Affective theory of mind inferences contextually influence the recognition of emotional facial expressions.

The recognition of emotional facial expressions is often subject to contextual influence, particularly when the face and the context convey similar emotions. We investigated whether spontaneous, incidental affective theory of mind inferences made while reading vignettes describing social situations would produce context effects on the identification of same-valenced emotions (Experiment 1) as well as differently-valenced emotions (Experiment 2) conveyed by subsequently presented faces. Crucially, we found an effect of context on reaction times in both experiments while, in line with previous work, we found evidence for a context effect on accuracy only in Experiment 1. This demonstrates that affective theory of mind inferences made at the pragmatic level of a text can automatically, contextually influence the perceptual processing of emotional facial expressions in a separate task even when those emotions are of a distinctive valence. Thus, our novel findings suggest that language acts as a contextual influence to the recognition of emotional facial expressions for both same and different valences.

An eye-tracking examination of readers' sensitivity to pragmatic scope information during the processing of conditional inducements.

Previous research into conditional inducements has shown that readers are sensitive after reading such conditionals to pragmatic scope differences between promises and threats; specifically, threats can be referred to as promises, but promises cannot be referred to as threats. Crucially, previous work has not revealed whether such scope effects emerge while processing the conditional itself. In the experiment reported here, participants' eye movements were recorded while they read vignettes containing conditional promises and threats. We observed a reading time penalty on the conditional itself when participants read a conditional promise that was described as a "threat" (e.g., Liam threatened Perry "if you tell dad, then I'll take equal responsibility"). There was no such penalty when the word "promise" was presented before a conditional threat. These results suggest that readers are sensitive during reading of the conditional itself to pragmatic scope differences between "threats" and "promises." (PsycINFO Database Record

'It's hard to write a good article': The online comprehension of excuses as indirect replies.

In an eye-tracking experiment, we examined how readers comprehend indirect replies when they are uttered in reply to a direct question. Participants read vignettes that described two characters engaged in dialogue. Each dialogue contained a direct question (e.g., How are you doing in Chemistry?) answered with an excuse (e.g., The exams are not fair). In response to direct questions, such indirect replies are typically used to avoid a face-threatening disclosure (e.g., doing badly on the Chemistry course). Our goal was to determine whether readers are sensitive during reading to the indirect meaning communicated by such replies. Of the three contexts we examined, the first described a negative, face-threatening situation and the second a positive, non-face threatening situation, while the third was neutral. Analysis of reading times to the replies provides strong evidence that readers are sensitive online to the face-saving function of indirect replies.

Do Non-Reflective Thinkers Apply Extreme Personal Meanings to their Activated Moods?

BACKGROUND: The integrative cognitive model of mood swings proposes that mood symptoms are driven by extreme, self-referent appraisals. For example, if activated mood is appraised positively, this prompts selection of mood regulation strategies that act to up-regulate mood. Appraisals are driven by fast and automatic Type 1 cognitive processes, which, left unchecked, can cause activated mood to escalate. AIMS: It was hypothesized that greater propensity to override these automatic processes by engaging in reflective (Type 2) thinking would be negatively associated with extreme appraisals of activation and activation. METHOD: Study 1 (n = 150) was a cross-sectional survey consisting of measures of activation, extreme appraisals, and an objective performance-based measure of the propensity to engage in reflective thought (cognitive reflection test; CRT). In Study 2 (n = 241) participants completed these measures plus three alternative measures of effortful cognitive engagement (CRT-2, Need for Cognition and Actively Open-Minded Thinking). RESULTS: In Study 1, propensity to engage in reflective thought (higher CRT scores) was not significantly associated with activated mood or extreme appraisals, but activated mood and extreme appraisals were positively correlated. In study 2, the association between activation and extreme appraisals was replicated. Predicted associations between alternative measures of reflective thinking, activated mood, and extreme appraisals were not found. CONCLUSIONS: Extreme appraisals of internal states may be a psychological mechanism underlying activated mood. Propensity to reflect on and override default cognitions was unrelated to these extreme appraisals and activated mood. Further research in a clinical sample using mood-relevant measures of reflective thinking is warranted.

