The mystery of the brain-culture interface.

Nature and culture work together to shape who we are. We are embedded in culture and are profoundly influenced by what those around us say and do. The interface between minds occurs at the level of explicit metacognition, which is at the top of our brain's control hierarchy. But how do our brains do this?

Knowing me, knowing you: Spontaneous use of mentalistic language for self and other in autism.

LAY ABSTRACT: Autistic people can have difficulties in understanding non-autistic people's mental states such as beliefs, emotions and intentions. Although autistic adults may learn to overcome difficulties in understanding of explicit (overt) mental states, they may nevertheless struggle with implicit (indirect) understanding of mental states. This study explores how spontaneous language is used in order to specifically point to this implicit (indirect) understanding of mental states. In particular, our study compares the spontaneous statements that were used in descriptions of oneself and a familiar other person. Here, we found that autistic and non-autistic adults were comparable in the number of statements about physical traits they made. In contrast, non-autistic adults made more statements about mentalistic traits (about the mental including psychological traits, relationship traits and statements reflecting about these) both for the self and the other. Non-autistic and autistic adults showed no difference in the number of statements about relationships but in the number of statements about psychological traits and especially in the statements reflecting on these. Each group showed a similar pattern of kinds of statements for the self and for the other person. This suggests that autistic individuals show the same unique pattern of description in mentalistic terms for the self and another person. This study also indicates that investigating spontaneous use of language, especially for statements reflecting about mental states, enables us to look into difficulties with implicit (indirect) understanding of mental states.

Annual Research Review: Looking back to look forward - changes in the concept of autism and implications for future research.

The concept of autism is a significant contribution from child psychiatry that has entered wider culture and public consciousness, and has evolved significantly over the last four decades. Taking a rather personal retrospective, reflecting on our own time in autism research, this review explores changes in the concept of autism and the implications of these for future research. We focus on seven major changes in how autism is thought of, operationalised, and recognised: (1) from a narrow definition to wide diagnostic criteria; (2) from a rare to a relatively common condition, although probably still under-recognised in women; (3) from something affecting children, to a lifelong condition; (4) from something discreet and distinct, to a dimensional view; (5) from one thing to many 'autisms', and a compound or 'fractionable' condition; (6) from a focus on 'pure' autism, to recognition that complexity and comorbidity is the norm; and finally, (7) from conceptualising autism purely as a 'developmental disorder', to recognising a neurodiversity perspective, operationalised in participatory research models. We conclude with some challenges for the field and suggestions for areas currently neglected in autism research.

Fast Lane to Slow Science.

Fast Science is bad for scientists and bad for science. Slow Science may actually help us to make faster progress, but how can we slow down? Here, I offer preliminary suggestions for how we can transition to a healthier and more sustainable research culture.

Flux of life.

Developmental cognitive neuroscience is flourishing but there are new challenges and new questions to be asked. I argue that we need a bigger picture and an evolutionary framework. This brings some challenges, such as the need to rewrite the old story of nature and nurture, and the need to systematically investigate innate predispositions. While brain imaging has provided some splendid insights and new puzzles to solve, its limitations must not be ignored. Can they help us to find out more about the extent to which the infant brain already configures the adult brain? Can we find out why neurodevelopmental disorders often have severe consequences on cognition and behaviour, despite the mitigating force of brain plasticity? I wish to encourage researchers of the future to take risks by letting their imagination inspire theories to pursue hard questions. I end with a wish list of topics, from start-up kits to abstract reasoning, that I hope can be tackled afresh. However, collecting physiological and behavioural data is not enough. We need a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of cognitive development.

Annual research review: Towards a developmental neuroscience of atypical social cognition.

As a starting point for our review we use a developmental timeline, starting from birth and divided into major developmental epochs defined by key milestones of social cognition in typical development. For each epoch, we highlight those developmental disorders that diverge from the normal developmental pattern, what is known about these key milestones in the major disorders affecting social cognition, and any available research on the neural basis of these differences. We relate behavioural observations to four major networks of the social brain, that is, Amygdala, Mentalizing, Emotion and Mirror networks. We focus on those developmental disorders that are characterized primarily by social atypicality, such as autism spectrum disorder, social anxiety and a variety of genetically defined syndromes. The processes and aspects of social cognition we highlight are sketched in a putative network diagram, and include: agent identification, emotion processing and empathy, mental state attribution, self-processing and social hierarchy mapping involving social 'policing' and in-group/out-group categorization. Developmental disorders reveal some dissociable deficits in different components of this map of social cognition. This broad review across disorders, ages and aspects of social cognition leads us to some key questions: How can we best distinguish primary from secondary social disorders? Is social cognition especially vulnerable to developmental disorder, or surprisingly robust? Are cascading notions of social development, in which early functions are essential stepping stones or building bricks for later abilities, necessarily correct?

