ABSTRACT
This essay explores the mostly unexamined analogy of psychoanalytic free association to democratic free speech. The author turns back to a time when free speech was a matter of considerable discussion: the classical period of the Athenian constitution and its experiment with parrhesia. Ordinarily translated into English as "free speech," parrhesia is startlingly relevant to psychoanalysis. The Athenian stage-in particular, Hippolytus (Euripides, 5th century BCE)-illustrates this point. Euripides's tragic tale anticipates Freud's inquiries, exploring the fundamental link between free speech and female embodiment. The author suggests that psychoanalysis should claim its own conception of a polis as a mediated and ethical space between private and public spheres, between body and mind, and between speaking and listening communities.
Subject(s)
Free Association , Freudian Theory , Psychoanalysis , Psychoanalytic Therapy , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
Elaborating upon Winnicott's seminal contributions on the transitional object, the author proposes a conception of a transitional subject in which the patient comes into being simultaneously between private and public, subjective creation and material life, me and not-me. By anchoring subjective creation in the real world (including the body), the patient creates a basis for authentic psychesoma as well as for both personal and symbolic contributions to the world beyond omnipotence, including the world of other subjects. In this sense, intersubjective life is seen as predicated upon transitionality, with the patient seen as simultaneously coming into being as a distinctly personal subject and, in part, as a symbol. Clinical phenomenology is described and is interpreted with respect to the need within psychoanalysis itself for a third, and for a realm of meaning-creation that lies beyond privacy, omnipotence, and the dyad.
Subject(s)
Privacy , Psychoanalytic Interpretation , Self Concept , Social Environment , HumansABSTRACT
Recent theories of intersubjectivity attach primacy to the creation of meaning between subjects, obscuring the role of the material world to which both Freud and Winnicott attached significance. Yet, as this article argues, intersubjectivity itself is predicated upon a transitional space between subjective creation and material life. After considering Winnicott's conceptions of psychesoma and transitionality, the author examines the developmental literature for precursors in the encounter with matter that set the stage for the emergence both of symbolic life and of an embodied "transitional subject" to come into being. Clinical illustrations are provided.