Extreme cognitions are associated with diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence.

OBJECTIVES: An Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder proposes that cognitive styles characterized by extreme self-referent appraisals of internal states (e.g., 'If I have a bad night's sleep it means that I am about to have a breakdown') interfere with mood regulation. The aim of this study is to determine whether strong endorsement of such appraisals is predicted by a diminished ability to access disconfirming counterexamples. DESIGN: We examined whether the ability to access two different categories of counterexample (known as Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes) would predict endorsement of extreme appraisals (measured by the Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive Predictions Inventory; HAPPI) and mania risk (measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale; HPS). METHOD: A non-clinical sample of 150 students completed the HAPPI, the HPS and a conditional reasoning task that indexed the ability to access Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes. Current mood was controlled for using the Internal States Scale. RESULTS: The ability to make use of disabling counterexamples during the reasoning task was inversely related with scores on the HAPPI (r = -.19, p < .05); participants that were less able to make use of disabling counterexamples endorsed extreme self-referent appraisals to a greater extent. There was no association between the use of alternative cause counterexamples and the HAPPI, and no association between either measure of counterexample generation and the HPS. CONCLUSIONS: A diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence when reasoning about the world may reinforce problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalized appraisals of experience, which can interfere with mood regulation. PRACTITIONER POINTS: Problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalized appraisals of experience may be reinforced by the inability to produce or access evidence that disconfirms these maladaptive beliefs. This reasoning bias may be associated with cognitive styles underlying psychopathology. There may be clinical utility in exploring the use of disabler generation in psychological interventions, to help disconfirm maladaptive beliefs.

"This Isn't a Promise, It's a Threat".

Participants had their eye movements recorded as they read vignettes containing implied promises and threats. We observed a reading time penalty when participants read the word "threat" when it anaphorically referred to an implied promise. There was no such penalty when the word "promise" was used to refer to an implied threat. On a later measure of processing we again found a reading time penalty when the word "threat" was used to refer to a promise, but also when the word "promise" was used to refer to a threat. These results suggest that anaphoric processing of such expressions is driven initially by sensitivity to the semantic scope differences of "threats" versus "promises." A threat can be understood as a type of promise, but a promise cannot be understood as a type of threat. However, this effect was short lived; readers were ultimately sensitive to mismatched meaning, regardless of speech act performed.

Slippery slope arguments imply opposition to change.

Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) of the form if A, then C describe an initial proposal (A) and a predicted, undesirable consequence of this proposal (C) (e.g., "If cannabis is ever legalized, then eventually cocaine will be legalized, too"). Despite SSAs being a common rhetorical device, there has been surprisingly little empirical research into their subjective evaluation and perception. Here, we present evidence that SSAs are interpreted as a form of consequentialist argument, inviting inferences about the speaker's (or writer's) attitudes. Study 1 confirmed the common intuition that a SSA is perceived to be an argument against the initial proposal (A), whereas Study 2 showed that the subjective strength of this inference relates to the subjective undesirability of the predicted consequences (C). Because arguments are rarely made out of context, in Studies 3 and 4 we examined how one important contextual factor, the speaker's known beliefs, influences the perceived coherence, strength, and persuasiveness of a SSA. Using an unobtrusive dependent variable (eye movements during reading), in Study 3 we showed that readers are sensitive to the internal coherence between a speaker's beliefs and the implied meaning of the argument. Finally, Study 4 revealed that this degree of internal coherence influences the perceived strength and persuasiveness of the argument. Together, these data indicate that SSAs are treated as a form of negative consequentialist argument. People infer that the speaker of a SSA opposes the initial proposal; therefore, SSAs are only perceived to be persuasive and conversationally relevant when the speaker's attitudes match this inference.

Has the Standard Cognitive Reflection Test Become a Victim of Its Own Success?

