Patterns of Mental Health Service Utilisation: A Population-Based Linkage of Over 17 Years of Health Administrative Records.

A cross-sectoral partnership was formed in 2021 in support of the recommendations in an audit on access to state-funded mental health services. In this first paper, we aimed to describe the demographic and service utilisation of adults with a mental health diagnosis in the Western Australian state-funded health system from 2005 to 2021. Inpatient, emergency department, specialised (ambulatory) community mental health service, and death records were linked in individuals aged ≥ 18 years with a mental health diagnosis in Western Australia. Altogether, 392,238 individuals with at least one mental health service contact between 1st January 2005 and 31st December 2021 were included for analysis. Females, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander people, and those who lived outside major cities or in the most disadvantaged areas were more likely to access state-funded mental health services. While the number of individuals who accessed community mental health services increased over time (from 28,769 in 2005 to 50,690 in 2021), the percentage increase relative to 2005 was notably greater for emergency department attendances (127% for emergency department; 76% for community; and 63% for inpatient). Conditions that contributed to the increase for emergency department were mainly alcohol disorder, reaction to severe stress and adjustment disorders, and anxiety disorders. Sex differences were observed between conditions. The pattern of access increased for emergency department and the community plus emergency department combination. This study confirmed that the patterns of access of state-funded mental health services have changed markedly over time and the potential drivers underlying these changes warrant further investigation.

Action inhibition in individuals with high obsessive-compulsive trait of incompleteness: An ERP study.

BACKGROUND: Missing action completion signals are assumed to trigger repetitive behavior and feelings of the action "not being right". This proposal is based mostly on individual's self-reports. Here, we investigated the influence of experimentally manipulated action completion experience and the obsessive-compulsive (OC) trait of incompleteness on behavioral and neurophysiological measures of action inhibition. METHODS: Action completion was manipulated in an adapted Go/NoGo task, and OC trait incompleteness was assessed in healthy participants. More commission errors and faster responses were expected after missing action completion, especially for individuals with high OC trait incompleteness. The inhibition-related event-related potentials (ERPs) N200 and P300 were also measured. RESULTS: High OC trait incompleteness led to more errors following omitted- and faster responses during commission errors following incongruent outcomes. Furthermore, lower N200 was associated with worse response inhibition, and high OC trait incompleteness was associated with reduced N200, but not reduced P300 amplitude. These findings provide evidence that trait-like feelings of incompleteness may underlie maladaptive action repetition and impaired inhibitory control as observed in OCD.

Setting the beat of an internal clock: Effects of dexamphetamine on different interval ranges of temporal processing in healthy volunteers.

Drug studies are powerful models to investigate the neuropharmacological mechanisms underlying temporal processing in humans. This study administered dexamphetamine to 24 healthy volunteers to investigate time perception at different time scales, along with contributions from working memory. Healthy volunteers were administered 0.45 mg/kg dexamphetamine or placebo in a double-blind, crossover, placebo-controlled design. Time perception was assessed using three experimental tasks: a time-discrimination task, which asked participants to determine whether a comparison interval (1200 ± 0, 50, 100, 150, 200 ms) was shorter or longer than a standard interval (1200 ms); a retrospective time estimation task, which required participants to verbally estimate time intervals (10, 30, 60, 90 and 120 s) retrospectively; and a prospective time-production task, where participants were required to prospectively monitor the passing of time (10, 30, 60, 90 and 120 s). Working memory was assessed with the backwards digit span. On the discrimination task, there was a change in the proportion of long-to-short responses and reaction times in the dexamphetamine condition (but no association with working memory), consistent with an increase in the speed of an internal pacemaker, and an overestimation of durations in the timing of shorter intervals. There was an interaction between dexamphetamine, working memory, and performance on the estimation and production tasks, whereby increasing digit span scores were associated with decreasing interval estimates and increased produced intervals in the placebo condition, but were associated with increased interval estimates and decreased produced intervals after dexamphetamine administration. These findings indicate that the dexamphetamine-induced increase in the speed of the internal pacemaker was modulated by the basal working memory capacity of each participant. These findings in healthy humans have important implications for the role of dopamine, and its contributions to timing deficits, in models of psychiatric disorders.

