Driving factors of individual differences in broad retrieval ability: Gr is more than the sum of its parts.

Broad retrieval ability (Gr) posits an essential factor of human cognitive abilities. Previous literature indicates Gr is best modeled as a higher-order factor model with lower-level factors such as ideational fluency (IF), word fluency (WF), expressional fluency (EF), or figural fluency (FF). However, the dimensionality of Gr is not well studied. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether specific retrieval affordances such as differing retrieval time periods (e.g., short vs. long) can be psychometrically separated from more general retrieval affordances. Such a distinction would imply differential associations between specific retrieval, general retrieval, and other cognitive abilities, which, in turn, depict a vital part of explanatory models of individual differences in Gr. To test these assumptions, we conducted a multivariate study (N = 331) and evaluated competing latent variable measurement models for a variety of Gr tests. We then regressed the best measurement model onto working memory capacity, secondary memory, mental speed, and crystallized intelligence in order to evaluate the distinctiveness of Gr. Our results suggest that no specific retrieval affordances with regard to time periods can be distinguished. A higher-order model, with a second-order Gr factor above three first-order factors (IF, WF, EF, and FF) fitted the data best, extending previous literature by increasing construct coverage through the implementation of FF. All covariates show incremental predictive validity, beyond their communality. Summarizing, our results endorse a perspective on Gr as a strong and discriminant factor of cognitive abilities that is not affected by time constraints, and show that Gr is more than a linear combination of its parts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The Nomological Net of Knowledge, Self-Reported Knowledge, and Overclaiming in Children.

Research on self-reported knowledge and overclaiming in children is sparse. With the current study, we aim to close this gap by developing an overclaiming questionnaire measuring self-reported knowledge and overclaiming that is tailored to children. Moreover, we examine the nomological net of self-reported knowledge and overclaiming in childhood discussing three perspectives: Overclaiming as (a) a result of deliberate self-enhancement tendencies, (b) a proxy for declarative knowledge, and (c) an indicator of creative engagement. We juxtaposed overclaiming, as indicated by claiming familiarity with non-existent terms, and self-reported knowledge with fluid and crystallized intelligence, creativity, and personality traits in a sample of 897 children attending third grade. The results of several latent variable analyses were similar to findings known from adult samples: We found no strong evidence for any of the competing perspectives on overclaiming. Just like in adults, individual differences in self-reported knowledge were strongly inflated by overclaiming, and only weakly related to declarative knowledge.

Stop Worrying about Multiple-Choice: Fact Knowledge Does Not Change with Response Format.

Declarative fact knowledge is a key component of crystallized intelligence. It is typically measured with multiple-choice (MC) items. Other response formats, such as open-ended formats are less frequently used, although these formats might be superior for measuring crystallized intelligence. Whereas MC formats presumably only require recognizing the correct response to a question, open-ended formats supposedly require cognitive processes such as searching for, retrieving, and actively deciding on a response from long-term memory. If the methods of inquiry alter the cognitive processes involved, mean-changes between methods for assessing declarative knowledge should come along with changes in the covariance structure. We tested these assumptions in two online studies administering declarative knowledge items in different response formats (MC, open-ended, and open-ended with cues). Item difficulty clearly increases in the open-ended methods although effects in logistic regression models vary slightly across items. Importantly, latent variable analyses suggest that the method of inquiry does not affect what is measured with different response formats. These findings clearly endorse the position that crystallized intelligence does not change as a function of the response format.

Is long-term memory used in a visuo-spatial change-detection paradigm?

In tests of working memory with verbal or spatial materials, repeating the same memory sets across trials leads to improved memory performance. This well-established "Hebb repetition effect" could not be shown for visual materials in previous research. The absence of the Hebb effect can be explained in two ways: Either persons fail to acquire a long-term memory representation of the repeated memory sets, or they acquire such long-term memory representations, but fail to use them during the working memory task. In two experiments (N1 = 18 and N2 = 30), we aimed to decide between these two possibilities by manipulating the long-term memory knowledge of some of the memory sets used in a change-detection task. Before the change-detection test, participants learned three arrays of colors to criterion. The subsequent change-detection test contained both previously learned and new color arrays. Change detection performance was better on previously learned compared with new arrays, showing that long-term memory is used in change detection.

Binding Costs in Processing Efficiency as Determinants of Cognitive Ability.

Performance in elementary cognitive tasks is moderately correlated with fluid intelligence and working memory capacity. These correlations are higher for more complex tasks, presumably due to increased demands on working memory capacity. In accordance with the binding hypothesis, which states that working memory capacity reflects the limit of a person's ability to establish and maintain temporary bindings (e.g., relations between items or relations between items and their context), we manipulated binding requirements (i.e., 2, 4, and 6 relations) in three choice reaction time paradigms (i.e., two comparison tasks, two change detection tasks, and two substitution tasks) measuring mental speed. Response time distributions of 115 participants were analyzed with the diffusion model. Higher binding requirements resulted in generally reduced efficiency of information processing, as indicated by lower drift rates. Additionally, we fitted bi-factor confirmatory factor analysis to the elementary cognitive tasks to separate basal speed and binding requirements of the employed tasks to quantify their specific contributions to working memory capacity, as measured by Recall-1-Back tasks. A latent factor capturing individual differences in binding was incrementally predictive of working memory capacity, over and above a general factor capturing speed. These results indicate that the relation between reaction time tasks and working memory capacity hinges on the complexity of the reaction time tasks. We conclude that binding requirements and, therefore, demands on working memory capacity offer a satisfactory account of task complexity that accounts for a large portion of individual differences in ability.