Game-theoretic algorithm for interdependent infrastructure network restoration in a decentralized environment.

Having reliable interdependent infrastructure networks is vital for well-being of a safe and productive society. Systems are vulnerable to failure or performance loss due to their interdependence among various networks, as each failure can propagate through the whole system. Although the conventional view has concentrated on optimizing the restoration of critical interdependent infrastructure networks using a centralized approach, having a lone actor as a decision-maker in the system is substantially different from the actual restoration decision environment, wherein infrastructure utilities make their own decisions about how to restore their network service. In a decentralized environment, the definition of whole system optimality does not apply as each decision-maker's interest may not converge with the others. Subsequently, this results in each decision-maker developing its own reward functions. Therefore, in this study, we address the concern of having multiple decision-makers with various payoff functions in interdependent networks by proposing a decentralized game theory algorithm for finding Nash equilibria solutions for network restoration in postdisaster situations.

Multiregional, multi-industry impacts of fairness on pandemic policies.

The health and economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the necessity for a deeper understanding and investigation of state- and industry-level mitigation policies. While different control strategies in the early stages, such as lockdowns and school and business closures, have helped decrease the number of infections, these strategies have had an adverse economic impact on businesses and some controversial impacts on social justice. Therefore, optimal timing and scale of closure and reopening strategies are required to prevent both different waves of the pandemic and the negative socioeconomic impact of control strategies. This article proposes a novel multiobjective mixed-integer linear programming formulation, which results in the optimal timing of closure and reopening of states and industries in each. The three objectives being pursued include: (i) the epidemiological impact of the pandemic in terms of the percentage of the infected population; (ii) the social vulnerability index of the pandemic policy based on the vulnerability of communities to getting infected, and for losing their job; and (iii) the economic impact of the pandemic based on the inoperability of industries in each state. The proposed model is implemented on a dataset that includes 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 19 industries in the United States. The Pareto-optimal solutions suggest that for any control decision (state and industry closure or reopening), the economic impact and the epidemiological impact change in the opposite direction.

Modeling social, economic, and health perspectives for optimal pandemic policy decision-making.

While different control strategies in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic have helped decrease the number of infections, these strategies have had an adverse economic impact on businesses. Therefore, optimal timing and scale of closure and reopening strategies are required to prevent both different waves of the pandemic and the negative economic impact of control strategies. This paper proposes a novel multi-objective mixed-integer linear programming (MOMILP) formulation, which results in the optimal timing of closure and reopening of states and industries in each state to mitigate the economic and epidemiological impact of a pandemic. The three objectives being pursued include: (i) the epidemiological impact, (ii) the economic impact on the local businesses, and (iii) the economic impact on the trades between industries. The proposed model is implemented on a dataset that includes 11 states, the District of Columbia, and 19 industries in the US. The solved by augmented ε-constraint approach is used to solve the multi-objective model, and a final strategy is selected from the set of Pareto-optimal solutions based on the least cubic distance of the solution from the optimal value of each objective. The Pareto-optimal solutions suggest that for any control decision (state and industry closure or reopening), the economic impact and the epidemiological impact change in the opposite direction, and it is more effective to close most states while keeping the majority of industries open during the planning horizon.

Adaptive algorithm for dependent infrastructure network restoration in an imperfect information sharing environment.

Critical infrastructure networks are vital for a functioning society and their failure can have widespread consequences. Decision-making for critical infrastructure resilience can suffer based on several characteristics exhibited by these networks, including (i) that there exist interdependencies with other networks, (ii) that several decision-makers represent potentially competing interests among the interdependent networks, and (iii) that information about other decision-makers' actions are uncertain and potentially unknown. To address these concerns, we propose an adaptive algorithm using machine learning to integrate predictions about other decision-makers' behavior into an interdependent network restoration planning problem considering an imperfect information sharing environment. We examined our algorithm against the optimal solution for various types, sizes, and dependencies of networks, resulting in insignificant differences. To assess the proposed algorithm's efficiency, we compared its results with a proposed heuristic method that prioritizes, and schedules components restoration based on centrality-based importance measures. The proposed algorithm provides a solution sufficiently close to the optimal solution showing the algorithm performs well in situations where the information sharing environment is incomplete.

Protecting infrastructure performance from disinformation attacks.

