadens our understanding of stereotyping and intergroup relations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Globally Inaccurate Stereotypes Can Result From Locally Adaptive Exploration.

Inaccurate stereotypes-perceived differences among groups that do not actually differ-are prevalent and consequential. Past research explains stereotypes as emerging from a range of factors, including motivational biases, cognitive limitations, and information deficits. Considering the minimal forces required to produce inaccurate assumptions about group differences, we found that locally adaptive exploration is sufficient: An initial arbitrary interaction, if rewarding enough, may discourage people from investigating alternatives that would be equal or better. Historical accidents can snowball into globally inaccurate generalizations, and inaccurate stereotypes can emerge in the absence of real group differences. Using multiarmed-bandit models, we found that the mere act of choosing among groups with the goal of maximizing the long-term benefit of interactions is enough to produce inaccurate assessments of different groups. This phenomenon was reproduced in two large online experiments with English-speaking adults (N = 2,404), which demonstrated a minimal process that suffices to produce biased impressions.

Relational versus structural goals prioritize different social information.

People gather information about others along a few fundamental dimensions; their current goals determine which dimensions they most need to know. As proponents of competing social-evaluation models, we sought to study the dimensions that perceivers spontaneously prioritize when gathering information about unknown social groups. Because priorities depend on functions, having relational goals (e.g., deciding whether and how to interact with a group) versus structural goals (e.g., getting an overview of society) should moderate dimensional priorities. Various candidate dimensions could differentiate perceivers' impressions of social groups. For example, the Stereotype Content model argues that people evaluate others in terms of their Warmth (i.e., their Sociability and Morality) and Competence (i.e., their Ability and Assertiveness). Alternatively, the Agency-Beliefs-Communion (ABC) model proposes conservative-progressive Beliefs. Five studies (N = 2,268) found that participants consistently prioritized learning about targets' Warmth. However, goal moderated priority: When participants had a relational goal, such as an unknown group increasing in their neighborhood, they showed more interest in targets' Sociability, a facet of Warmth. When participants had a structural goal, such as an unknown group increasing in their nation, they showed more interest in the groups' Beliefs, as well as increased interest in Competence-related facets. Diverse methods reveal interest in all dimensions, reconciling discrepancies among social-evaluation models by identifying how relational versus structural goals differentiate priorities of the fundamental dimensions proposed by current models. Results have implications for fundamental dimensions of social cognition, more generally. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Stories in Action.

Stories have played a central role in human social and political life for thousands of years. Despite their ubiquity in culture and custom, however, they feature only peripherally in formal government policymaking. Government policy has tended to rely on tools with more predictable responses-incentives, transfers, and prohibitions. We argue that stories can and should feature more centrally in government policymaking. We lay out how stories can make policy more effective, specifying how they complement established policy tools. We provide a working definition of stories' key characteristics, contrasting them with other forms of communication. We trace the evolution of stories from their ancient origins to their role in mediating the impact of modern technologies on society. We then provide an account of the mechanisms underlying stories' impacts on their audiences. We conclude by describing three functions of stories-learning, persuasion, and collective action.

Systemic racism: individuals and interactions, institutions and society.

Systemic racism is a scientifically tractable phenomenon, urgent for cognitive scientists to address. This tutorial reviews the built-in systems that undermine life opportunities and outcomes by racial category, with a focus on challenges to Black Americans. From American colonial history, explicit practices and policies reinforced disadvantage across all domains of life, beginning with slavery, and continuing with vastly subordinated status. Racially segregated housing creates racial isolation, with disproportionate costs to Black Americans' opportunities, networks, education, wealth, health, and legal treatment. These institutional and societal systems build-in individual bias and racialized interactions, resulting in systemic racism. Unconscious inferences, empirically established from perceptions onward, demonstrate non-Black Americans' inbuilt associations: pairing Black Americans with negative valences, criminal stereotypes, and low status, including animal rather than human. Implicit racial biases (improving only slightly over time) imbed within non-Black individuals' systems of racialized beliefs, judgments, and affect that predict racialized behavior. Interracial interactions likewise convey disrespect and distrust. These systematic individual and interpersonal patterns continue partly due to non-Black people's inexperience with Black Americans and reliance on societal caricatures. Despite systemic challenges, Black Americans are more diverse now than ever, due to resilience (many succeeding against the odds), immigration (producing varied backgrounds), and intermarriage (increasing the multiracial proportion of the population). Intergroup contact can foreground Black diversity, resisting systemic racism, but White advantages persist in all economic, political, and social domains. Cognitive science has an opportunity: to include in its study of the mind the distortions of reality about individual humans and their social groups.

