[Family structure, parental support, and leaving home among young Americans in the twentieth century]. / Composition familiale, soutien parental et depart du foyer des jeunes Americains au XXe siecle.

"This paper examines the effects of childhood family structure on patterns of home leaving (route and timing). The analysis uses data from the [U.S.] National Survey of Families and Households.... Family disruption is linked with leaving home via all routes except college attendance.... We interpret the results as indicating the ways the parental home provides the resources needed for a successful launching into adult independence or prompts leaving home either too early, or to new living arrangements likely to make establishing a stable independent adult role set more difficult." (SUMMARY IN ENG AND SPA)

Patterns of contraceptive use in the United States: the importance of religious factors.

Previous research has shown that the major religious communities in the US have all shifted their expected family size downward but significant differences in contraceptive use styles continue to characterize Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and those of no religious affiliation. This paper examines data from Cycle IV of the National Survey of Family Growth (1988) to extend the time period covered by previous research by comparing the emerging contraceptive use patterns and fertility expectations among women in the late 1980s with earlier cohorts from previous national studies, beginning in the 1960s. The categories of religious affiliation are extended to include specific religious denominations (fundamentalist Protestants, Baptists, and other denominations, as well as Mormons) and include measures of religiosity--church attendance, the extent of receiving communion among Catholics, and attendance at church-related schools. These data are examined for blacks, Hispanics, and non-Hispanic whites. The analysis suggests how religious affiliation and religiosity continue to be important factors in the contraceptive paths to low fertility under general conditions of controlled fertility and in the context of secularization.

Religious affiliation and contraceptive usage: changing American patterns, 1955-82.

This paper presents national estimates of contraceptive usage patterns among white women from 1955-82 for the major religious populations in the United States. Drawing on several surveys, the data show that in 1955 differences in contraceptive use between white Protestants and Catholics were very large and corresponded to the higher fertility levels among Catholics. By 1982, all the major religious groups had experienced downward changes in expected family size and all used effective contraceptive methods, including sterilization, the pill, and the IUD. Despite some convergence in the patterns of contraceptive usage over time, significant differences in contraceptive use styles remain among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and those of no religious affiliation after multivariate controls eliminated socioeconomic and sociodemographic differences among these subpopulations. The evidence points to the multiple contraceptive paths to similar levels of low fertility. A series of hypotheses are proposed to account for these different contraceptive use styles that relate to religious communities, peer pressure and social norms, differential sex roles, male-female communication patterns, and the differential use of physician-based versus other sources of contraceptives.

PIP: This paper presents national estimates of contraceptive usage patterns among white women from 1955-1982 for the major religious populations in the US. Drawing on serveral surveys, the data show that in 1955 differences in contraceptive use between white Protestants and Catholics were very large and corresponded to the higher fertility levels among Catholics. By 1982, all the major religious groups had experienced downward changes in expected family size and all used effective contraceptive methods, including sterilization, the pill, and the IUD. Despite some convergence in the patterns of contraceptive usage over time, significant differences in contraceptive use styles remain among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and those of no religious affiliation after multivariate controls eliminated socioeconomic and sociodemographic differenceds among these subpopulations. The evidence points to the multiple contraceptive paths to similar levels of low fertility. A series of hypotheses are proposed to account for these different contraceptive use styles that relate to religious communities, peer pressure and social norms, differential sex roles, male-female communication patterns, and the differential use of physician-based versus other sources of contraceptives. As marriage and family formation patterns change in the future, and as sex roles are altered, new contraceptive use styles are likely to emerge. To the extent that religious groups in the US continue to differ in family formation, fertility, and child spacing patterns, they are likely to continue to differ in their contraceptive styles as well.

Contraceptive patterns of religious and racial groups in the United States, 1955-76: convergence and distinctiveness.

A number of studies have reported data on contraceptive use among white Protestant and white Catholic couples in the United States, but this paper is the first to study a large sample of couples with other or no religious affiliation, as well as black couples by religion, using multivariate controls. Using a nationally representative sample of 14,000 married women aged 15-44, we find convergence among white Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish couples in contraceptive patterns between 1955 and the mid-1970s, but large differences remained at the latter date, even after multivariate controls. Among black couples, differences by religious affiliation are smaller, but differences between white and black couples within religion categories are substantial. We conclude that religious differences are not artifacts of an incomplete demographic transition, and that religious affiliation is an indispensable datum for understanding contraceptive choice in the United States.

PIP: The purpose of this paper is to use a very large national sample of married women to show that religious affiliation and race are important factors affecting the contraceptive practice of married couples in the US. The 1973 and 1976 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) studies were combined. They are 2 nationally representative samples containing 14,048 married women. The studies were based on personal interviews with multistage area probability samples of women aged 15-44 in the household population of the coterminus US. Comparisons are made between the contraceptive practice of religious groups in the US during the baby boom of the 1950s, and those of the mid-1970's when fertility was much lower. In 1955, there was a substantial difference between Protestant and Catholic wives in the total births expected--0.56 children/woman. Jewish women expected 0.47 fewer children than Protestant women, and 1.03 fewer children than Catholic women. A dramatic overall increase in surgical sterilization, from 9 to 23%, took place with a sharper increase among male operations. There was a dramatic decline among nonusers of contraception. The proportion using contraception changed little among Protestants and jews, but increased from 42 to 57% among Catholics. In the 50s, Protestant and Jewish couples were more likely to use the condom or the diaphragm, while Catholics used the rhythm method. By the 70s, the pill was the most popular method in all 3 groups. The proportion using contraception is highest among Jewish women (76%); all the white groups have a higher proportion using contraception than any of the black groups. White wives with no religious affiliation are very similar to Jewish wives (75%). The proportion contraceptively sterile is highest among white Protestant couples (21%) compared with 14.4% or less for all other groups of both races.