Disinformation campaigns are prevalent, affecting vaccination coverage, creating uncertainty in election results, and causing supply chain disruptions, among others. Unfortunately, the problems of misinformation and disinformation are exacerbated due to the wide availability of online platforms and social networks. Naturally, these emerging disinformation networks could lead users to engage with critical infrastructure systems in harmful ways, leading to broader adverse impacts. One such example involves the spread of false pricing information, which causes drastic and sudden changes in user commodity consumption behavior, leading to shortages. Given this, it is critical to address the following related questions: (i) How can we monitor the evolution of disinformation dissemination and its projected impacts on commodity consumption? (ii) What effects do the mitigation efforts of human intermediaries have on the performance of the infrastructure network subject to disinformation campaigns? (iii) How can we manage infrastructure network operations and counter disinformation in concert to avoid shortages and satisfy user demands? To answer these questions, we develop a hybrid approach that integrates an epidemiological model of disinformation spread (based on a susceptible-infectious-recovered model, or SIR) with an efficient mixed-integer programming optimization model for infrastructure network performance. The goal of the optimization model is to determine the best protection and response actions against disinformation to minimize the general shortage of commodities at different nodes over time. The proposed model is illustrated with a case study involving a subset of the western US interconnection grid located in Los Angeles County in California.

Interdependent Network Recovery Games.

Recovery of interdependent infrastructure networks in the presence of catastrophic failure is crucial to the economy and welfare of society. Recently, centralized methods have been developed to address optimal resource allocation in postdisaster recovery scenarios of interdependent infrastructure systems that minimize total cost. In real-world systems, however, multiple independent, possibly noncooperative, utility network controllers are responsible for making recovery decisions, resulting in suboptimal decentralized processes. With the goal of minimizing recovery cost, a best-case decentralized model allows controllers to develop a full recovery plan and negotiate until all parties are satisfied (an equilibrium is reached). Such a model is computationally intensive for planning and negotiating, and time is a crucial resource in postdisaster recovery scenarios. Furthermore, in this work, we prove this best-case decentralized negotiation process could continue indefinitely under certain conditions. Accounting for network controllers' urgency in repairing their system, we propose an ad hoc sequential game-theoretic model of interdependent infrastructure network recovery represented as a discrete time noncooperative game between network controllers that is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. We further reduce the computation time needed to find a solution by applying a best-response heuristic and prove bounds on ε-Nash equilibrium, where ε depends on problem inputs. We compare best-case and ad hoc models on an empirical interdependent infrastructure network in the presence of simulated earthquakes to demonstrate the extent of the tradeoff between optimality and computational efficiency. Our method provides a foundation for modeling sociotechnical systems in a way that mirrors restoration processes in practice.

Competitive percolation strategies for network recovery.

Restoring operation of critical infrastructure systems after catastrophic events is an important issue, inspiring work in multiple fields, including network science, civil engineering, and operations research. We consider the problem of finding the optimal order of repairing elements in power grids and similar infrastructure. Most existing methods either only consider system network structure, potentially ignoring important features, or incorporate component level details leading to complex optimization problems with limited scalability. We aim to narrow the gap between the two approaches. Analyzing realistic recovery strategies, we identify over- and undersupply penalties of commodities as primary contributions to reconstruction cost, and we demonstrate traditional network science methods, which maximize the largest connected component, are cost inefficient. We propose a novel competitive percolation recovery model accounting for node demand and supply, and network structure. Our model well approximates realistic recovery strategies, suppressing growth of the largest connected component through a process analogous to explosive percolation. Using synthetic power grids, we investigate the effect of network characteristics on recovery process efficiency. We learn that high structural redundancy enables reduced total cost and faster recovery, however, requires more information at each recovery step. We also confirm that decentralized supply in networks generally benefits recovery efforts.

Integrating Operational and Organizational Aspects in Interdependent Infrastructure Network Recovery.

Managing risk in infrastructure systems implies dealing with interdependent physical networks and their relationships with the natural and societal contexts. Computational tools are often used to support operational decisions aimed at improving resilience, whereas economics-related tools tend to be used to address broader societal and policy issues in infrastructure management. We propose an optimization-based framework for infrastructure resilience analysis that incorporates organizational and socioeconomic aspects into operational problems, allowing to understand relationships between decisions at the policy level (e.g., regulation) and the technical level (e.g., optimal infrastructure restoration). We focus on three issues that arise when integrating such levels. First, optimal restoration strategies driven by financial and operational factors evolve differently compared to those driven by socioeconomic and humanitarian factors. Second, regulatory aspects have a significant impact on recovery dynamics (e.g., effective recovery is most challenging in societies with weak institutions and regulation, where individual interests may compromise societal well-being). And third, the decision space (i.e., available actions) in postdisaster phases is strongly determined by predisaster decisions (e.g., resource allocation). The proposed optimization framework addresses these issues by using: (1) parametric analyses to test the influence of operational and socioeconomic factors on optimization outcomes, (2) regulatory constraints to model and assess the cost and benefit (for a variety of actors) of enforcing specific policy-related conditions for the recovery process, and (3) sensitivity analyses to capture the effect of predisaster decisions on recovery. We illustrate our methodology with an example regarding the recovery of interdependent water, power, and gas networks in Shelby County, TN (USA), with exposure to natural hazards.