The Language of Creativity: Evidence from Humans and Large Language Models.

Recent developments in computerized scoring via semantic distance have provided automated assessments of verbal creativity. Here, we extend past work, applying computational linguistic approaches to characterize salient features of creative text. We hypothesize that, in addition to semantic diversity, the degree to which a story includes perceptual details, thus transporting the reader to another time and place, would be predictive of creativity. Additionally, we explore the use of generative language models to supplement human data collection and examine the extent to which machine-generated stories can mimic human creativity. We collect 600 short stories from human participants and GPT-3, subsequently randomized and assessed on their creative quality. Results indicate that the presence of perceptual details, in conjunction with semantic diversity, is highly predictive of creativity. These results were replicated in an independent sample of stories (n = 120) generated by GPT-4. We do not observe a significant difference between human and AI-generated stories in terms of creativity ratings, and we also observe positive correlations between human and AI assessments of creativity. Implications and future directions are discussed.

Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow.

De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing "fast and slow" processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.

Evidence for Spinozan "Unbelieving" in the Right Inferior Prefrontal Cortex.

Humans can think about possible states of the world without believing in them, an important capacity for high-level cognition. Here, we use fMRI and a novel "shell game" task to test two competing theories about the nature of belief and its neural basis. According to the Cartesian theory, information is first understood, then assessed for veracity, and ultimately encoded as either believed or not believed. According to the Spinozan theory, comprehension entails belief by default, such that understanding without believing requires an additional process of "unbelieving." Participants (n = 70) were experimentally induced to have beliefs, desires, or mere thoughts about hidden states of the shell game (e.g., believing that the dog is hidden in the upper right corner). That is, participants were induced to have specific "propositional attitudes" toward specific "propositions" in a controlled way. Consistent with the Spinozan theory, we found that thinking about a proposition without believing it is associated with increased activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus. This was true whether the hidden state was desired by the participant (because of reward) or merely thought about. These findings are consistent with a version of the Spinozan theory whereby unbelieving is an inhibitory control process. We consider potential implications of these results for the phenomena of delusional belief and wishful thinking.

Boosting the impact of charitable giving with donation bundling and micromatching.

The most effective charities are hundreds of times more impactful than typical charities. However, most donors favor charities with personal/emotional appeal over effectiveness. We gave donors the option to split their donations between their personal favorite charity and an expert-recommended highly effective charity. This bundling technique increased donors' impact without undermining their altruistic motivation, boosting effective donations by 76%. An additional boost of 55% was achieved by offering matching donations with increasing rates for allocating more to the highly effective charity. We show further that matching funds can be provided by donors focused on effectiveness through a self-sustaining process of micromatching. We applied these techniques in a new online donation platform (GivingMultiplier.org), which fundraised more than $1.5 million in its first 14 months. While prior applied research on altruism has focused on the quantity of giving, the present results demonstrate the value of focusing on the effectiveness of altruistic behavior.

A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away: How temporal are episodic contents?

A prominent feature of mental event (i.e. 'episodic') simulations is their temporal orientation: human adults can generate episodic representations directed towards the past or the future. Here, we investigated how the temporal orientation of imagined events relates to the contents of these events. Is there something intrinsically temporal about episodic contents? Or does their temporality rely on a distinct set of representations? In three experiments (N = 360), we asked participants to generate and later recall a series of imagined events differing in (1) location, (2) time of day, (3) temporal orientation, and (4) weekday. We then tested to what extent successful recall of episodic content (i.e. (1) and (2)) would predict recall of temporality and/or weekday information. Results showed that recall of temporal orientation was only weakly predicted by recall of episodic contents. Nonetheless, temporal orientation was more strongly predicted by content recall than weekday recall. This finding suggests that episodic simulations are unlikely to be intrinsically temporal in nature. Instead, similar to other forms of temporal information, temporal orientation might be determined from such contents by reconstructive post-retrieval processes. These results have implications for how the human ability to 'mentally travel' in time is cognitively implemented.

The Psychology of (In)Effective Altruism.

