The future vision of simulation in health care.

Simulation is a technique-not a technology-to replace or amplify real experiences with guided experiences that evoke or replicate substantial aspects of the real world in a fully interactive manner. The diverse applications of simulation in health care can be categorised by 11 dimensions: aims and purposes of the simulation activity; unit of participation; experience level of participants; health care domain; professional discipline of participants; type of knowledge, skill, attitudes, or behaviours addressed; the simulated patient's age; technology applicable or required; site of simulation; extent of direct participation; and method of feedback used. Using simulation to improve safety will require full integration of its applications into the routine structures and practices of health care. The costs and benefits of simulation are difficult to determine, especially for the most challenging applications, where long term use may be required. Various driving forces and implementation mechanisms can be expected to propel simulation forward, including professional societies, liability insurers, health care payers, and ultimately the public. The future of simulation in health care depends on the commitment and ingenuity of the health care simulation community to see that improved patient safety using this tool becomes a reality.

The culture of safety: results of an organization-wide survey in 15 California hospitals.

OBJECTIVE: To understand fundamental attitudes towards patient safety culture and ways in which attitudes vary by hospital, job class, and clinical status. DESIGN: Using a closed ended survey, respondents were questioned on 16 topics important to a culture of safety in health care or other industries plus demographic information. The survey was conducted by US mail (with an option to respond by Internet) over a 6 month period from April 2001 in three mailings. SETTING: 15 hospitals participating in the California Patient Safety Consortium. SUBJECTS: A sample of 6312 employees generally comprising all the hospital's attending physicians, all the senior executives (defined as department head or above), and a 10% random sample of all other hospital personnel. The response rate was 47.4% overall, 62% excluding physicians. Where appropriate, responses were weighted to allow an accurate comparison between participating hospitals and job types and to correct for non-response. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Frequency of responses suggesting an absence of safety culture ("problematic responses" to survey questions) and the frequency of "neutral" responses which might also imply a lack of safety culture. Responses to each question overall were recorded according to hospital, job class, and clinician status. RESULTS: The mean overall problematic response was 18% and a further 18% of respondents gave neutral responses. Problematic responses varied widely between participating institutions. Clinicians, especially nurses, gave more problematic responses than non-clinicians, and front line workers gave more than senior managers. CONCLUSION: Safety culture may not be as strong as is desirable of a high reliability organization. The culture differed significantly, not only between hospitals, but also by clinical status and job class within individual institutions. The results provide the most complete available information on the attitudes and experiences of workers about safety culture in hospitals and ways in which perceptions of safety culture differ among hospitals and between types of personnel. Further research is needed to confirm these results and to determine how senior managers can successfully transmit their commitment to safety to the clinical workplace.

[Patient safety and errors in medicine: development, prevention and analyses of incidents]. / Patientensicherheit und Fehler in der Medizin. Entstehung, Prävention und Analyse von Zwischenfällen.

"Patient safety" and "errors in medicine" are issues gaining more and more prominence in the eyes of the public. According to newer studies, errors in medicine are among the ten major causes of death in association with the whole area of health care. A new era has begun incorporating attention to a "systems" approach to deal with errors and their causes in the health system. In other high-risk domains with a high demand for safety (such as the nuclear power industry and aviation) many strategies to enhance safety have been established. It is time to study these strategies, to adapt them if necessary and apply them to the field of medicine. These strategies include: to teach people how errors evolve in complex working domains and how types of errors are classified; the introduction of critical incident reporting systems that are free of negative consequences for the reporters; the promotion of continuous medical education; and the development of generic problem-solving skills incorporating the extensive use of realistic simulators wherever possible. Interestingly, the field of anesthesiology--within which realistic simulators were developed--is referred to as a model for the new patient safety movement. Despite this proud track record in recent times though, there is still much to be done even in the field of anesthesiology. Overall though, the most important strategy towards a long-term improvement in patient safety will be a change of "culture" throughout the entire health care system. The "culture of blame" focused on individuals should be replaced by a "safety culture", that sees errors and critical incidents as a problem of the whole organization. The acceptance of human fallability and an open-minded non-punitive analysis of errors in the sense of a "preventive and proactive safety culture" should lead to solutions at the systemic level. This change in culture can only be achieved with a strong commitment from the highest levels of an organization. Patient safety must have the highest priority in the goals of the institution: "Primum nihil nocere"--"First, do not harm".

Time for a new paradigm in pediatric medical education: teaching neonatal resuscitation in a simulated delivery room environment.