Selective disruption of sociocognitive structural brain networks in autism and alexithymia.

Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are neurodevelopmental disorders characterized by abnormal social cognition. A core feature of ASC is disrupted Theory of Mind (ToM), our ability to take the mental perspective of others. ASC is also associated with alexithymia, a trait characterized by altered emotional interoception and empathy. Here, we applied structural MRI covariance analysis to assess whether ASC and alexithymia differentially affect structural brain networks associated with sociocognitive and socioaffective functions. Based on previous functional MRI findings, we expected disrupted ToM networks (centered on dorsomedial prefontal cortex [dmPFC], and temporo-parietal junction [TPJ]) in ASC, while alexithymia would affect networks centered on fronto-insular cortex (FI), regions associated with interoception of emotion and empathy. Relative to controls, ASC indeed showed reduced covariance in networks centered on dmPFC and TPJ, but not within FI networks. Irrespective of ASC, covariance was negatively modulated by alexithymia in networks extending from FI to posterior regions. Network findings were complemented by self-reports, indicating decreased perspective taking but normal empathic concern in ASC. Our results show divergent effects of ASC and alexithymia on inter-regional structural networks, suggesting that networks mediating socioaffective processes may be separable from networks mediating sociocognitive processing.

Autistic adolescents show atypical activation of the brain's mentalizing system even without a prior history of mentalizing problems.

Some autistic children pass classic Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks that others fail, but the significance of this finding is at present unclear. We identified two such groups of primary school age (labelled ToM+ and ToM-) and a matched comparison group of typically developing children (TD). Five years later we tested these participants again on a ToM test battery appropriate for adolescents and conducted an fMRI study with a story based ToM task. We also assessed autistic core symptoms at these two time points. At both times the ToM- group showed more severe social communication impairments than the ToM+ group, and while showing an improvement in mentalizing performance, they continued to show a significant impairment compared to the NT group. Two independent ROI analyses of the BOLD signal showed activation of the mentalizing network including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and lateral temporal cortices. Strikingly, both ToM+ and ToM- groups showed very similar patterns of heightened activation in comparison with the NT group. No differences in other brain regions were apparent. Thus, autistic adolescents who do not have a history of mentalizing problems according to our ToM battery showed the same atypical neurophysiological response during mentalizing as children who did have such a history. This finding indicates that heterogeneity at the behavioural level may nevertheless map onto a similar phenotype at the neuro-cognitive level.

Autism and Dyslexia: A Glance Over 25 Years of Research.

AUTISM AND DYSLEXIA ARE WRONGLY CLASSIFIED AS CHILDHOOD DISORDERS: They are lifelong and therefore have to be studied in adults as well as in children. Individual variability is enormous, and, as a result, behavioral diagnosis remains problematic. The study of the underlying cognitive abilities in autism and dyslexia has acted as a gateway for the emergence of developmental cognitive neuroscience.

Why we need cognitive explanations of autism.

In the 70 years since autism was described and named there have been huge changes in the conceptualization of this enigmatic condition. This review takes a personal perspective on the history of autism research. The origins of the first cognitive theories of autism, theory of mind and weak central coherence, are discussed and updated to inform future developments. Selected experimental findings are interpreted in the historical context of changes that have been brought about by advances in methodology. A three-level framework graphically illustrates a causal chain between brain, mind, and behaviour to facilitate the identification of phenotypes in neurodevelopmental disorders. Cognition is placed at the centre of the diagram to reveal that it can link together brain and behaviour, when there are complex multiple mappings between the different levels.

Mechanisms of social cognition.

