Action initiation and action inhibition follow the same time course when compared under matched experimental conditions.

The ability to initiate an action quickly when needed and the ability to cancel an impending action are both fundamental to action control. It is often presumed that they are qualitatively distinct processes, yet they have largely been studied in isolation and little is known about how they relate to one another. Comparing previous experimental results shows a similar time course for response initiation and response inhibition. However, the exact time course varies widely depending on experimental conditions, including the frequency of different trial types and the urgency to respond. For example, in the stop-signal task, where both action initiation and action inhibition are involved and could be compared, action inhibition is typically found to be much faster. However, this apparent difference is likely due to there being much greater urgency to inhibit an action than to initiate one in order to avoid failing at the task. This asymmetry in the urgency between action initiation and action inhibition makes it impossible to compare their relative time courses in a single task. Here, we demonstrate that when action initiation and action inhibition are measured separately under conditions that are matched as closely as possible, their speeds are not distinguishable and are positively correlated across participants. Our results raise the possibility that action initiation and action inhibition may not necessarily be qualitatively distinct processes but may instead reflect complementary outcomes of a single decision process determining whether or not to act.NEW & NOTEWORTHY The time courses of initiating an action and canceling an action have largely been studied in isolation, and little is known about their relationship. Here, we show that when measured under comparable conditions the speeds of action initiation and action inhibition are the same. This finding raises the possibility that these two functions may be more closely related than previously assumed, with potentially important implications for their underlying neural basis.

Dissociable Codes in Motor Working Memory.

Working memory has been comprehensively studied in sensory domains, like vision, but little attention has been paid to how motor information (e.g., kinematics of recent movements) is maintained and manipulated in working memory. "Motor working memory" (MWM) is important for short-term behavioral control and skill learning. Here, we employed tasks that required participants to encode and recall reaching movements over short timescales. We conducted three experiments (N = 65 undergraduates) to examine MWM under varying cognitive loads, delays, and degrees of interference. The results support a model of MWM that includes an abstract code that flexibly transfers across effectors, and an effector-specific code vulnerable to interfering movements, even when interfering movements are irrelevant to the task. Neither code was disrupted by increasing visuospatial working memory load. These results echo distinctions between representational formats in other domains, suggesting that MWM shares a basic computational structure with other working memory subsystems.

A common format for representing spatial location in visual and motor working memory.

Does the mind rely on similar systems of spatial representation for both perception and action? Here, we assessed the format of location representations in two simple spatial localization tasks. In one task, participants simply remembered the location of an item based solely on visual input. In another, participants remembered the location of a point in space based solely on kinesthetic input. Participants' recall errors were more consistent with the use of polar coordinates than Cartesian coordinates in both tasks. Moreover, measures of spatial bias and performance were correlated across modalities. In a subsequent study, we tested the flexibility with which people use polar coordinates to represent space; we show that the format in which the information is presented to participants influences how that information is encoded and the errors that are made as a result. We suggest that polar coordinates may be a common means of representing location information across visual and motor modalities, but that these representations are also flexible in form.

Metacognitive judgments during visuomotor learning reflect the integration of error history.

People form metacognitive representations of their own abilities across a range of tasks. How these representations are influenced by errors during learning is poorly understood. Here, we ask how metacognitive confidence judgments of performance during motor learning are shaped by the learner's recent history of errors. Across four motor learning experiments, our computational modeling approach demonstrated that people's confidence judgments are best explained by a recency-weighted averaging of visually observed errors. Moreover, in the formation of these confidence estimates, people appear to reweight observed motor errors according to a subjective cost function. Confidence judgments were adaptive, incorporating recent motor errors in a manner that was sensitive to the volatility of the learning environment, integrating a shallower history when the environment was more volatile. Finally, confidence tracked motor errors in the context of both implicit and explicit motor learning but only showed evidence of influencing behavior in the latter. Our study thus provides a novel descriptive model that successfully approximates the dynamics of metacognitive judgments during motor learning.NEW & NOTEWORTHY This study examined how, during visuomotor learning, people's confidence in their performance is shaped by their recent history of errors. Using computational modeling, we found that confidence incorporated recent error history, tracked subjective error costs, was sensitive to environmental volatility, and in some contexts may influence learning. Together, these results provide a novel model of metacognitive judgments during motor learning that could be applied to future computational and neural studies at the interface of higher-order cognition and motor control.

