Dramatic changes to well-known places go unnoticed.

How well do we know our city? It turns out, much more poorly than we might imagine. We used declarative memory and eye-tracking techniques to examine people's ability to detect modifications to real-world landmarks and scenes in Toronto locales with which they have had extensive experience. Participants were poor at identifying which scenes contained altered landmarks, whether the modification was to the landmarks' relative size, internal features, or relation to surrounding context. To determine whether an indirect measure would prove more sensitive, we tracked eye movements during viewing. Changes in overall visual exploration, but not to specific regions of change, were related to participants' explicit endorsement of scenes as modified. These results support the contention that very familiar landmarks are represented at a global or gist level, but not local or fine-grained, level. These findings offer a unified view of memory for gist across verbal and spatial domains, and across recent and remote memory, with implications for hippocampal-neocortical interactions.

Temporal Construal Effects Are Independent of Episodic Future Thought.

Human thought is prone to biases. Some biases serve as beneficial heuristics to free up limited cognitive resources or improve well-being, but their neurocognitive basis is unclear. One such bias is a tendency to construe events in the distant future in abstract, general terms and events in the near future in concrete, detailed terms. Temporal construal may rely on our capacity to orient toward and/or imagine context-rich future events. We tested 21 individuals with impaired episodic future thinking resulting from lesions to the hippocampus or ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and 57 control participants (aged 45-76 years) from Canada and Italy on measures sensitive to temporal construal. We found that temporal construal persisted in most patients, even those with impaired episodic future thinking, but was abolished in some vmPFC cases, possibly in relation to difficulties forming and maintaining future intentions. The results confirm the fractionation of future thinking and that parts of vmPFC might critically support our ability to flexibly conceive and orient ourselves toward future events.