Cosmopolitan morality trades off in-group for the world, separating benefits and protection.

Global cooperation rests on popular endorsement of cosmopolitan values-putting all humanity equal to or ahead of conationals. Despite being comparative judgments that may trade off, even sacrifice, the in-group's interests for the rest of the world, moral cosmopolitanism finds support in large, nationally representative surveys from Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Japan, the United States, Colombia, and Guatemala. A series of studies probe this trading off of the in-group's interests against the world's interests. Respondents everywhere distinguish preventing harm to foreign citizens, which almost all support, from redistributing resources, which only about half support. These two dimensions of moral cosmopolitanism, equitable security (preventing harm) and equitable benefits (redistributing resources), predict attitudes toward contested international policies, actual charitable donations, and preferences for mask and vaccine allocations in the COVID-19 response. The dimensions do not reflect several demographic variables and only weakly reflect political ideology. Moral cosmopolitanism also differs from related psychological constructs such as group identity. Finally, to understand the underlying thought structures, natural language processing reveals cognitive associations underlying moral cosmopolitanism (e.g., world, both) versus the alternative, parochial moral mindset (e.g., USA, first). Making these global or local terms accessible introduces an effective intervention that at least temporarily leads more people to behave like moral cosmopolitans.

Navigating the social world: Toward an integrated framework for evaluating self, individuals, and groups.

Social evaluation occurs at personal, interpersonal, group, and intergroup levels, with competing theories and evidence. Five models engage in adversarial collaboration, to identify common conceptual ground, ongoing controversies, and continuing agendas: Dual Perspective Model (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007); Behavioral Regulation Model (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007); Dimensional Compensation Model (Yzerbyt et al., 2005); Stereotype Content Model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002); and Agency-Beliefs-Communion Model (Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016). Each has distinctive focus, theoretical roots, premises, and evidence. Controversies dispute dimensions: number, organization, definition, and labeling; their relative priority; and their relationship. Our first integration suggests 2 fundamental dimensions: Vertical (agency, competence, "getting ahead") and Horizontal (communion, warmth, "getting along"), with respective facets of ability and assertiveness (Vertical) and friendliness and morality (Horizontal). Depending on context, a third dimension is conservative versus progressive Beliefs. Second, different criteria for priority favor different dimensions: processing speed and subjective weight (Horizontal); pragmatic diagnosticity (Vertical); moderators include number and type of target, target-perceiver relationship, context. Finally, the relation between dimensions has similar operational moderators. As an integrative framework, the dimensions' dynamics also depend on perceiver goals (comprehension, efficiency, harmony, compatibility), each balancing top-down and bottom-up processes, for epistemic or hedonic functions. One emerging insight is that the nature and number of targets each of these models typically examines alters perceivers' evaluative goal and how bottom-up information or top-down inferences interact. This framework benefits theoretical parsimony and new research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Race-status associations: Distinct effects of three novel measures among White and Black perceivers.

Race is fraught with meaning, but unequal status is central. Race-status associations (RSAs) link White Americans with high status and Black Americans with low status. RSAs could occur via observation of racially distributed jobs, perceived status-related stereotypic attributes, or simple ranking. Nine samples (N = 3,933) validate 3 novel measures of White = high status/Black = low status RSAs-based on jobs, rank, and attributes. First, RSA measures showed clear factor structure, internal validity, and test-retest reliability. Second, these measures differentially corresponded to White Americans' hierarchy-maintaining attitudes, beliefs, and preferences. Potentially based on observation, the more spontaneous Job-based RSAs predicted interracial bias, social dominance orientation, meritocracy beliefs, and hierarchy-maintaining hiring or policy preferences. Preference effects held after controlling for bias and support for the status quo. In contrast, the more deliberate Rank- and Attribute-based RSAs negatively predicted hierarchy-maintaining beliefs and policy preferences; direct inferences of racial inequality linked to preferences for undoing it. Third, Black = low status, rather than White = high status, associations largely drove these effects. Finally, Black Americans also held RSAs; Rank- or Attribute-based RSAs predicted increased perceived discrimination, reduced social dominance, and reduced meritocracy beliefs. Although individuals' RSAs vary, only White Americans' Job-based stratifying associations help maintain racial status hierarchies. Theory-guided evidence of race-status associations introduces powerful new assessment tools. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Social Cognition evolves: Illustrations from our work on Intergroup Bias and on Healthy Adaptation.

