Novel embryo selection strategies-finding the right balance.

The use of novel technologies in the selection of embryos during in vitro fertilisation (IVF) has the potential to improve the chances of pregnancy and birth of a healthy child. However, it is important to be aware of the potential risks and unintended consequences that may arise from the premature implementation of these technologies. This article discusses the ethical considerations surrounding the use of novel embryo selection technologies in IVF, including the growing uptake of genetic testing and others, and argues that prioritising embryos for transfer using these technologies is acceptable, but discarding embryos based on unproven advances is not. Several historical examples are provided, which demonstrate possible harms, where the overall chance of pregnancy may have been reduced, and some patients may have missed out on biological parenthood altogether. We emphasise the need for caution and a balanced approach to ensure that the benefits of these technologies outweigh any potential harm. We also highlight the primacy of patients' autonomy in reproductive decision-making, especially when information gained by utilising novel technologies is imprecise.

The Ethics of Human Life Extension: The Second Argument from Evolution.

One argument that is sometimes made against pursuing radical forms of human life extension is that such interventions will make the species less evolvable, which would be morally undesirable. In this article, I discuss the empirical and evaluative claims of this argument. I argue that radical increases in life expectancy could, in principle, reduce the evolutionary potential of human populations through both biological and cultural mechanisms. I further argue that if life extension did reduce the evolvability of the species, this will be undesirable for three reasons: (1) it may increase the species' susceptibility to extinction risks, (2) it may adversely affect institutions and practices that promote well-being, and (3) it may impede moral progress.

Cognitive diversity and moral enhancement.

One debate in contemporary bioethics centers on whether the development of cognitive enhancement technologies (CETs) will hasten the need for moral enhancement. In this article we provide a new argument in favor of pursuing these enhancement technologies together. The widespread availability of CETs will likely increase population-level cognitive diversity. Different people will choose to enhance different aspects of their cognition, and some won't enhance themselves at all. Although this has the potential to be beneficial for society, it could also result in harms as people become more different from one another. Aspects of our moral psychology make it difficult for people to cooperate and coordinate actions with those who are very different from themselves. These moral failings could be targeted by moral enhancement technologies, which may improve cooperation among individuals. Moral enhancement technologies will therefore help society maximize the benefits, and reduce the costs, associated with widespread access to cognitive enhancements.

Stocking the genetic supermarket: reproductive genetic technologies and collective action problems.

Reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs) allow parents to decide whether their future children will have or lack certain genetic predispositions. A popular model that has been proposed for regulating access to RGTs is the 'genetic supermarket'. In the genetic supermarket, parents are free to make decisions about which genes to select for their children with little state interference. One possible consequence of the genetic supermarket is that collective action problems will arise: if rational individuals use the genetic supermarket in isolation from one another, this may have a negative effect on society as a whole, including future generations. In this article we argue that RGTs targeting height, innate immunity, and certain cognitive traits could lead to collective action problems. We then discuss whether this risk could in principle justify state intervention in the genetic supermarket. We argue that there is a plausible prima facie case for the view that such state intervention would be justified and respond to a number of arguments that might be adduced against that view.