Israel's population: the challenge of pluralism.

PIP: This Bulletin describes the interplay of demographic and sociopolitical processes in Israel since the founding of the state in May 1948 and projects what it might be until the year 2015. Heavy Jewish immigration, especially during the mass immigration of 1948-51, has balanced the high natural increase of Moslems, who comprise the majority of Israeli Arabs, so that the proportion of Jews in Israel's population at the end of 1982 (83% of 4.1 million) was little changed from June 1948 (81% of 806,000). Even with Jewish immigration now low, this proportion is likely to be no lower than 76% in 2015, the Jewish proportion could be only 50% in a Greater Israel as Israel annexes the Occupied Areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip where 1.2 million Arabs now live. Oriental Jews from less developed North African and Asian countries, 15% of Israel's Jewish population in 1984, with their largescale immigration to the mid-1960s and initially higher fertility, have managed to outnumber European-American Jews by 1970. This was an important factor in the 1977 shift of political dominance from the leftwing Labor parties, supported by the better educated, socialist leaning European-American Jews, to the rightwing Likud bloc, espousing economic policies based on more private initiative and Israel's historic rights to Judea and Samaria (West Bank). Western oriented Jews of European or American origin, although still the country's establishment, comprised only 40% of Israel's population by 1981. By 2015, their share is likely to be down to 30% within Israel's present boundaries and would be only 22% of the population of a Greater Israel. First raised by 19th century Zionists in Europe who set off the drive for the reestablishment of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, the quesions of whether or not Israel will be a Jewish state and remain a Western society will continue salient into the 21st century.^ieng

Rejoinder to Roberto Bachi's article on The Population of Israel.

PIP: This article is a response by authors Friedlander and Goldscheider to a review article about their book written by Roberto Bachi. They maintain that he has misunderstood their analysis. In order to convey the gist of their analysis, a brief outline is presented of the objectives of their book, The Population of Israel. According to the authors, Israel provides an interesting case study of the relationship between population processes and policies which may have more far-reaching implications. The focus on Bachi's criticisms is on the analysis of immigration patterns and policies, especially an evaluation of Israeli natality policies. Mainly, he was critical of the immigration model, where the use of absolute numbers of immigrants rather than rates of immigration was preferred. The authors did compare immigration rates and volume of immigration for the periods 1924-26 and 1933-36 and these waves of migration were analyzed. Bachi has claimed that the main reason for the decline in immigration to Israel is due to the progressive exhaustion of Jewish population outside Israel; clearly the appropriate explanation is otherwise. Bachi should be able to see how immigration to Israel has responded in ways similar to the socioeconomic and political forces of other international migrations. The authors cite Bachi on 2 points and show how he wrote a biased and distorted review in order to defend his ideological position. Kibbutz fertility and birth rates as influenced by abortion are the 2 issues discussed. The 2 authors claim that since abortion in Israel is connected to socioeconomic and ethnic subgroups, a policy which restricts abortions would reinforce ethnic stratification and discrimination. Other criticisms by Bachi are refuted as well. The authors feel that it is necessary to question the assumptions underlying policies, to evaluate critically their efficacy, and to search out the relative costs and benefits of alternative investments. In analyzing population policies and patterns in Israel, Friedlander and Goldscheider argue for the central importance of population factors in the continuing evaluation of Israeli society. New population polcies must take into account the errors and weaknesses of previous policies in order that they not be repeated.^ieng

Fertility of the jews.

The objectives of this paper were to review and summarize the existing literature on Jewish fertility and to discuss the highlights of data on fertility trends and differentials based on survey data obtained on the Jewish population of the metropolitan area of Providence, Rhode Island. The literature consistently confirmed the finding of lower fertility among Jews since the 1880's in the United States and for the last seventy-five years in a variety of European countries.A review of available data on fertility trends and differentials within the Jewish population indicated contradictory and inconsistent findings. The Providence survey data pointed to changing patterns of fertility among Jews and clarified a number of seeming inconsistencies. These data suggested (1) the pre-World War II decline and postwar recovery of Jewish fertility; (2) the change from an inverse relationship of social class and Jewish fertility among first-generation Jews to a direct relationship among second- and third-generation Jews; (3) the changing relationship of religiosity and Jewish fertility, which reflects social class changes.Finally, an attempt is made to clarify the interpretation of these and related findings by placing the analysis of Jewish fertility in the context of assimilation and acculturation.

A further look at catholic fertility.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which suburbanization has influenced the traditional fertility differences observed between Catholics and Protestants. It is hypothesized that suburbanization has served to decrease religious differences in fertility, since in the more advanced stages of urbanism, that is, suburbanization, the Catholic population is likely to adopt the fertility patterns of the larger and more secularized society. Attention is focused on two objectives: (1) to examine selected aspects of fertility for Catholic8 and Protestants living in metropolitan areas and (2) to analyze religious differentials in fertility among residents in different parts of the metropolitan community.The data, consisting of a sample of households in six metropolitan areas in three population size classes, supported the general findings pertaining to religious differences in fertility that have been reported in the literature. Catholics had larger families, shorter average spacing between children, and longer fertility spans when compared to Protestants, even when a number of control variables were employed. Examining fertility differences between Catholics and Protestants in central city and suburban segments of large and small metropolitan areas, we found that the data indicated that marked Catholic-Protestant differences are still found in central cities. However, fertility differences between the two religious groups tended largely to disappear among suburban residents. The convergence in the fertility patterns of suburbanites is due to combined effects of higher fertility among Protestant suburban residents when compared to central city Protestants and the tendency of suburban Catholics to have fewer children than those who live in the city. The net result is convergence in suburban fertility.