When we first wrote Social Cognition (1984), social psychology's crisis critiqued methods, replicability, theory, and relevance. Social cognition research illustrates four phases of response to these challenges. First, the Cognitive Miser approach introduced methods less prone to experimenter or participant interference: looking time as attention, categorical memory for who said what. Next, the Motivated Tactician approach addressed replicability by identifying moderator variables, primarily goals and motivations. For example, interdependence (Fiske) and threat (Taylor) are prominent motivations in our respective research. The third wave, perceivers as Activated Actors, translated mental states to behavior, using theory-guided prediction. In intergroup bias, for example, Fiske's Stereotype Content Model predicts patterns of discriminatory behavior distinctive to each combination of stereotypic warmth and competence. Going beyond reported behavior, distinctive activations emerged in brain-imaging and muscle responses. In health psychology, Taylor's Positive Illusions theory predicts people cope with life-threatening illness by viewing the odds optimistically, the self positively, and possible control affirmatively. Again, the social cognitive processes interplay with psycho-physiology. Recently, social cognitive approaches have increasingly addressed inequality: health disparities, bias interventions, power dynamics, class effects, social morality, and intent inferences. Viewing perceivers as Inequality Enablers answers any remaining doubts about the field's continuing relevance.

Research priorities for the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond: A call to action for psychological science.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) that has caused the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic represents the greatest international biopsychosocial emergency the world has faced for a century, and psychological science has an integral role to offer in helping societies recover. The aim of this paper is to set out the shorter- and longer-term priorities for research in psychological science that will (a) frame the breadth and scope of potential contributions from across the discipline; (b) enable researchers to focus their resources on gaps in knowledge; and (c) help funders and policymakers make informed decisions about future research priorities in order to best meet the needs of societies as they emerge from the acute phase of the pandemic. The research priorities were informed by an expert panel convened by the British Psychological Society that reflects the breadth of the discipline; a wider advisory panel with international input; and a survey of 539 psychological scientists conducted early in May 2020. The most pressing need is to research the negative biopsychosocial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic to facilitate immediate and longer-term recovery, not only in relation to mental health, but also in relation to behaviour change and adherence, work, education, children and families, physical health and the brain, and social cohesion and connectedness. We call on psychological scientists to work collaboratively with other scientists and stakeholders, establish consortia, and develop innovative research methods while maintaining high-quality, open, and rigorous research standards.

As diversity increases, people paradoxically perceive social groups as more similar.

With globalization and immigration, societal contexts differ in sheer variety of resident social groups. Social diversity challenges individuals to think in new ways about new kinds of people and where their groups all stand, relative to each other. However, psychological science does not yet specify how human minds represent social diversity, in homogeneous or heterogenous contexts. Mental maps of the array of society's groups should differ when individuals inhabit more and less diverse ecologies. Nonetheless, predictions disagree on how they should differ. Confirmation bias suggests more diversity means more stereotype dispersion: With increased exposure, perceivers' mental maps might differentiate more among groups, so their stereotypes would spread out (disperse). In contrast, individuation suggests more diversity means less stereotype dispersion, as perceivers experience within-group variety and between-group overlap. Worldwide, nationwide, individual, and longitudinal datasets (n = 12,011) revealed a diversity paradox: More diversity consistently meant less stereotype dispersion. Both contextual and perceived ethnic diversity correlate with decreased stereotype dispersion. Countries and US states with higher levels of ethnic diversity (e.g., South Africa and Hawaii, versus South Korea and Vermont), online individuals who perceive more ethnic diversity, and students who moved to more ethnically diverse colleges mentally represent ethnic groups as more similar to each other, on warmth and competence stereotypes. Homogeneity shows more-differentiated stereotypes; ironically, those with the least exposure have the most-distinct stereotypes. Diversity means less-differentiated stereotypes, as in the melting pot metaphor. Diversity and reduced dispersion also correlate positively with subjective wellbeing.