Evaluation of the statutory surveillance system for invasive MRSA infections in Germany, 2016-2017.

BACKGROUND: Mandatory notification of invasive methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections was introduced for laboratories in Germany in 2009. The aims were to support local health authorities (LHAs) in their mandate to prevent and control infections in hospitals and to improve population-based nationwide surveillance of healthcare associated infections. We evaluated the MRSA surveillance system to assess whether its aims were met and to identify areas for improvement. METHODS: Using the updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention we assessed the attributes simplicity, timeliness, data quality, acceptability, and usefulness. In 2016/2017 we interviewed staff in LHAs, state health authorities (SHAs), and laboratories and analyzed surveillance data of cases notified between 2009 and 2016. RESULTS: We interviewed 10% of LHAs (n = 38), 63% of SHAs (n = 10), 5 selected laboratories and analyzed information on 27,706 notified MRSA cases. LHAs reported that on receiving notifications from laboratories they contacted hospitals for clinical information, which was time-consuming and complicated as physicians were hard to reach or refused to answer questions, citing doctor-patient confidentiality. LHAs suggested reducing the amount of information collected as some clinical information was unnecessary for implementing control measures. LHAs stated that they received notifications on time, however surveillance data analysis showed some delay. Data completeness exceeded 90% for most variables, however it was only 68% and 80% for dates of disease onset and hospital admission respectively making it impossible to discriminate between hospital and community acquired infections in half of the cases. The surveillance system was well accepted by half of the interviewees. A third however stated that the benefits of the surveillance system were outweighed by the work associated with it. The majority rated the system to be useful for recognizing trends in the MRSA incidence and the ability to check up on infection control measures in hospitals. CONCLUSIONS: The surveillance system proved to be useful by fulfilling its aims. It was timely, acceptable and provided complete data for most variables. However, the system was complicated; ensuring that only relevant variables are reported could simplify the system without losing any of its usefulness.

Estimating true incidence of O157 and non-O157 Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli illness in Germany based on notification data of haemolytic uraemic syndrome.

Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) is an important cause of gastroenteritis (GE) and haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS). Incidence of STEC illness is largely underestimated in notification data, particularly of serogroups other than O157 ('non-O157'). Using HUS national notification data (2008-2012, excluding 2011), we modelled true annual incidence of STEC illness in Germany separately for O157 and non-O157 STEC, taking into account the groups' different probabilities of causing bloody diarrhoea and HUS, and the resulting difference in their under-ascertainment. Uncertainty of input parameters was evaluated by stochastic Monte Carlo simulations. Median annual incidence (per 100 000 population) of STEC-associated HUS and STEC-GE was estimated at 0·11 [95% credible interval (CrI) 0·08-0·20], and 35 (95% CrI 12-145), respectively. German notification data underestimated STEC-associated HUS and STEC-GE incidences by factors of 1·8 and 32·3, respectively. Non-O157 STEC accounted for 81% of all STEC-GE, 51% of all bloody STEC-GE and 32% of all STEC-associated HUS cases. Non-O157 serogroups dominate incidence of STEC-GE and contribute significantly to STEC-associated HUS in Germany. This might apply to many other countries considering European surveillance data on HUS. Non-O157 STEC should be considered in parallel with STEC O157 when searching aetiology in patients with GE or HUS, and accounted for in modern surveillance systems.

Ebola response missions: to go or not to go? Cross-sectional study on the motivation of European public health experts, December 2014.

We surveyed European infectious disease epidemiologists and microbiologists about their decisions to apply for Ebola response missions. Of 368 respondents, 49 (15%) had applied. Applicants did not differ from non-applicants in terms of age, sex or profession but had more training in field epidemiology and more international experience. Common concerns included lack of support from families and employers. Clearer terms of reference and support from employers could motivate application and support outbreak response in West Africa.

[The 2015 edition of case definitions for the surveillance of notifiable infectious diseases in Germany]. / Falldefinitionen für die Surveillance meldepflichtiger Infektionskrankheiten in Deutschland, Ausgabe 2015.

Case definitions ensure standardised criteria for the surveillance of infectious diseases in Germany. Since its last revision in 2007, an update of the complete case definition edition became necessary due to new scientific insights, changes in legislature, terminology and classification systems. At the same time, the case definition should be further standardised and work at local public health authorities should be simplified. The department for infectious disease epidemiology at the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) coordinated the revision of the case definitions. During several feedback sessions, internal RKI experts and external experts from different levels of the German public health system, as well as from medical associations and laboratories, were involved in the revision process. The new edition and an annotated version are published on the RKI website (www.rki.de/falldefinitionen). The new case definitions will become effective on 1st January 2015. The most important changes are summarised in this article.

The disease burden of hepatitis B, influenza, measles and salmonellosis in Germany: first results of the burden of communicable diseases in Europe study.

