Relational integrativity of prime-target pairs moderates congruity effects in evaluative priming.

In evaluative priming, positive or negative primes facilitate reactions to targets that share the same valence. While this effect is commonly explained as reflecting invariant structures in semantic long-term memory or in the sensorimotor system, the present research highlights the role of integrativity in evaluative priming. Integrativity refers to the ease of integrating two concepts into a new meaningful compound representation. In extended material tests using paired comparisons from two pools of positive and negative words, we show that evaluative congruity is highly correlated with integrativity. Therefore, in most priming studies, congruity and integrativity are strongly confounded. When both aspects are disentangled by manipulating congruity and integrativity orthogonally, three priming experiments show that evaluative-priming effects were confined to integrative prime-target pairs. No facilitation of prime-congruent targets was obtained for non-integrative stimuli. These findings are discussed from a broader perspective on priming conceived as flexible, context-dependent, and serving a generative adaptation function.

Inferring correlations: from exemplars to categories.

Research and theorizing suggest a processing advantage of category-level correlations over exemplar-level correlations. That research has also shown that category-level correlations serve as a proxy for inferring exemplar-level correlations. For example, an individual may learn that the demand for a product category, like cheese, in one store predicts the demand for this category in another. The individual could then draw the unwarranted conclusion that the demand for an exemplar, like cheddar, would also predict the demand for this exemplar in the other store. This notion is supported by previous experiments demonstrating that the subjective exemplar-level correlation follows the implication of the category-level correlation. However, in virtually all previous experiments suggesting a processing advantage for category-level over exemplar-level correlations, the stimulus correlation at the category level was substantial, whereas the correlation at the exemplar level was weak. Here, we tested the hypothesis that individuals process the level that is most informative, either the exemplar or the category level. We presented participants with a zero correlation at the category level, but varied the correlation at the exemplar level. Participants presented with a zero correlation across exemplar products correctly reproduced a zero correlation across product categories. When presented with a substantial correlation at the exemplar level, however, they erroneously reproduced a similar correlation at the category level. These findings therefore imply that there is no general processing advantage for correlations at higher aggregation levels. Instead, individuals seemingly attend to the level that holds the most regular information. Findings are discussed regarding the role of covariation strength in correlation detection and use.

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations.

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations X i and Y i about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(X i ,Y i ) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.

The impact of open and closed mindsets on evaluative priming.

In the present research, we argue that open versus closed mindsets, accompanying ongoing versus completed mental jobs on the prime, determine the size of congruity effects in the evaluative priming paradigm. More specifically, we hypothesised that disfluent primes that resist an easily completed encoding process should induce an open mindset and thereby result in stronger congruity effects than fluent primes that induce closed mindsets. Across two experiments, we applied two different manipulations of prime fluency: gradual demasking (experiment 1) and colour contrast (experiment 2). As expected, in both experiments we found robust congruity effects, but only on trials with disfluent (vs. fluent) primes. Results of a follow-up experiment suggest that these effects are not due to attentional processes. We conclude that the mindsets resulting from individuals' activities during encoding are crucial in determining the outcome of evaluative priming effects.

A robust classic.

In the present research, we argue for the robustness of illusory correlations (ICs, Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) regarding two boundary conditions suggested in previous research. First, we argue that ICs are maintained under extended experience. Using simulations, we derive conflicting predictions. Whereas noise-based accounts predict ICs to be maintained (Fielder, 2000; Smith, 1991), a prominent account based on discrepancy-reducing feedback learning predicts ICs to disappear (Van Rooy et al., 2003). An experiment involving 320 observations with majority and minority members supports the claim that ICs are maintained. Second, we show that actively using the stereotype to make predictions that are met with reward and punishment does not eliminate the bias. In addition, participants' operant reactions afford a novel online measure of ICs. In sum, our findings highlight the robustness of ICs that can be explained as a result of unbiased but noisy learning.

An adaptive-learning approach to affect regulation: strategic influences on evaluative priming.

An adaptive cognition approach to evaluative priming is not compatible with the view that the entire process is automatically determined by prime stimulus valence alone. In addition to the evaluative congruity of individual prime-target pairs, an adaptive regulation function should be sensitive to the base rates of positive and negative stimuli as well as to the perceived contingency between prime and target valence. The present study was particularly concerned with pseudocontingent inferences that offer a proxy for the assessment of contingencies from degraded or incomplete stimulus input. As expected, response latencies were shorter for the more prevalent target valence and for evaluatively congruent trials. However, crucially, the congruity effect was eliminated and overridden by pseudocontingencies inferred from the stimulus environment. These strategic inferences were further enhanced when the task called for the evaluation of both prime stimuli and target stimuli.

Exploiting attractiveness in persuasion: senders' implicit theories about receivers' processing motivation.

