Nonlocal neurology: beyond localization to holonomy.

The concept of local pathology has long served neurology admirably. Relevant models include self-organizing nonlinear brain dynamics, global workspace and dynamic core theories. However such models are inconsistent with certain clinical phenomena found in Charles Bonnet syndrome, disjunctive agnosia and schizophrenia, where there is disunity of content within the unity of consciousness. This is contrasted with the split-brain case where there is disunity of content and disunity of consciousnesses. The development of quantum brain theory with it nonlocal mechanisms under the law of the whole ("holonomy") offers new possibilities for explaining disintegration within unity. Dissipative quantum brain dynamics and its approach to the binding problem, memory and consciousness are presented. A nonlocal neurology armed with a holonomic understanding might see more deeply into what clinical neurology has always aspired to: the patient as a whole.

Psychiatry and the new dynamics.

Self-organizing and self-tuning neural networks are conceptualized as nonlinear dynamical systems. It is shown that biological psychiatry can be encompassed within this nonlinear dynamical framework, where it becomes coherent with trends in cognitive science. A state space representation that is a hyperspace with an energy topology and a fractal dimension is utilized. The state space representation provides a unifying framework for the classification of mental disorders. Clinical phenomena in schizophrenia can be explained in terms of nonlinear dynamics. The framework is also productive of psychiatric research. These results motivate the development of a nonlinear dynamical psychiatry.

Toward a noncomputational cognitive neuroscience.

The near universally accepted theory that the brain processes information persists in current neural network theory where there is "subsymbolic" computation (Smolensky, 1988) on distributed representations. This theory of brain information processing may suffice for simplifying models simulated in silicon but not for living neural nets where there is ongoing chemical tuning of the input/output transfer function at the nodes, connection weights, network parameters, and connectivity. Here the brain continually changes itself as it intersects with information from the outside. An alternative theory to information processing is developed in which the brain permits and supports "participation" of self and other as constraints on the dynamically evolving, self-organizing whole. The noncomputational process of "differing and deferring" in nonlinear dynamic neural systems is contrasted with Black's (1991) account of molecular information processing. State hyperspace for the noncomputational process of nonlinear dynamical systems, unlike classical systems, has a fractal dimension. The noncomputational model is supported by suggestive evidence for fractal properties of the brain.

On "I": the conceptual foundations of responsibility.

In clinical practice, great emphasis is placed on the patient's being responsible, yet the conceptual bases of this therapeutic posture are obscure. The author examines the conceptual foundations of responsibility by focusing on the subjective "I". Although "I" is widely considered to be an empty term, signifying only an illusory "ghost in the machine," the author argues that our acquaintance with "I" is acceptable at face value. "I" is strictly identified with the tacit, rule-governed, grammatical actions of distinguishing (or meaning) that constitute the experienced personal world. The author discusses the clinically important distinction between "having" and "assuming" responsibility.