OBJECTIVES: Acquisition and maintenance of the skills necessary for successful resuscitation of the neonate are typically accomplished by a combination of completion of standardized training courses using textbooks, videotape, and manikins together with active participation in the resuscitation of human neonates in the real delivery room. We developed a simulation-based training program in neonatal resuscitation (NeoSim) to bridge the gap between textbook and real life and to assess trainee satisfaction with the elements of this program. METHODS: Thirty-eight subjects (physicians and nurses) participated in 1 of 9 full-day NeoSim programs combining didactic instruction with active, hands-on participation in intensive scenarios involving life-like neonatal and maternal manikins and real medical equipment. Subjects were asked to complete an extensive evaluation of all elements of the program on its conclusion. RESULTS: The subjects expressed high levels of satisfaction with nearly all aspects of this novel program. Responses to open-ended questions were especially enthusiastic in describing the realistic nature of simulation-based training. The major limitation of the program was the lack of fidelity of the neonatal manikin to a human neonate. CONCLUSION: Realistic simulation-based training in neonatal resuscitation is possible using current technology, is well received by trainees, and offers benefits not inherent in traditional paradigms of medical education.

Assessment of clinical performance during simulated crises using both technical and behavioral ratings.

BACKGROUND: Techniques are needed to assess anesthesiologists' performance when responding to critical events. Patient simulators allow presentation of similar crisis situations to different clinicians. This study evaluated ratings of performance, and the interrater variability of the ratings, made by multiple independent observers viewing videotapes of simulated crises. METHODS: Raters scored the videotapes of 14 different teams that were managing two scenarios: malignant hyperthermia (MH) and cardiac arrest. Technical performance and crisis management behaviors were rated. Technical ratings could range from 0.0 to 1.0 based on scenario-specific checklists of appropriate actions. Ratings of 12 crisis management behaviors were made using a five-point ordinal scale. Several statistical assessments of interrater variability were applied. RESULTS: Technical ratings were high for most teams in both scenarios (0.78 +/- 0.08 for MH, 0.83 +/- 0.06 for cardiac arrest). Ratings of crisis management behavior varied, with some teams rated as minimally acceptable or poor (28% for MH, 14% for cardiac arrest). The agreement between raters was fair to excellent, depending on the item rated and the statistical test used. CONCLUSIONS: Both technical and behavioral performance can be assessed from videotapes of simulations. The behavioral rating system can be improved; one particular difficulty was aggregating a single rating for a behavior that fluctuated over time. These performance assessment tools might be useful for educational research or for tracking a resident's progress. The rating system needs more refinement before it can be used to assess clinical competence for residency graduation or board certification.

Factors influencing vigilance and performance of anesthetists.

As a group, anesthetists have been the leaders in medicine in the study of vigilance, performance, and safety. This review updates the work that has been done in the last year regarding the study of anesthetist vigilance and performance. Much of this work has been performed with the use of patient simulators.

Evaluation of a medical diagnosis system using simulator test scenarios.

This paper describes an informal but systematic method for how to test and verify a knowledge-based system in a large open-ended medical target domain. The system used is Guardian, an intelligent system for monitoring and diagnosis of post-cardiac surgery patients in an intensive-care unit. The knowledge base is tested and verified by running the system on a series of realistic test scenarios, both with an embedded simulator and with an external simulation system. The same scenarios are presented to human test subjects, making it possible to compare and analyze the performance of the knowledge-based system with that of human physicians. The use of simulators instead of clinical data also means that it is possible to test crucial scenarios which occur seldom in medical practice. Our results show that a system like Guardian might indeed be useful in medical care.

Anesthesia patient risk: a quantitative approach to organizational factors and risk management options.

The risk of death or brain damage to anesthesia patients is relatively low, particularly for healthy patients in modern hospitals. When an accident does occur, its cause is usually an error made by the anesthesiologist, either in triggering the accident sequence, or failing to take timely corrective measures. This paper presents a pilot study which explores the feasibility of extending probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) of anesthesia accidents to assess the effects of human and management components on the patient risk. We develop first a classic PRA model for the patient risk per operation. We then link the probabilities of the different accident types to their root causes using a probabilistic analysis of the performance shaping factors. These factors are described here as the "state of the anesthesiologist" characterized both in terms of alertness and competence. We then analyze the effects of different management factors that affect the state of the anesthesiologist and we compute the risk reduction benefits of several risk management policies. Our data sources include the published version of the Australian Incident Monitoring Study as well as expert opinions. We conclude that patient risk could be reduced substantially by closer supervision of residents, the use of anesthesia simulators both in training and for periodic recertification, and regular medical examinations for all anesthesiologists.

The effect of electronic record keeping and transesophageal echocardiography on task distribution, workload, and vigilance during cardiac anesthesia.

