Visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky situations.

In an fMRI study, we tested the prediction that visualizing risky situations induces a stronger neural response in brain areas associated with mental imagery and emotions than visualizing non-risky and more positive situations. We assumed that processing mental images that allow for "trying-out" the future has greater adaptive importance for risky than non-risky situations, because the former can generate severe negative outcomes. We identified several brain regions that were activated when participants produced images of risky situations and these regions overlap with brain areas engaged in visual, speech, and movement imagery. We also found that producing images of risky situations, in contrast to non-risky situations, was associated with increased neural activation in the insular cortex and cerebellum-the regions involved, among other functions, in emotional processing. Finally, we observed an increased BOLD signal in the cingulate gyrus associated with reward-based decision making and monitoring of decision outcomes. In summary, risky situations increased neural activation in brain areas involved in mental imagery, emotional processing, and decision making. These findings imply that the evaluation of everyday risky situations may be driven by emotional responses that result from mental imagery.

Associations between Case Fatality Rates and Self-Reported Fear of Neoplasms and Circulatory Diseases.

Background. According to decision by sampling theory, people store relative frequencies of events in memory, and these values constitute subjective representations of events. Because fear is a natural response to the threat of death, we hypothesized that case fatality rate (CFR) statistics, which represent how deadly a disease is, would be positively correlated with self-reported fear ratings of neoplasms and circulatory diseases. Methods. Participants (N = 239) were asked to rate various neoplasms and circulatory diseases (110 diseases in total) on fear, typicality, and disgust scales (e.g., 1 = no fear, 10 = intense fear). They also estimated mortality and morbidity rates for the same set of diseases. Finally, they completed the Berlin Numeracy Test. CFRs were obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO) database. The association between relative CFR and fear ratings was tested using correlation analyses and a multilevel linear model with Bayesian inference techniques. Results. We found that fear ratings were related to relative CFRs (r = 0.42, [0.25, 0.56], BF = 3511). This effect was present on aggregate and, to some extent, on individual levels, even after controlling for other ratings, morbidity rate, participants' estimates of mortality and morbidity statistics, numeracy, sex, age, and knowledge of WHO statistics. Also, women rated neoplasms as more frightening than circulatory diseases, and typicality ratings were related to morbidity rates. Limitations. Limited number of diagnostic entities and categories, lack of control over the technicality of disease names and participants' experience of diseases, and study sample (83% young women). Conclusions. We present initial evidence that implicit acquisition of CFRs of diseases through everyday experience may be related to the intensity of fear reactions to them.

Does mental number line training work? The effects of cognitive training on real-life mathematics, numeracy, and decision making.

We developed and validated intervention aimed at enhancing numeracy (the ability to understand and use the concept of probability and statistical information) and decision making. One hundred and twenty-two participants were randomly assigned to a Mental Number Line Training condition (MNLT) or an Arithmetic Training Active Control condition (ATAC). Response mode (a slider anchored within the current response range vs. a numerical keyboard) was the only, and essential, difference between experimental conditions. After MNLT, participants developed a more precise mapping of numbers onto the mental number line. However, the results regarding the transfer of this effect to performance in other cognitive tasks were mixed. We observed the transfer to an ability to quickly estimate the sum of numerical quantities (measured by the precision of estimates for the total price of everyday products), but we did not find evidence that MNLT, as compared to the control condition, improved performance on numerical competencies measures or decision-making tasks. Interestingly, we found that both MNLT and ATAC resulted in higher subjective numeracy as well as normatively better financial decisions, and valuation of risky prospects. Developing more exact symbolic-number mapping may be a promising direction of future research on improving decision making skills. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Does Fear Increase Search Effort in More Numerate People? An Experimental Study Investigating Information Acquisition in a Decision From Experience Task.

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of numeracy and the emotion of fear on the decision-making process. While previous research demonstrated that these factors are independently related to search effort, search policy and choice in a decision from experience task, less is known about how their interaction contributes to processing information under uncertainty. We attempted to address this problem and to fill this gap. In the present study, we hypothesized that more numerate people would sample more information about a decision problem and that the effect of fear would depend on the source of this emotion: whether it is integral (i.e., relevant) or incidental (i.e., irrelevant) to a decision problem. Additionally, we tested how these factors predict choices. We addressed these hypotheses in a series of two experiments. In each experiment, we used a sampling paradigm to measure search effort, search policy and choice in nine binary problems included in a decision from experience task. In Experiment 1, before the sampling task we elicited incidental fear by asking participants to recall fearful events from their life. In Experiment 2, integral fear was elicited by asking participants to make choices concerning medical treatment. Decision problems and their payoff distributions were the same in the two experiments and across each condition. In both experiments, we assessed objective statistical numeracy and controlled for a change in the current emotional state. We found that more numerate people sampled more information about a decision problem and switched less frequently between alternatives. Incidental fear marginally predicted search effort. Integral fear led to larger sample sizes, but only among more numerate people. Neither numeracy nor fear were related to the number of choices that maximized expected values. However, across two experiments sample sizes predicted the number of choices that maximized experienced mean returns. The findings suggest that people with higher numeracy may be more sensitive to integral emotions; this may result in more effortful sampling of relevant information leading to choices maximizing experienced returns.

Numeracy moderates the influence of task-irrelevant affect on probability weighting.

Statistical numeracy, defined as the ability to understand and process statistical and probability information, plays a significant role in superior decision making. However, recent research has demonstrated that statistical numeracy goes beyond simple comprehension of numbers and mathematical operations. On the contrary to previous studies that were focused on emotions integral to risky prospects, we hypothesized that highly numerate individuals would exhibit more linear probability weighting because they would be less biased by incidental and decision-irrelevant affect. Participants were instructed to make a series of insurance decisions preceded by negative (i.e., fear-inducing) or neutral stimuli. We found that incidental negative affect increased the curvature of the probability weighting function (PWF). Interestingly, this effect was significant only for less numerate individuals, while probability weighting in more numerate people was not altered by decision-irrelevant affect. We propose two candidate mechanisms for the observed effect.