Review of Restricted Experiment Requests, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014-2021.

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) regulates laboratories that possess, use, or transfer select agents and toxins within United States as part of the Federal Select Agent Program. DSAT also mitigates biosafety risks through the review of "restricted experiments," which under the select agent regulations are experiments that pose heightened biosafety risks. In a previous study, we evaluated restricted experimental requests submitted to DSAT for review between 2006 and 2013. The purpose of this study is to provide an updated analysis of requests to conduct potential restricted experiments submitted to DSAT between 2014 and 2021. This article describes the trends and characteristics of the data associated with restricted experimental requests involving select agents and toxins that have an impact on public health and safety (US Department of Health and Human Services agents only) or both public health and safety and animal health or products (overlap agents). From January 2014 to December 2021, DSAT received 113 requests to conduct potential restricted experiments; however, 82% (n=93) of those requests were determined not to meet the regulatory definition of a restricted experiment. Of the 20 requests that met the definition of a restricted experiment, 8 were denied because the experiments had the potential to compromise disease control in humans. DSAT continues to encourage entities to practice due diligence and request a review of research that could potentially meet the regulatory definition of a restricted experiment out of an abundance of caution to protect public health and safety and prevent any potential compliance action.

Review of Requests to Exclude Attenuated Strains of Select Agents and Modified Select Toxins, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003-2017.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) regulates the possession, use, and transfer of select agents and toxins throughout the United States as part of the Federal Select Agent Program. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) select agent regulations also include criteria for the exclusion of select agents and toxins from the requirements of the regulations (42 CFR § 73.3 and 73.4). An entity may request the exclusion of an attenuated strain of a select agent or a select toxin modified to be less potent or toxic. The Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee (ISATTAC) reviews the exclusion request by conducting a risk assessment to determine whether the attenuated strain or modified toxin has the potential to pose a severe risk to public health and safety. In this study, DSAT analyzed the number and types of exclusion requests reviewed by the ISATTAC from January 2003 through December 2017. As of December 2017, DSAT has excluded 50 strains of biological agents and 10 modified toxins from the select agent regulations. The select agent regulations provision for the exclusion of attenuated select agents or modified toxins that no longer have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety is an important mechanism for reducing the regulatory burden on entities that do not need to work with the fully virulent or toxic forms of the agent or toxin. This provision may have the added benefit of encouraging entities to consider working with variants of select agents or toxins that are of less risk than the fully virulent or toxic forms in their research studies and as a positive control.

Review of Restricted Experiment Requests, Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006-2013.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT) regulates laboratories that possess, use, or transfer select agents and toxins in the United States. DSAT also mitigates biosafety risks through the review of "restricted experiments," which under the select agent regulations are experiments that pose heightened biosafety risks. From January 2006 through December 2013, DSAT received 618 requests from 109 entities to perform potentially restricted experiments. Of these requests, 85% were determined not to meet the regulatory definition of a restricted experiment, while 15% of the requests met the definition of a restricted experiment. Of the 91 restricted experiments proposed, DSAT approved 31 (34%) requests because the biosafety conditions proposed were commensurate with the experiments' biosafety risk. All 31 approved restricted experiments were for work with select toxins. DSAT did not approve 60 restricted experiment requests due to potentially serious biosafety risks to public health and safety. All 60 denied restricted experiments proposed inserting drug resistance traits into select agents that could compromise the control of disease. The select agents and toxins associated most frequently with requests that met the regulatory definition of a restricted experiment are Shiga toxin (n = 16), Burkholderia mallei (n = 15), Botulinum neurotoxin (n = 14), and Brucella abortus (n = 14). In general, all restricted experiment decisions are determined on a case-by-case basis. This article describes the trends and characteristics of the data associated with restricted experiment requests among select agents that have an impact on public health and safety (HHS only agents) or both public health and safety and animal health or products (overlap agents). The information presented here, coupled with the information published in the restricted experiment guidance document ( www.selectagents.gov ), is intended to promote awareness among the research community of the type of experiments that meet the regulatory definition of a restricted experiment as well as to provide a greater understanding of the restricted experiment review process.

Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins: 2003-2013.

The Federal Select Agent Program, which is composed of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Division of Select Agents and Toxins and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Agricultural Select Agent Services, regulates entities that possess, use, or transfer biological select agents and toxins in the United States and must preapprove all transfers within or into the US. The requirement to preapprove transfers allows the Federal Select Agent Program to monitor and track shipments to receive alerts of theft, loss, or release during shipment, thereby protecting public health and safety. As part of the program, the Division of Select Agents and Toxins regulates biological select agents and toxins that have been identified by the US government as posing a severe threat to public health and safety. The division analyzed 4,402 transfers that occurred between March 2003 and December 2013 to identify frequently transferred biological select agents and toxins and the types of entities involved in transfers. During the study period, 1 package was lost during shipment and it was determined not to pose a threat to public health. The Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated the loss and concluded that the package was most likely damaged by the commercial carrier and discarded. Further, there were no reports of theft or release associated with biological select agents and toxins shipments. This report represents the first in-depth review of biological select agent and toxin transfers that were approved by the Division of Select Agents and Toxins.

Biosafety Recommendations for Work with Influenza Viruses Containing a Hemagglutinin from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 Lineage.