Social animals including humans share a range of social mechanisms that are automatic and implicit and enable learning by observation. Learning from others includes imitation of actions and mirroring of emotions. Learning about others, such as their group membership and reputation, is crucial for social interactions that depend on trust. For accurate prediction of others' changeable dispositions, mentalizing is required, i.e., tracking of intentions, desires, and beliefs. Implicit mentalizing is present in infants less than one year old as well as in some nonhuman species. Explicit mentalizing is a meta-cognitive process and enhances the ability to learn about the world through self-monitoring and reflection, and may be uniquely human. Meta-cognitive processes can also exert control over automatic behavior, for instance, when short-term gains oppose long-term aims or when selfish and prosocial interests collide. We suggest that they also underlie the ability to explicitly share experiences with other agents, as in reflective discussion and teaching. These are key in increasing the accuracy of the models of the world that we construct.

Reputation management: in autism, generosity is its own reward.

A recent study has found that autistic people donate the same to charity regardless of whether they are observed. This is not because they are oblivious to others, but because they are free of hypocrisy.

A clash of bottom-up and top-down processes in visual search: the reversed letter effect revisited.

It is harder to find the letter "N" among its mirror reversals than vice versa, an inconvenient finding for bottom-up saliency accounts based on primary visual cortex (V1) mechanisms. However, in line with this account, we found that in dense search arrays, gaze first landed on either target equally fast. Remarkably, after first landing, gaze often strayed away again and target report was delayed. This delay was longer for target "N" We suggest that the delay arose because bottom-up saliency clashed with top-down shape recognition. Thus, although gaze landed accurately and quickly to the distinctive feature in the target shape (the orientation of the diagonal bar in "N" or "И"), the identical zigzag shape of target and distractors was registered, leading to temporary confusion. In sparser search arrays with smaller set sizes, top-down target shape recognition occurs earlier and bottom-up saliency is weaker. The clash in this case causes search asymmetry even before target location at first gaze landing. Our findings rule out previous suggestions that search asymmetry stems from stronger preattentive salience for the reversed target and/or faster rejection of familiar distractors.

Developing the Frith-Happé animations: a quick and objective test of Theory of Mind for adults with autism.

It is now widely accepted that individuals with autism have a Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing deficit. This has traditionally been assessed with false-belief tasks and, more recently, with silent geometric animations, an on-line ToM task. In adults with milder forms of autism standard false-belief tests, originally devised for children, often prove insensitive, while the Frith-Happé animations have had rather better success at capturing the on-line ToM deficit in this population. However, analysis of participants' verbal descriptions of these animations, which span scenarios from "Random" to "Goal-Directed" and "ToM," is time consuming and subjective. In this study, we developed and established the feasibility of an objective method of response through a series of multiple-choice questions. Sixteen adults with autism and 15 typically developing adults took part, matched for age and intelligence. The adults with autism were less accurate as a group at categorizing the Frith-Happé animations by the presence or absence of mental and physical interactions. Furthermore, they were less able to select the correct emotions that are typically attributed to the triangles in the mental state animations. This new objective method for assessing the understanding of the animations succeeded in being as sensitive as the original subjective method in detecting the mentalizing difficulties in autism, as well as being quicker and easier to administer and analyze.

Exploring the building blocks of social cognition: spontaneous agency perception and visual perspective taking in autism.

Individuals with autism spectrum disorders have highly characteristic impairments in social interaction and this is true also for those with high functioning autism or Asperger syndrome (AS). These social cognitive impairments are far from global and it seems likely that some of the building blocks of social cognition are intact. In our first experiment, we investigated whether high functioning adults who also had a diagnosis of AS would be similar to control participants in terms of their eye movements when watching animated triangles in short movies that normally evoke mentalizing. They were. Our second experiment using the same movies, tested whether both groups would spontaneously adopt the visuo-spatial perspective of a triangle protagonist. They did. At the same time autistic participants differed in their verbal accounts of the story line underlying the movies, confirming their specific difficulties in on-line mentalizing. In spite of this difficulty, two basic building blocks of social cognition appear to be intact: spontaneous agency perception and spontaneous visual perspective taking.

Reputation management in the age of the world-wide web.

The reciprocal interactions with others that play such a significant part in our lives depend upon trust; individuals need to be confident that their partners are cooperative, and that they will return favours. Reputation permits the choice of better partners and provides incentives to be more cooperative. These uses of reputation are not unique to humans. However, in complex human societies, with large numbers of potential partners, keeping track of each other's reputation is a vital part of everyday life, and, in an inevitable arms race, ever more powerful strategies of reputation management are being developed. In this article, we bring together insights from different disciplines to throw new light onto the importance and scope of reputation management.