BACKGROUND: Electronic anesthesia record keeping (EARK) systems increasingly are used in the operating room, but studies have only recently begun to investigate their effect on anesthesia task performance. Teak analysis, workload assessment, and vigilance assessment techniques were used to study senior residents providing anesthesia for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) procedures. The impact on anesthesia residents' workload of the routine use of transesophageal echocardiography (TEE) also was examined. METHODS: Before each case, the record keeping system was randomly selected as either electronic (Distek ARKIVE; EARK) or traditional manual recording (MAN). Twenty CABG procedures (10 EARK and 10 MAN) were examined, with observation commencing with anesthetic induction and terminating on initiation of cardiopulmonary bypass. The activities of each resident, divided into 32 task categories (e.g., "laryngoscopy," "observe monitors," etc.), were recorded by a trained observer using a computer. The response latency to a randomly activated alarm light was used as a measure of vigilance ("vigilance latency"). Workload was rated by subject and observer at random 10- to 15-min intervals throughout the case. Data analysis included calculation of workload density (number of tasks/min multiplied by task-specific workload values) and task-links (relationship between sequential tasks). RESULTS: The two groups had a similar distribution of tasks before intubation. In only 4 of the 20 cases studied did any manual record keeping occur before intubation. After intubation, the EARK group spent less time record keeping and using the TEE but more time observing the monitors and conversing with the attending physician than the MAN group did. All subjects reported significantly higher workload scores before intubation compared with after intubation. Similarly, vigilance latency was greater before intubation compared with after intubation (57 vs. 31 s; P < 0.001). There were no significant differences between the two record keeping groups in subjective workload scores, workload density, or vigilance latency. During TEE use, vigilance latency was significantly longer, and workload density was greater than during other monitoring or recording tasks. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides an objective description of the task distribution and workload during the administration of anesthesia for cardiac surgery. Under the conditions of this study. EARK use modestly decreased the time spent record keeping during the postintubation prebypass period. However, there was no effect of EARK either on vigilance or several measures of workload. TEE use was associated with increased workload and possibly decreased vigilance.

Anesthesia crisis resource management: real-life simulation training in operating room crises.

Little formal training is provided in anesthesiology residency programs to help acquire, develop, and practice skills in resource management and decision making during crises in practice. Using anesthesia crisis resource management (ACRM) principles developed at another institution, 68 anesthesiologists and 4 nurse-anesthetists participated in an ACRM training course held over a 2 and a half-month period. The anesthesia environment was recreated in a real operating room, with standard equipment and simulations requiring actual performance of clinical interventions. Scenarios included overdose of inhalation anesthetic, oxygen source failure, cardiac arrest, malignant hyperthermia, tension pneumothorax, and complete power failure. A detailed questionnaire was administered following the debriefing and completed by all participants, documenting their immediate impressions. Participants rated themselves as having performed well in the simulator. Senior attendings and residents rated themselves more highly than did their junior counterparts. The potential benefit of this course for anesthesiologists to practice anesthesia more safely in a controlled exercise environment, was rated highly by both groups. Over one half of respondents in all categories felt that the course should be taken once every 12 months; another third of each group felt that the course should be taken once every 24 months. While no senior attendings believed that the course should be taken once every 6 months, approximately 10% of respondents in other categories that it should. Of respondents in the senior and junior attending category, 5% felt the course should never be taken. Although attendings were less favorable than residents in their rating of the value of the course, both groups were still enthusiastic.

Situation awareness in anesthesiology.

Situation awareness has primarily been confined to the aviation field. We believe that situation awareness is an equally important characteristic in the complex, dynamic, and risky field of anesthesiology. We describe three aspects of situations of which the decision maker must remain aware: subtle cues, evolving situations, and special knowledge elements. We provide examples of real or simulated anesthesia situations in which situation awareness is clearly involved in the provision of optimal patient care, and we map the elements of situation awareness onto a cognitive process model of the anesthesiologist. Finally, we consider how situation awareness can be further investigated and taught in this medical domain using anesthesia simulators and analyses of real cases. The study of situation awareness in anesthesiology may provide a good example of the wider application of the concept of situation awareness to nonaerospace environments.

Production pressure in the work environment. California anesthesiologists' attitudes and experiences.

BACKGROUND: Pressure to put efficiency, output, or continued production ahead of safety has caused catastrophic accidents in various industries. The authors assessed the attitudes and experiences of anesthesiologists concerning production pressure. METHODS: A random, repeated-mailing survey was conducted among 647 members of the American Society of Anesthesiologists residing in California. Questions were asked about attitudes toward production pressure and other patient safety issues, frequency of occurrence of various operating room events, encounters with situations involving unsafe actions, and ratings of sources of production pressure. RESULTS: Forty-seven percent of those sampled returned surveys. The demographics of the respondent population were largely similar to those of the population of anesthesiologists in California. There was no systematic difference between the respondents to the first versus the second mailing, reducing (but not eliminating) the possibility of self-selection bias. Nearly half (49%) of respondents had witnessed production pressure result in what they believed to be unsafe actions by an anesthesiologist. Such events included elective surgery in patients without adequate evaluation or with significant contraindications to surgery. Anesthesiologists felt pressures within themselves to work agreeably with surgeons, avoid delaying cases, and avoid litigation. They also reported overt pressure by surgeons to proceed with cases instead of cancelling them, and to hasten anesthetic procedures. Some aspects of production pressure were perceived differently by those reimbursed by fee-for-service versus those paid by salary. CONCLUSIONS: Production pressure from internal and external sources is a reality for many anesthesiologists and is perceived in some cases to have resulted in unsafe actions being performed.