Self- and other-agency in people with passivity (first rank) symptoms in schizophrenia.

Individuals with passivity (first-rank) symptoms report that their actions, thoughts and sensations are influenced or controlled by an external (non-self) agent. Passivity symptoms are closely linked to schizophrenia and related disorders yet they remain poorly understood. One dominant framework posits a role for deficits in the sense of agency. An important question is whether deficits in self-agency can be differentiated from other-agency in schizophrenia and passivity symptoms. This study aimed to evaluate self- and other-agency in 51 people with schizophrenia (n=20 current, 10 past, 21 no history of passivity symptoms), and 48 healthy controls. Participants completed the projected hand illusion (PHI) with active and passive movements, as well as immediate and delayed visual feedback. Experiences of agency and loss of agency over the participant's hand and the image ('the other hand') were assessed with a self-report questionnaire. Those with passivity symptoms (current and past) reported less difference in agency between active and passive movements on items assessing agency over their own hand (but not agency over the other hand). Relative to the healthy controls, the current and never groups continued to experience the illusion with delayed visual feedback suggesting impaired timing mechanisms regardless of symptom profile. These findings are consistent with a reduced contribution of proprioceptive predictive cues to agency judgements specific to self representations in people with passivity symptoms, and a subsequent reliance on external visual cues in these judgements. Altogether, these findings emphasise the multifactorial nature of agency and the contribution of multiple impairments to passivity symptoms.

Body representations in schizophrenia: an alteration of body structural description is common to people with schizophrenia while alterations of body image worsen with passivity symptoms.

INTRODUCTION: Individuals with schizophrenia, particularly those with passivity symptoms, often feel that their actions and thoughts are controlled by an external agent. Recent evidence has elucidated the role of body representations in the aetiology of passivity symptoms, yet one representation - body structural description - has not yet been examined. Additionally, body image has rarely been examined outside of bodily illusions (e.g., rubber hand experiments) and external validation is required. METHODS: Body structural description was assessed with an in-between task and a matching body parts by location task, and body image with a questionnaire examining body distortion experiences (containing subscales assessing boundary loss, depersonalisation and body size distortions). Individuals with schizophrenia (20 with current, 12 with past and 21 with no history of passivity symptoms) and 48 healthy controls participated in the study. RESULTS: People with schizophrenia (as a group) made more errors on the in-between task, but not on the matching body parts by location task. Individuals with current passivity symptoms reported greater distortions on all subscales relative to the other clinical samples, except for experiences of boundary loss which were common to both passivity symptom groups. CONCLUSIONS: The results indicate that body structural description may be altered in schizophrenia generally and body image alterations are worsened in passivity symptoms, and these alterations likely contribute to the emergence of passivity symptoms.

When one's sense of agency goes wrong: Absent modulation of time perception by voluntary actions and reduction of perceived length of intervals in passivity symptoms in schizophrenia.

Passivity symptoms in schizophrenia are characterised by an absence of agency for actions, thoughts and other somatic experiences. Time perception and intentional binding have both been linked to agency and schizophrenia but have not been examined in passivity symptoms. Time perception and intentional binding were assessed in people with schizophrenia (n=15 with, n=24 without passivity symptoms) and 43 healthy controls using an interval estimation procedure (200, 400 and 600ms intervals) with active, passive and observed movements. People with passivity symptoms did not display action-modulation of time perception, while those without passivity symptoms estimated intervals to be the same after active and observed movements. Additionally, both clinical samples reported intervals to be shorter with increasing interval length. We propose that impaired predictive processes may produce an overreliance on external cues and, together with shorter perceived intervals, lead to the subjective loss of agency.