Uncertainty About the Size of the Unauthorized Foreign-Born Population in the United States.

One of the most common methods for estimating the U.S. unauthorized foreign-born population is the residual method. Over the last decade, residual estimates have typically fallen within a narrow range of 10.5 to 12 million. Yet it remains unclear how sensitive residual estimates are to their underlying assumptions. We examine the extent to which estimates may plausibly vary owing to uncertainties in their underlying assumptions about coverage error, emigration, and mortality. Findings show that most of the range in residual estimates derives from uncertainty about emigration rates among legal permanent residents, naturalized citizens, and humanitarian entrants (LNH); estimates are less sensitive to assumptions about mortality among the LNH foreign-born and coverage error for the unauthorized and LNH populations in U.S. Census Bureau surveys. Nevertheless, uncertainty in all three assumptions contributes to a range of estimates, whereby there is a 50% chance that the unauthorized foreign-born population falls between 9.1 and 12.2 million and a 95% chance that it falls between 7.0 and 15.7 million.

Commentary on "The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States: Estimates based on demographic modeling with data from 1990-2016".

"The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States: Estimates based on demographic modeling with data from 1990-2016" by Fazel-Zarandi, Feinstein and Kaplan presents strikingly higher estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population than established estimates using the residual method. Fazel-Zarandi et. al.'s estimates range from a low or "conservative" number of 16.7 million unauthorized immigrants, to an "average" of 22.1 million, and to a high of 27.5 million. The Pew Hispanic Center estimated the population at 11.3 million in 2016, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated it at 12.3 million. The new method shows much more rapid growth in unauthorized immigration during the 1990s and a substantially higher population in 2000 (13.3 million according to their "conservative" model) than Pew (8.6 million) and DHS (8.5 million). In this commentary, we explain that such an estimate for 2000 is implausible, as it suggests that the 2000 Census undercounted the unauthorized immigrant population by at least 42% in the 2000 Census, and it is misaligned with other demographic data. Fazel-Zarandi, Feinstein and Kaplan's model produces estimates that have a 10 million-person range in 2016, far too wide to be useful for public policy purposes; their estimates are not benchmarked against any external data sources; and their model appears to be driven by assumptions about return migration of unauthorized immigrants during the 1990s. Using emigration rates from the binational Mexican Migration Project survey for the illegal border-crosser portion of the unauthorized population, we generate a 2000 unauthorized population estimate of 8.2 million-slightly below Pew and DHS's estimates-without changing other assumptions in the model. We conclude that this new model's estimates are highly sensitive to assumptions about emigration, and moreover, that the knowledge base about emigration in the unauthorized population during the 1990s is not well enough developed to support the model underlying their estimates.

Looking Down or Looking Up: Status and Subjective Well-Being among Asian and Latino Immigrants in the United States.

Foundational theories of international migration rest on the assumption that immigrants maintain reference groups in their country of origin even after settling in a new place, while the transnationalism perspective suggests that immigrants maintain a dual frame of reference. This paper uses the nationally-representative National Latino and Asian American Survey to test the location of immigrants' reference groups. I find that the relationship between various measures of subjective social standing and subjective well-being suggests that immigrants maintain simultaneous reference groups in both the United States and the country of origin, supporting transnational theories, and refuting earlier theories.

What Happened to the Wages of Mexican Immigrants? Trends and Interpretations.

Over the past several decades the wages earned by Mexican immigrants stagnated relative to those earned by native Mexican Americans and non-Hispanic whites. In this article we draw on data from the decennial census and American Community Survey to understand why and how this stagnation occurred. We test two competing explanations: a decline in the quality of successive cohorts of Mexican immigrants and a shift in the political economy that increased the number of people lacking full labor rights in the United States while increasing discrimination and exclusion against such people. We present evidence in favor of the latter explanation by showing that observed quality increased rather than decreased and that what happened instead was a systematic decline in the returns to various measures of human capital and a wholesale drop in wages for all immigrants after 2000.