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a hugely influential problem solving task that measures individual differences in the propensity to reflect on and override intuitive (but incorrect) solutions. The validity of this three-item measure depends on participants being naïve to its materials and objectives. Evidence from 142 volunteers recruited online suggests this is often not the case. Over half of the sample had previously seen at least one of the problems, predominantly through research participation or the media. These participants produced substantially higher CRT scores than those without prior exposure (2.36 vs. 1.48), with the majority scoring at ceiling level. Participants that had previously seen a specific problem (e.g., the bat and ball problem) nearly always solved that problem correctly. These data suggest the CRT may have been widely invalidated. As a minimum, researchers must control for prior exposure to the three problems and begin to consider alternative, extended measures of cognitive reflection.

The exacerbating influence of hopelessness on other known risk factors for repeat self-harm and suicide.

BACKGROUND: Hopelessness is frequently observed in people who harm themselves and is an established risk factor for nonfatal self-harm repetition and suicide. Little is known about how the presence of hopelessness in addition to other risk factors affects subsequent risk. METHOD: Prospective cohort of 19,479 individuals presenting with self-harm to one of three English Emergency Departments between 1st January 2000 and 31st December 2010. Repeat self-harm and suicide deaths within twelve months of the first assessed episode were identified. Cox Proportional Hazards models were used to estimate Hazard Ratios (HRs) for risk factors with and without hopelessness. RESULTS: A clinical impression of hopelessness was associated with increased risk of further self-harm (HR 1.35, 95% CI 1.16-1.58) and suicide (HR 2.56, CI 1.10-5.96) in the year following an index episode. For individuals who were living alone or homeless, unemployed, reported problems with housing, had received psychiatric treatment in the past, were currently receiving treatment or used alcohol during the self-harm episode, an exacerbation of an already elevated risk of repetition was observed amongst those who were assessed as hopeless. Where individuals presented with forensic problems, physical health problems or bereavement, an increase in risk was only observed for those who were also assessed as hopeless. LIMITATIONS: A clinical impression of hopelessness was assigned using a binary "yes"/"no" classification rather than a validated scale. CONCLUSIONS: Hopelessness intensifies the impact of several known risk factors for adverse outcomes following self-harm. These findings highlight the importance of identifying and therapeutically addressing this dynamic but potentially modifiable clinical risk factor during the psychosocial assessment and in subsequent care.

Eye Movements Reveal How Readers Infer Intentions From the Beliefs and Desires of Others.

We examine how the beliefs and desires of a protagonist are used by readers to predict their intentions as a narrative vignette unfolds. Eye movement measures revealed that readers rapidly inferred an intention when the protagonist desired an outcome, even when this inference was not licensed by the protagonist's belief state. Reading was immediately disrupted when participants encountered a described action that contradicted this inference. During intermediate processing, desire inferences were moderated by the protagonist's belief state. Effects that emerged later in the text were again driven solely by the protagonist's desires. These data suggest that desire-based inferences are initially drawn irrespective of belief state, but are then quickly inhibited if not licensed by relevant beliefs. This inhibition of desire-based inferences may be an effortful process as it was not systematically sustained in later steps of processing.

Conditional sentences create a blind spot in theory of mind during narrative comprehension.

We identify a blind spot in the early Theory of Mind processing of conditional sentences that describe a protagonist's potential action, and its predictable consequences. We propose that such sentences create expectations through two independent channels. A decision theoretic channel creates an expectation that the action will be taken (viz., not taken) if it has desirable (viz., undesirable) consequences, but a structural channel acts in parallel to create an expectation that the action will be taken, irrespective of desirability. Accordingly, reading should be disrupted when a protagonist avoids an action with desirable consequences, but reading should not be disrupted when a protagonist takes an action with undesirable consequences. This prediction was supported by the eye movements of participants reading systematically varied vignettes. Reading was always disrupted when the protagonist avoided an action with desirable consequences, but disruptions were either delayed (Experiment 1) or recovered from faster (Experiment 2) when the protagonist took an action with undesirable consequences.

Alcohol-related mortality following self-harm: a multicentre cohort study.