The most effective charities are hundreds of times more effective than typical charities, yet few donors prioritize effectiveness. Why is that? How might we increase the effectiveness of charitable giving? We review the motivational and epistemic causes of (in)effective giving. Many donors view charitable giving as a matter of personal preference, which favors decisions based on emotional appeal rather than effectiveness. In addition, while many donors are motivated to give effectively, they often have misconceptions and cognitive biases that reduce effective giving. Nearly all research on charitable giving interventions focuses on increasing donation amounts. However, to increase societal benefit, donation effectiveness is likely to be more important. This underscores the need for research on strategies to encourage effective giving.

Two Ways to Build a Thought: Distinct Forms of Compositional Semantic Representation across Brain Regions.

To understand a simple sentence such as "the woman chased the dog", the human mind must dynamically organize the relevant concepts to represent who did what to whom. This structured recombination of concepts (woman, dog, chased) enables the representation of novel events, and is thus a central feature of intelligence. Here, we use functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) and encoding models to delineate the contributions of three brain regions to the representation of relational combinations. We identify a region of anterior-medial prefrontal cortex (amPFC) that shares representations of noun-verb conjunctions across sentences: for example, a combination of "woman" and "chased" to encode woman-as-chaser, distinct from woman-as-chasee. This PFC region differs from the left-mid superior temporal cortex (lmSTC) and hippocampus, two regions previously implicated in representing relations. lmSTC represents broad role combinations that are shared across verbs (e.g., woman-as-agent), rather than narrow roles, limited to specific actions (woman-as-chaser). By contrast, a hippocampal sub-region represents events sharing narrow conjunctions as dissimilar. The success of the hippocampal conjunctive encoding model is anti-correlated with generalization performance in amPFC on a trial-by-trial basis, consistent with a pattern separation mechanism. Thus, these three regions appear to play distinct, but complementary, roles in encoding compositional event structure.

Concepts and Compositionality: In Search of the Brain's Language of Thought.

Imagine Genghis Khan, Aretha Franklin, and the Cleveland Cavaliers performing an opera on Maui. This silly sentence makes a serious point: As humans, we can flexibly generate and comprehend an unbounded number of complex ideas. Little is known, however, about how our brains accomplish this. Here we assemble clues from disparate areas of cognitive neuroscience, integrating recent research on language, memory, episodic simulation, and computational models of high-level cognition. Our review is framed by Fodor's classic language of thought hypothesis, according to which our minds employ an amodal, language-like system for combining and recombining simple concepts to form more complex thoughts. Here, we highlight emerging work on combinatorial processes in the brain and consider this work's relation to the language of thought. We review evidence for distinct, but complementary, contributions of map-like representations in subregions of the default mode network and sentence-like representations of conceptual relations in regions of the temporal and prefrontal cortex.

Veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good.

The "veil of ignorance" is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision making by denying decision makers access to potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here, we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning in a more focused way to specific moral dilemmas, all of which involve a tension between the greater good and competing moral concerns. Across 7 experiments (n = 6,261), 4 preregistered, we find that veil-of-ignorance reasoning favors the greater good. Participants first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning about a specific dilemma, asking themselves what they would want if they did not know who among those affected they would be. Participants then responded to a more conventional version of the same dilemma with a moral judgment, a policy preference, or an economic choice. Participants who first engaged in veil-of-ignorance reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to a classic philosophical dilemma, a medical dilemma, a real donation decision between a more vs. less effective charity, and a policy decision concerning the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. These effects depend on the impartial thinking induced by veil-of-ignorance reasoning and cannot be explained by anchoring, probabilistic reasoning, or generic perspective taking. These studies indicate that veil-of-ignorance reasoning may be a useful tool for decision makers who wish to make more impartial and/or socially beneficial choices.

Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers.

