What is the use? An international look at reuse of single-use medical devices.

Reuse of single-use devices is common in most countries worldwide. We provide an overview of the issue from an international perspective. In many developing and transitional countries reuse of cheap single-use devices (needles, syringes, surgical gloves) is common leading to large numbers of unsafe interventions, specifically injections and, as a consequence, infection with hepatitis B, C or HIV. There are various reasons for reuse: limited resources, insufficient knowledge of healthcare workers and the belief of patients that injection is more beneficial than oral medication. Reuse of cheap single-use devices should cease and both medical staff and the public should be informed about potential safety risks associated with injection. In developed countries, reuse of single-use items is less common but may include expensive technical products. Reuse is regulated in many countries (e.g. US, Canada, some European countries) demanding ethical and legal considerations, high standards of reprocessing and training of staff, risk assessment, management and validation of reprocessing. Well regulated reprocessing can decrease the number of single-use devices reprocessed. In developing as well as developed countries, a decision to reprocess single-use devices should only be made after a critical reflection of advantages and disadvantages.

An outbreak of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium in an acute care pediatric hospital: Lessons from environmental screening and a case-control study.

BACKGROUND: The present study describes a vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) outbreak investigation and a case-control study to identify risk factors for VRE acquisition in a tertiary care pediatric hospital. OBJECTIVE: To report an outbreak investigation and a case-control study to identify risk factors for VRE colonization or infection in hospitalized children. METHODS: Screening for VRE cases was performed by culture or polymerase chain reaction. A case-control study of VRE-colonized patients was undertaken. Environmental screening was performed using standard culture and susceptibility methods, with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis to determine relationships between VRE isolates. Statistical analysis was performed using SAS version 9.0 (SAS Institute Inc, USA). RESULTS: Thirty-four VRE-positive cases were identified on 10 wards between February 28, 2005, and May 27, 2005. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis confirmed a single outbreak strain that was also isolated from a video game found on one affected ward. Multivariate analysis identified cephalosporin use as the major risk factor for VRE colonization. CONCLUSIONS: In the present study outbreak, VRE colonization was significantly associated with cephalosporin use. Because shared recreational items and environmental surfaces may be colonized by VRE, they warrant particular attention in housekeeping protocols, particularly in pediatric institutions.

Survey of isolation practices at a tertiary care pediatric hospital.

BACKGROUND: Although isolation precautions are an important aspect of hospital infection control, current rates of isolation in a pediatric hospital and rates of compliance with established precautions are unknown. We therefore initiated hospital-wide point prevalence studies to determine unit-specific rates of patient isolation and compliance with proper isolation requirements focusing on communication of isolation status and availability of personal protective equipment. In this report, we present data from the first 14 months of the study. METHODS: This was a prospective observational study. Twice monthly, between January 2004 and February 2005, infection control professionals reviewed the types and appropriateness of isolation of all hospitalized patients, except for those on the psychiatry unit. RESULTS: Seventeen percent of patients in the hospital during the study period were isolated, most frequently for community-acquired infections. Droplet isolation precautions were the most common form of isolation. Overall, only 74.6% of patients were isolated appropriately. The solid organ transplantation, hematology/oncology, and bone marrow transplantation units were those with the highest rates of inappropriate isolation. CONCLUSION: At our hospital, community-acquired infections, in particular respiratory infections, were the most common reasons for patient isolation. Monitoring of the appropriateness of isolation precautions offers the opportunity to reduce health care-related transmission of infection and identify specific target areas for improvement.

A point prevalence survey of health care-associated infections in pediatric populations in major Canadian acute care hospitals.

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the prevalence of pediatric health care-associated infections (HAI) in Canadian acute care hospitals. METHODS: A point-prevalence study conducted in February 2002 in 25 hospitals across Canada. Information on HAI, utilization of antimicrobial agents and invasive devices, isolation precautions, and microbial etiology was collected. RESULTS: Nine hundred ninety-seven children were surveyed. Ninety-one HAI were detected in 80 patients for a prevalence of 91 per 1000 patients surveyed. Bloodstream infections were the most common HAI (3% of patients; 34% of all HAI). The prevalence of patients with HAI was 8%, ranging from 0% in trauma/bum units to 19% in the pediatric intensive care units, and 27% in transplant units. By multivariate logistic regression analysis, having a central venous catheter (OR, 2.54; 95% CI, 1.46-4.40) or endotracheal tube with mechanical ventilation (OR, 2.59; 95% CI, 1.16-5.76) were independently associated with an HAI, as were being in isolation (OR, 2.90; 95% CI, 1.54-5.45), and receiving antimicrobial agents (OR, 9.27; 95% CI, 4.71-18.52). CONCLUSION: In this first national point-prevalence study in Canada, the prevalence of HAI was similar to that reported in other industrialized countries. These data will also be useful to provide an estimate of the health burden of pediatric HAI in Canada.

Enteral tube hub as a reservoir for transmissible enteric bacteria.

Enteral feeding is a risk factor for cross transmission of microbes. Administration set tubing can be colonized by organisms present in the enteral tube hub; molecular typing has demonstrated genetic relatedness of enteric bacteria isolated from both sites. Strict attention to infection control measures is imperative when handling enteral feed apparatuses.

Microbial contamination of enteral feed administration sets in a pediatric institution.

BACKGROUND: Enteral feeding tubes have been associated with outbreaks of antimicrobial-resistant organisms, but the pathogenesis of this association has not been investigated. We hypothesized that the enteral feed administration sets become colonized externally by microbes grown from the enteral tube hub, and therefore serve as a reservoir of organisms that can be crosstransmitted. METHODS: We conducted a prospective observational cohort pilot study, obtaining bacterial cultures from the external enteral feed administration set and from the hub of nasogastric, gastric, or gastrojejunal tubes in children receiving enteral feeding while hospitalized in a tertiary care pediatric hospital. RESULTS: Thirty-six of 37 hubs cultured had bacterial growth. Twenty-nine of 36 administration sets (78%) sampled had at least 1 microbe isolated that was also cultured from the hub. No significant risk factors for colonization were identified. CONCLUSIONS: Enteral feed administration sets are frequently colonized by organisms in the enteral tube hub. These sets can serve as a reservoir of organisms that can be crosstransmitted between patients. Adherence to Standard Precautions is critical when handling enteral feeding apparatuses.

Infection control and paediatric tuberculosis: A practical guide for the practicing paediatrician.

Tuberculosis (TB) in children requires close attention to infection control to prevent transmission to other patients and health care workers. Although many children with TB are not infectious, appropriate airborne precautions must be maintained until conditions that increase the risk of transmission have been ruled out and accompanying adults, who may also be infectious, have been screened. Concurrent strategies to prevent TB transmission should be implemented, including administrative, engineering and personal protective measures. The most important measure is maintaining a high clinical index of suspicion for TB in patients with compatible symptoms and epidemiological risk factors. Comprehensive tuberculin skin test programmes and the use of N 95 masks can reduce the risk of transmission within health care settings. Current standards of practice should be followed to prevent transmission from patients with active TB disease.