An observational study of skier compliance with posted "slow" signs and ski patrollers.

OBJECTIVES: To examine the efficacy of "slow" signs and patroller presence at "slow" signs to reduce speeds of snowsports participants, compared to a condition where no sign or patroller are present, independent of other factors that may contribute to skier slowing (such as prior knowledge, trail convergence, etc.). DESIGN AND METHODS: Snowsports participant speeds were measured on "more difficult" trails using a radar gun at two ski areas with: (1) no-sign - the usual condition for the trail, and (2) slow-sign - a large "slow" sign was posted in the middle of the trail. At one ski area, a third condition was also tested: (3) slow+patroller - a ski patroller stood at the slow sign. Participant equipment type and estimated ability were also recorded. RESULTS: At one ski area, there was no significant difference in speed between conditions. At the second ski area, the differences in mean (SD) speeds were small but significant for the no-sign, slow-sign, and slow+patroller conditions: 10.9 (3.0), 10.3 (2.9), and 9.8 (2.6)m/s. Effects were driven by non-beginner skiers; on average, beginner skiers and all snowboarders were slower than non-beginner skiers and did not adjust their speed in response to the signage conditions. CONCLUSIONS: Reductions in speed for the slow-sign and slow+patroller conditions compared to the no-sign condition were small (0.5 and 1.1m/s) compared to the variation in chosen skier speed reported in other studies. The small differences in chosen speeds make it unlikely that slow sign and patroller presence alone would produce meaningful reductions in collision likelihood or severity of impacts.

Engagement of fusiform cortex and disengagement of lateral occipital cortex in the acquisition of radiological expertise.

The human visual pathways that are specialized for object recognition stretch from lateral occipital cortex (LO) to the ventral surface of the temporal lobe, including the fusiform gyrus. Plasticity in these pathways supports the acquisition of visual expertise, but precisely how training affects the different regions remains unclear. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to measure neural activity in both LO and the fusiform gyrus in radiologists as they detected abnormalities in chest radiographs. Activity in the right fusiform face area (FFA) correlated with visual expertise, measured as behavioral performance during scanning. In contrast, activity in left LO correlated negatively with expertise, and the amount of LO that responded to radiographs was smaller in experts than in novices. Activity in the FFA and LO correlated negatively in experts, whereas in novices, the 2 regions showed no stable relationship. Together, these results suggest that the FFA becomes more engaged and left LO less engaged in interpreting radiographic images over the course of training. Achieving expert visual performance may involve suppressing existing neural representations while simultaneously developing others.

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias.

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.

Nonlinearities in rapid event-related fMRI explained by stimulus scaling.

Because of well-known nonlinearities in fMRI, responses measured with rapid event-related designs are smaller than responses measured with spaced designs. Surprisingly, no study to date has tested whether rapid designs also change the pattern of responses across different stimulus conditions. Here we report the results of such a test. We measured cortical responses to a flickering checkerboard at different contrasts using rapid and spaced event-related fMRI. The relative magnitude of responses across contrast conditions differed between rapid and spaced designs. Modeling the effect of the rapid design as a scaling of stimulus strength provided a good account of the data. The data were less well fit by a model that scaled the strength of responses. A similar stimulus scaling model has explained effects of neural adaptation, which suggests that adaptation may account for the observed difference between rapid and spaced designs. In a second experiment, we changed the stimulus in ways known to reduce neural adaptation and found much smaller differences between the two designs. Stimulus scaling provides a simple way to account for nonlinearities in event-related fMRI and relate data from rapid designs to data gathered using slower presentation rates.

Why is it easier to identify someone close than far away?

It is a matter of common sense that a person is easier to recognize when close than when far away. A possible explanation for why this happens begins with two observations. First, the human visual system, like many image-processing devices, can be viewed as a spatial filter that passes higher spatial frequencies, expressed in terms of cycles/degree, progressively more poorly. Second, as a face is moved farther from the observer, the face's image spatial frequency spectrum, expressed in terms of cycles/face, scales downward in a manner inversely proportional to distance. An implication of these two observations is that as a face moves away, progressively lower spatial frequencies, expressed in cycles/face--and therefore, progressively coarser facial details--are lost to the observer at a rate that is likewise inversely proportional to distance. We propose what we call the distance-as-filtering hypothesis, which is that these two observations are sufficient to explain the effect of distance on face processing. If the distance-as-filtering hypothesis is correct, one should be able to simulate the effect of seeing a face at some distance, D, by filtering the face so as to mimic its spatial frequency composition, expressed in terms of cycles/face, at that distance. In four experiments, we measured face perception at varying distances that were simulated either by filtering the face as just described or by shrinking the face so that it subtended the visual angle corresponding to the desired distance. The distance-as-filtering hypothesis was confirmed perfectly in two face perception tasks: assessing the informational content of the face and identifying celebrities. Data from the two tasks could be accounted for by assuming that they were mediated by different low-pass spatial filters within the human visual system that have the same general mathematical description but that differ in scale by a factor of approximately 0.75. We discuss our results in terms of (1) how they can be used to explain the effect of distance on visual processing, (2) what they tell us about face processing, (3) how they are related to "flexible spatial scale usage," as discussed by Schyns and colleagues, and (4) how they may be used in practical (e.g., legal) settings to demonstrate the loss of face information that occurs when a person is seen at a particular distance.