OBJECTIVES: To assess alcohol-related premature death in people who self-harm compared to the general population, including variation by socioeconomic deprivation. DESIGN: A retrospective longitudinal cohort analysis from the Multicentre Study of self-harm in England, 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2010, with cause-specific mortality follow-up through to 31 December 2012. SETTING: Six emergency departments in Oxford, Manchester and Derby. PARTICIPANTS: All individuals aged 15 years or more who presented with self-harm (n = 39,014) to general hospital emergency departments, together with follow-up mortality information from the Data Linkage Service of the Health and Social Care Information Centre. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: STANDARDISED MORTALITY RATIOS (OBSERVED/EXPECTED NUMBER OF DEATHS: SMRs) and mean number of years of life lost (YLL) were estimated for alcohol-related mortality. Patients' characteristics and clinical management following self-harm were also examined. RESULTS: After 7.5 years' (median) follow-up, 2695 individuals (6.9%) had died, significantly more males (9.5%) than females (5.0%), including 307 (11.4%) from alcohol-related causes. Alcohol-related death was more frequent than expected in both males (SMR 8.5, 95% CI 7.3 to 9.8) and females (11.6, 9.8 to 13.7), equating to 33.7 YLL (95% CI 32.4 to 35.0) in males and 38.1 YLL (36.6 to 39.6) in females. It was not associated with area-level socioeconomic deprivation. Alcohol-related death was associated with unemployed/sick/disabled status, alcohol use during self-harm, referral to drug/alcohol services and lack of psychosocial assessment following self-harm. CONCLUSIONS: Hospital-presenting self-harm patients should receive assessment following self-ham according to national guidance to enable early identification and treatment of alcohol problems.

An eye-tracking investigation into readers' sensitivity to actual versus expected utility in the comprehension of conditionals.

The successful comprehension of a utility conditional (i.e., an "if p, then q" statement where p and/or q is valued by one or more agents) requires the construction of a mental representation of the situation described by that conditional and integration of this representation with prior context. In an eye-tracking experiment, we examined the time course of integrating conditional utility information into the broader discourse model. Specifically, the experiment determined whether readers were sensitive, during rapid heuristic processing, to the congruency between the utility of the consequent clause of a conditional (positive or negative) and a reader's subjective expectations based on prior context. On a number of eye-tracking measures we found that readers were sensitive to conditional utility-conditionals for which the consequent utility mismatched the utility that would be anticipated on the basis of prior context resulted in processing disruption. Crucially, this sensitivity emerged on measures that are accepted to indicate early processing within the language comprehension system and suggests that the evaluation of a conditional's utility informs the early stages of conditional processing.

Does clinical management improve outcomes following self-harm? Results from the multicentre study of self-harm in England.

BACKGROUND: Evidence to guide clinical management of self-harm is sparse, trials have recruited selected samples, and psychological treatments that are suggested in guidelines may not be available in routine practice. AIMS: To examine how the management that patients receive in hospital relates to subsequent outcome. METHODS: We identified episodes of self-harm presenting to three UK centres (Derby, Manchester, Oxford) over a 10 year period (2000 to 2009). We used established data collection systems to investigate the relationship between four aspects of management (psychosocial assessment, medical admission, psychiatric admission, referral for specialist mental health follow up) and repetition of self-harm within 12 months, adjusted for differences in baseline demographic and clinical characteristics. RESULTS: 35,938 individuals presented with self-harm during the study period. In two of the three centres, receiving a psychosocial assessment was associated with a 40% lower risk of repetition, Hazard Ratios (95% CIs): Centre A 0.99 (0.90-1.09); Centre B 0.59 (0.48-0.74); Centre C 0.59 (0.52-0.68). There was little indication that the apparent protective effects were mediated through referral and follow up arrangements. The association between psychosocial assessment and a reduced risk of repetition appeared to be least evident in those from the most deprived areas. CONCLUSION: These findings add to the growing body of evidence that thorough assessment is central to the management of self-harm, but further work is needed to elucidate the possible mechanisms and explore the effects in different clinical subgroups.

Sensitivity to speaker control in the online comprehension of conditional tips and promises: an eye-tracking study.