Researchers have used "sacrificial" trolley-type dilemmas (where harmful actions promote the greater good) to model competing influences on moral judgment: affective reactions to causing harm that motivate characteristically deontological judgments ("the ends don't justify the means") and deliberate cost-benefit reasoning that motivates characteristically utilitarian judgments ("better to save more lives"). Recently, Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, and Savulescu (2015) argued that sacrificial judgments reflect antisociality rather than "genuine utilitarianism," but this work employs a different definition of "utilitarian judgment." We introduce a five-level taxonomy of "utilitarian judgment" and clarify our longstanding usage, according to which judgments are "utilitarian" simply because they favor the greater good, regardless of judges' motivations or philosophical commitments. Moreover, we present seven studies revisiting Kahane and colleagues' empirical claims. Studies 1a-1b demonstrate that dilemma judgments indeed relate to utilitarian philosophy, as philosophers identifying as utilitarian/consequentialist were especially likely to endorse utilitarian sacrifices. Studies 2-6 replicate, clarify, and extend Kahane and colleagues' findings using process dissociation to independently assess deontological and utilitarian response tendencies in lay people. Using conventional analyses that treat deontological and utilitarian responses as diametric opposites, we replicate many of Kahane and colleagues' key findings. However, process dissociation reveals that antisociality predicts reduced deontological inclinations, not increased utilitarian inclinations. Critically, we provide evidence that lay people's sacrificial utilitarian judgments also reflect moral concerns about minimizing harm. This work clarifies the conceptual and empirical links between moral philosophy and moral psychology and indicates that sacrificial utilitarian judgments reflect genuine moral concern, in both philosophers and ordinary people.

Reduced engagement of the anterior cingulate cortex in the dishonest decision-making of incarcerated psychopaths.

A large body of research indicates that psychopathic individuals lie chronically and show little remorse or anxiety. Yet, little is known about the neurobiological substrates of dishonesty in psychopathy. In a sample of incarcerated individuals (n = 67), we tested the hypothesis that psychopathic individuals show reduced activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) when confronted with an opportunity for dishonest gain, reflecting dishonest behavior that is relatively unhindered by response conflict. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, incarcerated offenders with different levels of psychopathy performed an incentivized prediction task wherein they were given real and repeated opportunities for dishonest gain. We found that while incarcerated offenders showed a high rate of cheating, levels of psychopathic traits did not influence the frequency of dishonesty. Higher psychopathy scores predicted decreased activity in the ACC during dishonest decision-making. Further analysis revealed that the ACC was functionally connected to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and that ACC activity mediated the relationship between psychopathic traits and reduced reaction times for dishonest behavior. These findings suggest that psychopathic individuals behave dishonestly with relatively low levels of response conflict and that the ACC may play a critical role in this pattern of behavior.

The rat-a-gorical imperative: Moral intuition and the limits of affective learning.

Decades of psychological research have demonstrated that intuitive judgments are often unreliable, thanks to their inflexible reliance on limited information (Kahneman, 2003, 2011). Research on the computational underpinnings of learning, however, indicates that intuitions may be acquired by sophisticated learning mechanisms that are highly sensitive and integrative. With this in mind, Railton (2014) urges a more optimistic view of moral intuition. Is such optimism warranted? Elsewhere (Greene, 2013) I've argued that moral intuitions offer reasonably good advice concerning the give-and-take of everyday social life, addressing the basic problem of cooperation within a "tribe" ("Me vs. Us"), but that moral intuitions offer unreliable advice concerning disagreements between tribes with competing interests and values ("Us vs. Them"). Here I argue that a computational perspective on moral learning underscores these conclusions. The acquisition of good moral intuitions requires both good (representative) data and good (value-aligned) training. In the case of inter-tribal disagreement (public moral controversy), the problem of bad training looms large, as training processes may simply reinforce tribal differences. With respect to moral philosophy and the paradoxical problems it addresses, the problem of bad data looms large, as theorists seek principles that minimize counter-intuitive implications, not only in typical real-world cases, but in unusual, often hypothetical, cases such as some trolley dilemmas. In such cases the prevailing real-world relationships between actions and consequences are severed or reversed, yielding intuitions that give the right answers to the wrong questions. Such intuitions-which we may experience as the voice of duty or virtue-may simply reflect the computational limitations inherent in affective learning. I conclude, in optimistic agreement with Railton, that progress in moral philosophy depends on our having a better understanding of the mechanisms behind our moral intuitions.

Variation in the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) is associated with differences in moral judgment.