The CDC and National Institutes of Health (NIH) Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) manual describes biosafety recommendations for work involving highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) (US Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], CDC. Biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories, 5th ed. Atlanta, GA: CDC; 2009. HHS publication no. [CDC] 21-1112. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5). The U.S. Department of Agriculture Guidelines for Avian Influenza Viruses builds on the BMBL manual and provides additional biosafety and biocontainment guidelines for laboratories working with HPAI (US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Agricultural Select Agent Program. Guidelines for avian influenza viruses. Washington, DC: US Department of Agriculture; 2011. Available at http://www.selectagents.gov/Guidelines_for_Avian_Influenza_Viruses.html). The recommendations in this report, which are intended for laboratories in the United States, outline the essential baseline biosafety measures for working with the subset of influenza viruses that contain a hemagglutinin (HA) from the HPAI influenza A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 lineage, including reassortant influenza viruses created in a laboratory setting. All H5N1 influenza virus clades known to infect humans to date have been derived from this lineage (WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group. Continued evolution of highly pathogenic avian influenza A [H5N1]: updated nomenclature. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 2012;6:1-5). In 2009, the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules were amended to include specific biosafety and biocontainment recommendations for laboratories working with Recombinant Risk Group 3 influenza viruses, including HPAI H5N1 influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96-like H5 lineage. In February 2013, the NIH guidelines were further revised to provide additional biosafety containment enhancements and practices for research with HPAI H5N1 viruses that are transmissible among mammals by respiratory droplets (i.e., mammalian-transmissible HPAI H5N1) (National Institutes of Health, Office of Biotechnology Activities. NIH guidelines for research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules. Appendix G-II-C-5: biosafety level 3 enhanced for research involving risk group 3 influenza viruses. Bethesda, MD: National Institutes of Health; 2013. Available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/rdna/nih_guidelines_oba.html). The recent revisions to the NIH guidelines focus on a smaller subset of viruses but are applicable and consistent with the recommendations in this report. The biosafety recommendations in this report were developed by CDC with advice from the Intragovernmental Select Agents and Toxins Technical Advisory Committee, which is a panel composed of federal government subject-matter experts, and from public input received in response to the request for information that was published in the Federal Register on October 17, 2012 (US Department of Health and Human Services, CDC. Influenza viruses containing the hemagglutinin from the Goose/ Guangdong/1/96 lineage; proposed rule; request for information and comment. 42 CFR, Part 73. Federal Register 2012;77:63783-5). Work with HPAI H5N1 virus should be conducted, at a minimum, at biosafety level 3 (BSL-3), with specific enhancements to protect workers, the public, animal health, and animal products. Original clinical specimens suspected of containing viruses of this lineage can only be handled at BSL-2 if the procedures do not involve the propagation of the virus. An appropriate biosafety level should be determined in accordance with a biosafety risk assessment. Additional information on performing biosafety risk assessments and establishing effective biosafety containment is available in the BMBL manual.

Identification of pre- and postselection TCRalphabeta+ intraepithelial lymphocyte precursors in the thymus.

The immune system preserves and makes use of autoreactive lymphocytes with specialized functions. Here we showed that one of these populations, CD8alphaalpha(+)TCRalphabeta(+) intestinal intraepithelial lymphocytes (IELs), arose from a unique subset of double-positive thymocytes. This subset of cells was precommitted to preferentially give rise to CD8alphaalpha(+)TCRalphabeta(+) IELs, but they required exposure to self-agonist peptides. The agonist-selected TCRalphabeta(+) thymocytes are CD4 and CD8 double-negative, and their final maturation, including the induction of CD8alphaalpha expression, appeared to occur only after thymus export in the IL-15-rich environment of the gut. These developmental steps, including precommitment of immature thymocytes, TCR-mediated agonist selection, and postthymic differentiation promoted by cytokines, define a unique pathway for the generation of CD8alphaalpha(+)TCRalphabeta(+) IEL.

The CD8 isoform CD8alphaalpha is not a functional homologue of the TCR co-receptor CD8alphabeta.

Although structurally similar, CD8alphabeta and CD8alphaalpha have notably diverted with regard to function. Whereas CD8alphabeta functions as a T-cell receptor (TCR) co-receptor on MHC-class-I-restricted thymocytes and mature T cells, CD8alphaalpha is unable to support conventional positive selection, and can be expressed on T cells independent of the MHC restriction of their TCR. CD8alphaalpha induction is consistent with antigenic stimulation through the TCR, and recent developments have now shown that CD8alphaalpha induced on agonist-triggered immature thymocytes, antigenic-stimulated conventional CD8alphabeta T cells and mucosal T cells mediates the specific modulation of TCR activation signals to facilitate their survival and differentiation into various specialized T-cell subsets.

An induced Ets repressor complex regulates growth arrest during terminal macrophage differentiation.

Defining the molecular mechanisms that coordinately regulate proliferation and differentiation is a central issue in development. Here, we describe a mechanism in which induction of the Ets repressor METS/PE1 links terminal differentiation to cell cycle arrest. Using macrophages as a model, we provide evidence that METS/PE1 blocks Ras-dependent proliferation without inhibiting Ras-dependent expression of cell type-specific genes by selectively replacing Ets activators on the promoters of cell cycle control genes. Antiproliferative effects of METS require its interaction with DP103, a DEAD box-containing protein that assembles a novel corepressor complex. Functional interactions between the METS/DP103 complex and E2F/ pRB family proteins are also necessary for inhibition of cellular proliferation, suggesting a combinatorial code that directs permanent cell cycle exit during terminal differentiation.