Statements of the form if… then… can be used to communicate conditional speech acts such as tips and promises. Conditional promises require the speaker to have perceived control over the outcome event, whereas conditional tips do not. In an eye-tracking study, we examined whether readers are sensitive to information about perceived speaker control during processing of conditionals embedded in context. On a number of eye-tracking measures, we found that readers are sensitive to whether or not the speaker of a conditional has perceived control over the consequent event; conditional promises (which require the speaker to have perceived control over the consequent) result in processing disruption for contexts where this control is absent. Conditional tips (which do not require perceived control) are processed equivalently easily regardless of context. These results suggest that readers rapidly utilize pragmatic information related to perceived control in order to represent conditional speech acts as they are read.

Reasoning as we read: establishing the probability of causal conditionals.

Indicative conditionals of the form if p then q (e.g., if student tuition fees rise, then applications for university places will fall) invite consideration of a hypothetical event (e.g., tuition fees rising) and of one of its possible consequences (e.g., applications falling). Since a rise in tuition fees is an uncertain event with equally uncertain consequences, a reader may believe the statement to a greater or lesser extent. As a conditional is read, the earliest point at which this probabilistic evaluation can take place is as the consequent clause is wrapped up (e.g., as the critical word fall is read in the example above). Wrap-up processing occurs at the end of the clause, as it is evaluated and integrated into the evolving discourse representation. Five sources of probability may plausibly influence the evaluation of a conditional as it is wrapped up; these are P(p), P(q), P(pq), P(q|p), and P(not-p or q). A total of 128 conditionals were constructed, with these probabilities calculated for each item in a pretest. The conditionals were then embedded in vignettes and read by 36 participants on a word-by-word basis. Using linear mixed-effects modeling, we found that wrap-up reading times were predicted by pretest ratings of P(p) and P(q|p). There was no influence of P(q), P(pq), or P(not-p or q) on wrap-up reading times. Our findings are consistent with the suppositional theory of conditionals proposed by Evans and Over (2004) but do not support the mental-models theory advanced by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002).

Conditional advice and inducements: are readers sensitive to implicit speech acts during comprehension?

Conditionals can implicitly convey a range of speech acts including promises, tips, threats and warnings. These are traditionally divided into the broader categories of advice (tips and warnings) and inducements (promises and threats). One consequence of this distinction is that speech acts from within the same category should be harder to differentiate than those from different categories. We examined this in two self-paced reading experiments. Experiment 1 revealed a rapid processing penalty when inducements (promises) and advice (tips) were anaphorically referenced using a mismatching speech act. In Experiment 2 a delayed penalty was observed when a speech act (promise or threat) was referenced by a mismatching speech act from the same category of inducements. This suggests that speech acts from the same category are harder to discriminate than those from different categories. Our findings not only support a semantic distinction between speech act categories, but also reveal pragmatic differences within categories.

An investigation into the online processing of counterfactual and indicative conditionals.

The ability to represent conditional information is central to human cognition. In two self-paced reading experiments we investigated how readers process counterfactual conditionals (e.g., If Darren had been athletic, he could probably have played on the rugby team) and indicative conditionals (e.g., If Darren is athletic, he probably plays on the rugby team). In Experiment 1 we focused on how readers process counterfactual conditional sentences. We found that processing of the antecedent of counterfactual conditionals was rapidly constrained by prior context (i.e., knowing whether Darren was or was not athletic). A reading-time penalty was observed for the critical region of text comprising the last word of the antecedent and the first word of the consequent when the information in the antecedent did not fit with prior context. In Experiment 2 we contrasted counterfactual conditionals with indicative conditionals. For counterfactual conditionals we found the same effect on the critical region as we found in Experiment 1. In contrast, however, we found no evidence that processing of the antecedent of indicative conditionals was constrained by prior context. For indicative conditionals (but not for counterfactual conditionals), the results we report are consistent with the suppositional account of conditionals. We propose that current theories of conditionals need to be able to account for online processing differences between indicative and counterfactual conditionals.