Moral judgments are produced through the coordinated interaction of multiple neural systems, each of which relies on a characteristic set of neurotransmitters. Genes that produce or regulate these neurotransmitters may have distinctive influences on moral judgment. Two studies examined potential genetic influences on moral judgment using dilemmas that reliably elicit competing automatic and controlled responses, generated by dissociable neural systems. Study 1 (N = 228) examined 49 common variants (SNPs) within 10 candidate genes and identified a nominal association between a polymorphism (rs237889) of the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) and variation in deontological vs utilitarian moral judgment (that is, judgments favoring individual rights vs the greater good). An association was likewise observed for rs1042615 of the arginine vasopressin receptor gene (AVPR1A). Study 2 (N = 322) aimed to replicate these findings using the aforementioned dilemmas as well as a new set of structurally similar medical dilemmas. Study 2 failed to replicate the association with AVPR1A, but replicated the OXTR finding using both the original and new dilemmas. Together, these findings suggest that moral judgment is influenced by variation in the oxytocin receptor gene and, more generally, that single genetic polymorphisms can have a detectable effect on complex decision processes.

An architecture for encoding sentence meaning in left mid-superior temporal cortex.

Human brains flexibly combine the meanings of words to compose structured thoughts. For example, by combining the meanings of "bite," "dog," and "man," we can think about a dog biting a man, or a man biting a dog. Here, in two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments using multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA), we identify a region of left mid-superior temporal cortex (lmSTC) that flexibly encodes "who did what to whom" in visually presented sentences. We find that lmSTC represents the current values of abstract semantic variables ("Who did it?" and "To whom was it done?") in distinct subregions. Experiment 1 first identifies a broad region of lmSTC whose activity patterns (i) facilitate decoding of structure-dependent sentence meaning ("Who did what to whom?") and (ii) predict affect-related amygdala responses that depend on this information (e.g., "the baby kicked the grandfather" vs. "the grandfather kicked the baby"). Experiment 2 then identifies distinct, but neighboring, subregions of lmSTC whose activity patterns carry information about the identity of the current "agent" ("Who did it?") and the current "patient" ("To whom was it done?"). These neighboring subregions lie along the upper bank of the superior temporal sulcus and the lateral bank of the superior temporal gyrus, respectively. At a high level, these regions may function like topographically defined data registers, encoding the fluctuating values of abstract semantic variables. This functional architecture, which in key respects resembles that of a classical computer, may play a critical role in enabling humans to flexibly generate complex thoughts.

The rise of moral cognition.

The field of moral cognition has grown rapidly in recent years thanks in no small part to Cognition. Consistent with its interdisciplinary tradition, Cognition encouraged the growth of this field by supporting empirical research conducted by philosophers as well as research native to neighboring fields such as social psychology, evolutionary game theory, and behavioral economics. This research has been exceptionally diverse both in its content and methodology. I argue that this is because morality is unified at the functional level, but not at the cognitive level, much as vehicles are unified by shared function rather than shared mechanics. Research in moral cognition, then, has progressed by explaining the phenomena that we identify as "moral" (for high-level functional reasons) in terms of diverse cognitive components that are not specific to morality. In light of this, research on moral cognition may continue to flourish, not as the identification and characterization of distinctive moral processes, but as a testing ground for theories of high-level, integrative cognitive function.

Response to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens predicts behavior in an independent test of honesty.

This study examines the cognitive and neural determinants of honesty and dishonesty. Human subjects undergoing fMRI completed a monetary incentive delay task eliciting responses to anticipated reward in the nucleus accumbens. Subjects next performed an incentivized prediction task, giving them real and repeated opportunities for dishonest gain. Subjects attempted to predict the outcomes of random computerized coin-flips and were financially rewarded for accuracy. In some trials, subjects were rewarded based on self-reported accuracy, allowing them to gain money dishonestly by lying. Dishonest behavior was indexed by improbably high levels of self-reported accuracy. Nucleus accumbens response in the first task, involving only honest rewards, accounted for ∼25% of the variance in dishonest behavior in the prediction task. Individuals showing relatively strong nucleus accumbens responses to anticipated reward also exhibited increased dorsolateral prefrontal activity (bilateral) in response to opportunities for dishonest gain. These results address two hypotheses concerning (dis)honesty. According to the "Will" hypothesis, honesty results from the active deployment of self-control. According to the "Grace" hypothesis, honesty flows more automatically. The present results suggest a reconciliation between these two hypotheses while explaining (dis)honesty in terms of more basic neural mechanisms: relatively weak responses to anticipated rewards make people morally "Graceful," but individuals who respond more strongly may resist temptation by force of Will.