ABSTRACT
The capacity to initiate actions endogenously is critical for goal-directed behavior. Spontaneous voluntary actions are typically preceded by slow-ramping medial frontal cortex activity that begins around two seconds before movement, which may reflect spontaneous fluctuations that influence action timing. However, the mechanisms by which these slow ramping signals emerge from single-neuron and network dynamics remain poorly understood. Here, we developed a spiking neural network model that produces spontaneous slow ramping activity in single neurons and population activity with onsets â¼2 seconds before threshold crossings. A key prediction of our model is that neurons that ramp together have correlated firing patterns before ramping onset. We confirmed this model-derived hypothesis in a dataset of human single neuron recordings from medial frontal cortex. Our results suggest that slow ramping signals reflect bounded spontaneous fluctuations that emerge from quasi-winner-take-all dynamics in clustered networks that are temporally stabilized by slow-acting synapses. Highlights: We reveal a mechanism for slow-ramping signals before spontaneous voluntary movements.Slow synapses stabilize spontaneous fluctuations in spiking neural network.We validate model predictions in human frontal cortical single neuron recordingsThe model recreates the readiness potential in an EEG proxy signal.Neurons that ramp together had correlated activity before ramping onset.
ABSTRACT
Philosophical accounts of free will frequently appeal to deliberate, consequential, and purposeful decisions. However, some recent studies have found that laypeople attribute more freedom to arbitrary than to deliberate decisions. We hypothesized that these differences stem from diverging intuitions about concepts surrounding free will-especially freedom, being in control, and the ability to decide otherwise. In two studies, we found that laypeople attributed high levels of free will, freedom, and control to both arbitrary and deliberate decisions. However, subjects surprisingly attributed reduced ability to decide otherwise when faced with an "easy" decision with one clearly superior option. Furthermore, laypeople attributed greater free will, freedom, and control to "easy" than "hard" decisions with no clearly superior option. Our results suggest that laypeople have diverging intuitions about these different, free-will-related concepts. Therefore, a scientific account of free will may require integrating results from studies on different types of decision-making.