Motor learning without movement.

Prediction errors guide many forms of learning, providing teaching signals that help us improve our performance. Implicit motor adaptation, for instance, is thought to be driven by sensory prediction errors (SPEs), which occur when the expected and observed consequences of a movement differ. Traditionally, SPE computation is thought to require movement execution. However, recent work suggesting that the brain can generate sensory predictions based on motor imagery or planning alone calls this assumption into question. Here, by measuring implicit motor adaptation during a visuomotor task, we tested whether motor planning and well-timed sensory feedback are sufficient for adaptation. Human participants were cued to reach to a target and were, on a subset of trials, rapidly cued to withhold these movements. Errors displayed both on trials with and without movements induced single-trial adaptation. Learning following trials without movements persisted even when movement trials had never been paired with errors and when the direction of movement and sensory feedback trajectories were decoupled. These observations indicate that the brain can compute errors that drive implicit adaptation without generating overt movements, leading to the adaptation of motor commands that are not overtly produced.

Age-related increases in reaction time result from slower preparation, not delayed initiation.

Recent work indicates that healthy younger adults can prepare accurate responses faster than their voluntary reaction times would suggest, leaving a seemingly unnecessary delay of 80-100 ms before responding. Here, we examined how the preparation of movements, initiation of movements, and the delay between them are affected by aging. Participants made planar reaching movements in two conditions. The "free reaction time" condition assessed the voluntary reaction times with which participants responded to the appearance of a stimulus. The "forced reaction time" condition assessed the minimum time actually needed to prepare accurate movements by controlling the time allowed for movement preparation. The time taken to both initiate movements in the free reaction time and to prepare movements in the forced response condition increased with age. Notably, the time required to prepare accurate movements was significantly shorter than participants' self-selected initiation times; however, the delay between movement preparation and initiation remained consistent across the lifespan (∼90 ms). These results indicate that the slower reaction times of healthy older adults are not due to an increased hesitancy to respond, but can instead be attributed to changes in their ability to process stimuli and prepare movements accordingly, consistent with age-related changes in brain structure and function.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Previous research argues that older adults have slower response times because they hesitate to react, favoring accuracy over speed. The present results challenge this proposal. We found the delay between the minimum time required to prepare movements and the self-selected time at which they initiated remained consistent at ∼90 ms from ages 21 to 80. We therefore suggest older adults' slower response times can be attributed to changes in their ability to process stimuli and prepare movements.

Time-dependent competition between goal-directed and habitual response preparation.

Habits are commonly conceptualized as learned associations whereby a stimulus triggers an associated response1-3. We propose that habits may be better understood as a process whereby a stimulus triggers only the preparation of a response, without necessarily triggering its initiation. Critically, this would allow a habit to exist without ever being overtly expressed, if the prepared habitual response is replaced by a goal-directed alternative before it can be initiated. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show that limiting the time available for response preparation4,5 can unmask latent habits. Participants practiced a visuomotor association for 4 days, after which the association was remapped. Participants easily learned the new association but habitually expressed the original association when forced to respond rapidly (~300-600 ms). More extensive practice reduced the latency at which habitual responses were prepared, in turn increasing the likelihood of their being expressed. The time-course of habit expression was captured by a computational model in which habitual responses are automatically prepared at short latency but subsequently replaced by goal-directed responses. Our results illustrate robust habit formation in humans and show that practice affects habitual behaviour in two distinct ways: by promoting habit formation and by modulating the likelihood of habit expression.

Reaction times can reflect habits rather than computations.

Reaction times (RTs) are assumed to reflect the underlying computations required for making decisions and preparing actions. Recent work, however, has shown that movements can be initiated earlier than typically expressed without affecting performance; hence, the RT may be modulated by factors other than computation time. Consistent with that view, we demonstrated that RTs are influenced by prior experience: when a previously performed task required a specific RT to support task success, this biased the RTs in future tasks. This effect is similar to the use-dependent biases observed for other movement parameters such as speed or direction. Moreover, kinematic analyses revealed that these RT biases could occur without changing the underlying computations used to perform the action. Thus the RT is not solely determined by computational requirements but is an independent parameter that can be habitually set by prior experience.