Neuroimaging in criminal trials and the role of psychiatrists expert witnesses: A case study.

Various neuroscientific techniques are increasingly being used in criminal courts causing a vivid debate on the way that this kind of techniques will and should be used as scientific evidence. The role of experts in this context is important, since it is them that analyse, present, interpret and communicate the results of these techniques to the judges and the jury. In an attempt to contribute to the discussion about the role of the experts in criminal cases where neuroimaging evidence was introduced, we examined twenty seven cases from the US and Europe. Focusing on the role of experts and their presentation of neuroscientific evidence, we aimed to examine the extent to which neuroimaging data can contribute to the construction of a solid and more objective, "scientifically - based" case. We found that neurobiological information introduced through experts' testimony is generally used in order to demonstrate some physical, organic base of a psychiatric condition, or/and in order to make visible some brain lesion, (structural or functional), susceptible to have affected the capacity to reason and to control one's impulses. While neuroimaging evidence is often presented by the defence as a scientific method able to offer a precise diagnosis of the pathology in question, our case analysis shows that the very same neurobiological evidence can be interpreted in different - sometimes diametrically opposed - ways by defence and State experts. Conflicting testimony about the same empirical evidence goes against the hypothesis of neuroscientific techniques constituting "objective and hard evidence", able to reach solid, scientific and objective conclusions. Frequent conflicts between neuroimaging experts require the courts to deal with the resulting uncertainty. As the law changes with technology, it is necessary for legal professionals to train and be prepared for the new issues they may encounter in light of new developments in neuroscience, so that they become more vigilant as to the interpretation of neuroscientific data.

Neuroscience in forensic psychiatry: From responsibility to dangerousness. Ethical and legal implications of using neuroscience for dangerousness assessments.

Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in criminal trials as part of psychiatric testimony. Up to now, "neurolaw" literature remained focused on the use of neuroscience for assessments of criminal responsibility. However, in the field of forensic psychiatry, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness and risk assessment gain increasing importance. In this paper, we argue that the introduction of neuroscientific data by forensic experts in criminal trials will be mostly be used in the future as a means to evaluate or as an indication of an offender's dangerousness, rather than their responsibility. Judges confronted with the pressure to ensure public security may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's risk of reoffending. First, we aim to show how the current socio-legal context has reshaped the task of the forensic psychiatrist, with dangerousness assessments prevailing. In the second part, we examine from a critical point of view the promise of neuroscience to serve a better criminal justice system by offering new tools for risk assessment. Then we aim to explain why neuroscientific evidence is likely to be used as evidence of dangerousness of the defendants. On a theoretical level, the current tendency in criminal policies to focus on prognostics of dangerousness seems to be "justified" by a utilitarian approach to punishment, supposedly revealed by new neuroscientific discoveries that challenge the notions of free will and responsibility. Although often promoted as progressive and humane, we believe that this approach could lead to an instrumentalization of neuroscience in the interest of public safety and give rise to interventions which could entail ethical caveats and run counter to the interests of the offenders. The last part of this paper deals with some of these issues-the danger of stigmatization for brain damaged offenders because of adopting a purely therapeutic approach to crime, and the impact on their sentencing, in particular.