Previous research suggests a positive correlation between physical attractiveness and the expectation of positive outcomes in social interactions, such as successful persuasion. However, prominent persuasion theories do not imply a general advantage of attractive senders. Instead, the persuasion success should vary with the receivers' processing motivation and processing capacity. Focusing on the perspective of the sender, the authors elaborate on lay theories about how attractiveness affects persuasion success. They propose that lay theories (a) match scientific models in that they also comprise the interaction of senders' attractiveness and receivers' processing characteristics, (b) guide laypersons' anticipation of persuasion success, and (c) translate into strategic behavior. They show that anticipated persuasion success depends on the interplay of perceived attractiveness and expectations about receivers' processing motivation (Experiment 1 and 2). Further experiments show that laypersons strategically attempt to exploit attractiveness in that they approach situations (Experiment 3) and persons (Experiment 4) that promise persuasion success.

On splitting and merging categories: a regression account of subadditivity.

Frequency judgments tend to be subadditive: A category's frequency is judged to be lower than the summed frequency of its subcategories. Thus, by splitting or merging categories, subjective frequencies increase or decrease, respectively. We offer an account of this phenomenon that is based on the statistical principle of regression. Because empirical information is never noise-free, high frequencies are underestimated, and low frequencies are overestimated. The underlying regression principle explains available evidence on subadditivity and allows novel predictions. The findings from two experiments supported predictions derived from the regression account of frequency estimates for split and merged categories: Subadditivity varied systematically as a function of the two parameters determining regression (extremity and reliability). More extreme frequencies and reduced reliability led to increased regression effects. Theoretical implications for subadditive judgments (of frequency, probability, and/or value) are discussed. Although other factors may contribute to subadditivity, their influence needs to exceed the baseline expected from the regression model alone.

Pseudocontingencies: an integrative account of an intriguing cognitive illusion.

The term pseudocontingency (PC) denotes the logically unwarranted inference of a contingency between 2 variables X and Y from information other than pairs of xi, yi observations, namely, the variables' univariate base rates as assessed in 1 or more ecological contexts. The authors summarize recent experimental evidence showing that PCs can play a pivotal role in many areas of judgment and decision making. They argue that the exploitation of the informational value of base rates underlying PCs offers an alternative perspective on many phenomena in the realm of adaptive cognition that have been studied in isolation so far. Although PCs can lead to serious biases under some conditions, they afford an efficient strategy for inductive inference making in probabilistic environments that render base-rate information, rather than genuine covariation information, readily available.

Base-rate neglect as a function of base rates in probabilistic contingency learning.

When humans predict criterion events based on probabilistic predictors, they often lend excessive weight to the predictor and insufficient weight to the base rate of the criterion event. In an operant analysis, using a matching-to-sample paradigm, Goodie and Fantino (1996) showed that humans exhibit base-rate neglect when predictors are associated with criterion events through physical similarity. In partial replications of their studies, we demonstrated similar effects when the predictors resembled the criterion events in terms of similarly skewed base rates. Participants' predictions were biased toward the more (or less) frequent criterion event following the more (or less) frequent predictor. This finding adds to the growing evidence for pseudocontingencies (Fiedler & Freytag, 2004), a framework that stresses base-rate influences on contingency learning.

Pseudocontingencies in a simulated classroom.

The pseudocontingency (PC) illusion is investigated in a simulated classroom setting. Related to the notion of ecological correlations, PCs arise when the assessment of contingencies at the individual level is affected by the base-rate relations at the group level. Positive PCs arise when base rates of 2 variables are skewed in the same direction (e.g., high ability and high motivation), whereas negative PCs arise when base rates are skewed in opposite directions. Experiment 1 demonstrates that PCs between student ability and motivation are contingent on effective base-rate assessment at the group level, with a bias toward positive PCs reflecting prior expectancies. Ruling out prior expectancies, Experiment 2 yields symmetric positive and negative PCs. Experiment 3 provides evidence for PC effects on gender stereotypes. Finally, Experiment 4 extends PCs from group base rates to individual student base rates, ruling out an explanation in terms of capacity deficits or inability to assess individuating information.

Pseudocontingencies.

In 3 experiments, the authors explored a contingency illusion termed pseudocontingency (PC) that produces logically unwarranted but potentially useful inferences. PCs arise when bivariate contingencies are inferred from univariate distributions via heuristic alignment processes. For example, in the absence of information about the co-occurrence of TV habits and aggressive behavior within a school class, when the prevalence of both attributes is high, a teacher may infer a positive PC as if students who often watch TV were highly aggressive. Throughout 3 experiments, predictions of the level of 1 variable from the level of another served as a measure of PCs. The illusion could be evoked reliably whether information about target attributes was presented successively or simultaneously, whether common-cause or common-effect models were activated, and whether attributes involved 2 or more levels. The discussion centers on the cognitive processes underlying PCs and their origin and adaptive value.

Inductive reasoning and judgment interference: experiments on Simpson's paradox.

In a series of experiments on inductive reasoning, participants assessed the relationship between gender, success, and a covariate in a situation akin to Simpson's paradox: Although women were less successful then men according to overall statistics, they actually fared better then men at either of two universities. Understanding trivariate relationships of this kind requires cognitive routines similar to analysis of covariance. Across the first five experiments, however, participants generalized the disadvantage of women at the aggregate level to judgments referring to the different levels of the covariate, even when motivation was high and appropriate mental models were activated. The remaining three experiments demonstrated that Simpson's paradox could be mastered when the salience of the covariate was increased and when the salience of gender was decreased by the inclusion of temporal cues that disambiguate the causal status of the covariate.