Setting priorities in the field of infectious diseases requires evidence-based and robust baseline estimates of disease burden. Therefore, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control initiated the Burden of Communicable Diseases in Europe (BCoDE) project. The project uses an incidence- and pathogen-based approach to measure the impact of both acute illness and sequelae of infectious diseases expressed in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). This study presents first estimates of disease burden for four pathogens in Germany. The number of reported incident cases adjusted for underestimation served as model input. For the study period 2005-2007, the average disease burden was estimated at 33 116 DALYs/year for influenza virus, 19 115 DALYs/year for Salmonella spp., 8708 DALYs/year for hepatitis B virus and 740 DALYs/year for measles virus. This methodology highlights the importance of sequelae, particularly for hepatitis B and salmonellosis, because if omitted, the burden would have been underestimated by 98% and 56%, respectively.

[The 2011 HUS epidemic in Germany. Challenges for disease control: what should be improved?]. / Der HUS-Ausbruch 2011 in Deutschland: Herausforderungen für den Infektionsschutz: Was sollte verbessert werden?

From May to July 2011 [corrected] the world's largest outbreak of hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) occurred in northern Germany with dramatic consequences for the population, the health care system and the food industry. In the following we examine the detection of the outbreak, epidemic management and related public communication aspects based on scientific publications, media reports as well as own and new data analyses. The subsequent 17 recommendations concern issues such as participation in and implementation of existing and new surveillance systems particularly with respect to physicians, broad application of finely tuned microbiological typing, improved personnel capacity and crisis management structures within the public health service and evidence-based communication by administrations and scientific associations. Outbreaks of similar dimensions can inevitably occur again and result in costs which will far exceed investments needed for early detection and control. This societal balance should be taken into account in spite of limited resources in the public health sector.

Large and ongoing outbreak of haemolytic uraemic syndrome, Germany, May 2011.

Since early May 2011, an increased incidence of haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS) and bloody diarrhoea related to infections with Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) has been observed in Germany, with most cases in the north of the country. Cases reported from other European countries had travelled to this area. First results of a case­control study conducted in Hamburg suggest an association between the occurrence of disease and the consumption of raw tomatoes, cucumber and leaf salad.

Prioritisation of infectious diseases in public health: feedback on the prioritisation methodology, 15 July 2008 to 15 January 2009.

In 2004, the German public health institute, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), prioritised pathogens by public health criteria and presented the methodology and findings. In order to further improve the methodology, the RKI invited experts to give feedback on this via a structured web-based questionnaire. The survey was completed by 72 participants during 15 July 2008 to 15 January 2009. Prioritisation of pathogens was considered as useful for public health purposes by 68 participants and for both surveillance and epidemiological research by 64 participants. Additional pathogens were suggested, including some that are resistant to antimicrobials. The criteria incidence, severity, outbreak potential, emerging potential and preventability were each considered as useful or very useful for the prioritisation (by more than 65 participants for each criterion). Weighting of the criteria was judged as relevant or very relevant by 67 of participants, but needs more explanation. It was also suggested that the group carrying out the prioritisation be composed of a median of 15 experts (range: 5­1,000). The feedback obtained in the survey has been taken into account in the modification of the methodology for the next round of prioritisation, which started in December 2010.

[First exchange of experiences concerning the H1N1 pandemic in Germany 2009/2010: report on a workshop held March 22-23, 2010, in Berlin]. / Erster Erfahrungsaustausch zur H1N1-Pandemie in Deutschland 2009/2010: Bericht über einen Workshop am 22. und 23. März 2010 in Berlin.

In April 2009 the first pandemic of the 21st century developed within a few weeks starting from Mexico. Its first wave reached Germany in autumn 2009 and was responsible for 1.8-3.5 million additional medical consultations. For the public health sector, this pandemic was one of the largest challenges of the last few decades. As a contribution to broader evaluations on national and international level, the Robert Koch Institute invited representatives from different professions involved in the pandemic response to participate in a workshop on 22-23 March 2010. This workshop was structured in short presentations, group work, and plenary discussions. Main experiences were that (a) pandemic preparedness was helpful, (b) the early warning systems were reliable, (c) vaccines were available within a few months, however, in limited amounts. Need for improvement was discussed for (a) effectiveness of vaccination logistics, (b) mechanisms for the reimbursement of the cost of vaccination, (c) availability of surveillance and monitoring systems, (d) integration of physicians in decision-making processes and health education, and (e) proactive communication strategies. Investments in the above mentioned areas can help to improve public health protection in the future.

Needs and obstacles of uniform immunisation schedules in the European Union.