The "saw-it-all-along" effect: demonstrations of visual hindsight bias.

The authors address whether a hindsight bias exists for visual perception tasks. In 3 experiments, participants identified degraded celebrity faces as they resolved to full clarity (Phase 1). Following Phase 1, participants either recalled the level of blur present at the time of Phase 1 identification or predicted the level of blur at which a peer would make an accurate identification. In all experiments, participants overestimated identification performance of naive observers. Visual hindsight bias was greater for more familiar faces--those shown in both phases of the experiment--and was not reduced following instructions to participants to avoid the bias. The authors propose a fluency-misattribution theory to account for the bias and discuss implications for medical malpractice litigation and eyewitness testimony.

Why is it difficult to see in the fog? How stimulus contrast affects visual perception and visual memory.

Processing visually degraded stimuli is a common experience. We struggle to find house keys on dim front porches, to decipher slides projected in overly bright seminar rooms, and to read 10th-generation photocopies. In this research, we focus specifically on stimuli that are degraded via reduction of stimulus contrast and address two questions. First, why is it difficult to process low-contrast, as compared with high-contrast, stimuli? Second, is the effect of contrast fundamental in that its effect is independent of the stimulus being processed and the reason for processing the stimulus? We formally address and answer these questions within the context of a series of nested theories, each providing a successively stronger definition of what it means for contrast to affect perception and memory. To evaluate the theories, we carried out six experiments. Experiments 1 and 2 involved simple stimuli (randomly generated forms and digit strings), whereas Experiments 3-6 involved naturalistic pictures (faces, houses, and cityscapes). The stimuli were presented at two contrast levels and at varying exposure durations. The data from all the experiments allow the conclusion that some function of stimulus contrast combines multiplicatively with stimulus duration at a stage prior to that at which the nature of the stimulus and the reason for processing it are determined, and it is the result of this multiplicative combination that determines eventual memory performance. We describe a stronger version of this theory--the sensory response, information acquisition theory--which has at its core, the strong Bloch's-law-like assumption of a fundamental visual system response that is proportional to the product of stimulus contrast and stimulus duration. This theory was, as it has been in the past, highly successful in accounting for memory for simple stimuli shown at short (i.e., shorter than an eye fixation) durations. However, it was less successful in accounting for data from short-duration naturalistic pictures and was entirely unsuccessful in accounting for data from naturalistic pictures shown at longer durations. We discuss (1) processing differences between short- and long-duration stimuli, (2) processing differences between simple stimuli, such as digits, and complex stimuli, such as pictures, (3) processing differences between biluminant stimuli (such as line drawings with only two luminance levels) and multiluminant stimuli (such as grayscale pictures with multiple luminance levels), and (4) Bloch's law and a proposed generalization of the concept of metamers.

How different spatial-frequency components contribute to visual information acquisition.

We test 3 theories of global and local scene information acquisition, defining global and local in terms of spatial frequencies. By independence theories, high- and low-spatial-frequency information are acquired over the same time course and combine additively. By global-precedence theories, global information acquisition precedes local information acquisition, but they combine additively. By interactive theories, global information also affects local-information acquisition rate. We report 2 digit-recall experiments. In the 1st, we confirmed independence theories. In the 2nd, we disconfirmed both independence theories and interactive theories, leaving global-precedence theories as the remaining alternative. We show that a specific global-precedence theory quantitatively accounted for Experiments 1-2 data as well as for past data. We discuss how their spatial-frequency definition of spatial scale comports with definitions used by others, and we consider the suggestion by P. G. Schyns and colleagues (e.g., D. J. Morrison & Schyns, 2001) that the visual system may act flexibly rather than rigidly in its use of spatial scales.