Do parents prefer sons in North Korea?

Son preference in South Korea is stronger than anywhere else in the world, yet little is known about such preference in North Korea. Simple indicators of son preference in North Korea are constructed from its 1993 population census and a 1998 survey of child nutrition (conducted in the wake of the recent famine). These indicators include sex ratio at birth, sex ratios of infant and child mortality, and sex ratios of child malnutrition. North Koreans do not evince prenatal discrimination against daughters, a finding that may indicate a lack of prenatal sex-testing technologies. Neither is evidence found of excess female mortality or malnutrition in the postnatal period, during which discrimination requires no special technology. The discrepancy in son preference across the Korean peninsula seems due largely to the socialist agenda pursued in the north following political partition after World War II. An important aspect of that agenda challenged the ancient Confucian ideology presumed to underlie son preference. Apparently, this challenge was more successful in North Korea than in other Asian societies instituting similar political changes, because son preference was not eliminated in China or in Vietnam.

PIP: This study examines the indicators of son preference in North Korea. Basing from the 1993 population census and 1998 surveys of child nutrition conducted in the wake of the recent famine, simple indicators of son preference were constructed. These include sex ratio at birth, sex ratios of infant and child mortality, and sex ratios of child malnutrition. Findings revealed that in North Korea, parents do not evince son preference at all. The reason is that son preference was already absent in the northern area prior to the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel in 1946 (the demilitarized zone established following the Korean War in 1953 falls near the same boundary). Other indicators proved no evidence, such as excess female mortality or malnutrition in the postnatal period, during which discrimination requires no special technology. The discrepancy in son preference across the Korean peninsula seems due largely to the social agenda pursued in the ancient Confucian ideology presumed to underlie son preference.

Living arrangements, patrilineality and sources of support among elderly Vietnamese.

PIP: This study examined social support for the elderly in Ho Chi Minh (HCM) City and Hanoi, Viet Nam, in 1996. The sample included the main towns and provinces surrounding the cities. Two major findings were that the family was the main source of social security for the elderly. Almost 75% of the elderly in Hanoi, and 80% in HCM City, lived with at least 1 adult child. Parents were more likely to live with a married son. Most of the remaining elderly lived in close proximity to adult children. Over 50% of the elderly lived in households with at least 3 generations, regardless of their location in the north or the south. Older elderly were more likely to live in 3-generation households. 5-6% of the elderly lived alone or with a spouse and did not live near an adult child. Living alone was more prevalent in rural areas and among women. In both regions, almost 60% were female and over 50% were aged under 70 years. 56.6-61.8% were currently married; 37.3-38.1% were widowed. The elderly functioned within a strong patrilineal system. The proportion of male children who lived with a parent divided by the proportion of female children living with a parent (patrilineal ratio) was at least 3 times higher in Hanoi, urban towns, and rural areas in the Red River Delta, than in HCM City and its environs. There was substantial variation in non-family support. A higher proportion of elderly in Hanoi received pensions and social welfare benefits. The elderly in the south were less likely to name themselves or their spouses as the main sources of family income.^ieng

Abortion in Vietnam: measurements, puzzles, and concerns.

This report summarizes current knowledge about abortion in Vietnam, drawing upon government statistics, survey data, and fieldwork undertaken by the author in Vietnam throughout 1993 and part of 1994. The official total abortion rate in Vietnam in 1992 was about 2.5 per woman, the highest in Asia and worrisome for a country with a still-high total fertility rate of 3.7 children per woman. Vietnamese provinces exhibited substantial variation in both the rate of abortion and the type of procedures performed. Among the hypotheses explored to explain Vietnam's high rate of abortion are the borrowing of family planning strategies from other poor socialist states where abortion is common; current antinatal population policies that interact with a lack of contraceptive alternatives; and a rise in pregnancies among young and unmarried women in the wake of recent free-market reforms. Because family-size preferences are still declining, abortion rates may continue to increase unless the incidence of unwanted pregnancy can be reduced, a goal that Vietnamese population specialists are seeking to achieve.

PIP: The official total abortion rate in Vietnam in 1992 was at least 2.5/woman, unusually high by international standards, especially for a country with a total fertility rate of 3.7 children/woman. This report summarizes current knowledge regarding abortion in Vietnam, drawing upon government registration statistics, a variety of survey data, and the author's observations and fieldwork in Vietnam during 1993 and part of 1994. Abortion appears to be concentrated among married women at the peak of childbearing age. The prevalence of repeat abortions reported in some provinces and survey responses suggest that some women are using abortion as a means of fertility control. At least three explanations can be advanced for Vietnam's high rate of abortion. First, like other poor socialist countries, Vietnam viewed the IUD and abortion as methods allowing maximum state control and monitoring of family planning. Although the number of contraceptive methods have improved marginally, Vietnam still lacks the resources to provide alternative choices. Second, the country's population policies, although not directly calling for abortion, raise the marginal costs of childbearing in some areas to such an extent that pregnancy termination becomes more acceptable. Third, the current trend toward modernization and development in the wake of free-market reforms of the mid-1980s contributes to premarital and unwanted pregnancy as it has in other countries. Relevant policy prescriptions would provide effective contraceptive alternatives that are acceptable, safe, and affordable, a goal that Vietnamese specialists hope to achieve. Unless these efforts continue, future declines in Vietnamese family size preferences may result in even higher rates of abortion.

New zodiacal influences on Chinese family formation: Taiwan, 1976.

Although Chinese folklore holds that the Dragon Year is an auspicious time to have a birth, notable increases in Chinese fertility in Dragon Years did not occur before 1976. Demographic explanations for the belated occurrence of this phenomenon rely on the notion of natural fertility: that is, couples' lack of modern contraception had kept such decisions outside the realm of choice. The decomposition performed in this article, however, shows that the bulk of the 1976 Dragon Year baby boom on Taiwan was due to strategies that had always been available: marriage timing, abortion, and coital behavior. The natural fertility paradigm thus is insufficient in explaining the motivation for this behavior and should be complemented by institutional approaches.

The free scapular flap.

We present our early experience with a flap that should become important to the microsurgeon. The scapular flap is based on the circumflex scapular branch of the subscapular artery and is a versatile, hardy, easily dissected flap. We have used it in 14 cases where a fairly thin flap was indicated. Four of the 14 patients developed complications. Two developed hematomas after removal of the drains. These were evacuated without any loss of the flap. One patient had to be returned to the operating room because of thrombosis of the venous anastomoses, but the flap eventually survived in its entirety. One flap was lost from progressive venous insufficiency.