Immunisation schedules are developed by national committees on immunisation and may differ considerably between the European Union (EU) member states (MS). The European Commission has launched an initiative for a council recommendation with the aim to establish a scientifically substantiated reference childhood immunisation schedule for the EU. In our view this initiative implies the establishment of one European childhood immunisation schedule, which could lead to the perception that this schedule is the only one scientifically justified. The expectations that one uniform immunisation schedule will facilitate mobility of EU residents, improve data collection and increase vaccination coverage are either quantitatively or qualitatively not relevant or even ethically problematic. Arguments that uniform schedules would lead to lower vaccine prices and reduce the need for clinical trials appear to be more relevant but could be addressed more effectively by other measures. On the other hand the following factors may differ substantially between MS and thus support different immunisation schedules, such as (a) values and goals, (b) epidemiological situation, (c) health care delivery system, (d) logistics of vaccine delivery and (e) economic situation. We argue that uniform schedules should not be perceived as a goal in itself but rather as a possibly desired by-product following increasing agreement on goals and values between MS and improved evidence base to be used by national committees on immunisation.

Large Q fever outbreak due to sheep farming near residential areas, Germany, 2005.

In June 2005 Coxiella burnetii-infected sheep, grazing and lambing on a meadow bordering a residential area, caused a large Q fever outbreak (331 cases) in Germany. Our outbreak investigation provided attack rates (AR) by distance between residence and meadow, sex and age groups. The AR of people living within 50 m of the meadow was 11.8%. It decreased the further the residence was from the meadow, falling to 1.3% at 350-400 m distance (RR 8.7, 95% CI 4.5-17.1). The AR was higher in men (RR 1.4, 95% CI 1.1-1.8). In the 25-64 years age group, the AR was 2.3 times higher compared to other age groups (95% CI 1.7-3.0). The distance-related AR showed a relationship between risk of infection and living close to the meadow. Ongoing urbanization will probably lead to further Q fever outbreaks, hence prevention activities undertaken by animal and public health practitioners should be aligned and strengthened.

Two clusters of human infection with influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Republic of Azerbaijan, February-March 2006.

Following the appearance of influenza A/H5 virus infection in several wild and domestic bird species in the Republic of Azerbaijan in February 2006, two clusters of potential human avian influenza due to A/H5N1 (HAI) cases were detected and reported by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe during the first two weeks of March 2006. On 15 March 2006, WHO led an international team, including infection control, clinical management, epidemiology, laboratory, and communications experts, to support the MoH in investigation and response activities. As a result of active surveillance, 22 individuals, including six deaths, were evaluated for HAI and associated risk infections in six districts. The investigations revealed eight cases with influenza A/H5N1 virus infection confirmed by a WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza and one probable case for which samples were not available. The cases were in two unrelated clusters in Salyan (seven laboratory confirmed cases, including four deaths) and Tarter districts (one confirmed case and one probable case, both fatal). Close contact with and de-feathering of infected wild swans was considered to be the most plausible source of exposure to influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Salyan cluster, although difficulties in eliciting information were encountered during the investigation, because of the illegality of some of the activities that might have led to the exposures (hunting and trading in wild birds and their products). These cases constitute the first outbreak worldwide where wild birds were the most likely source of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection in humans. The rapid mobilisation of resources to contain the spread of influenza A/H5 in the two districts was achieved through collaboration between the MoH, WHO and its international partners. Control activities were supported by the establishment of a field laboratory with real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) capacity to detect influenza A/H5 virus. Daily door-to-door surveillance undertaken in the two affected districts made it unlikely that human cases of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection remained undetected.

Two clusters of human infection with influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Republic of Azerbaijan, February-March 2006.

Following the appearance of influenza A/H5 virus infection in several wild and domestic bird species in the Republic of Azerbaijan in February 2006, two clusters of potential human avian influenza due to A/H5N1 (HAI) cases were detected and reported by the Ministry of Health (MoH) to the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe during the first two weeks of March 2006. On 15 March 2006, WHO led an international team, including infection control, clinical management, epidemiology, laboratory, and communications experts, to support the MoH in investigation and response activities. As a result of active surveillance, 22 individuals, including six deaths, were evaluated for HAI and associated risk infections in six districts. The investigations revealed eight cases with influenza A/H5N1 virus infection confirmed by a WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza and one probable case for which samples were not available. The cases were in two unrelated clusters in Salyan (seven laboratory confirmed cases, including four deaths) and Tarter districts (one confirmed case and one probable case, both fatal). Close contact with and de-feathering of infected wild swans was considered to be the most plausible source of exposure to influenza A/H5N1 virus in the Salyan cluster, although difficulties in eliciting information were encountered during the investigation, because of the illegality of some of the activities that might have led to the exposures (hunting and trading in wild birds and their products). These cases constitute the first outbreak worldwide where wild birds were the most likely source of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection in humans. The rapid mobilisation of resources to contain the spread of influenza A/H5 in the two districts was achieved through collaboration between the MoH, WHO and its international partners. Control activities were supported by the establishment of a field laboratory with real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) capacity to detect influenza A/H5 virus. Daily door-to-door surveillance undertaken in the two affected districts made it unlikely that human cases of influenza A/H5N1 virus infection remained undetected.