Illness as a Crisis of Meaning.

In Phenomenological Bioethics: Medical Technologies, Human Suffering, and the Meaning of Being Alive, the Swedish philosopher Fredrik Svenaeus aims to show how the continental tradition of phenomenology can enrich bioethical debates by adding important but often-ignored perspectives, namely, that of lived experience. Phenomenology focuses not on supposedly objective, scientifically validated facts, but on the "life world" of the individuals affected by a situation. Individuals' life worlds consist of their experience of their own lived bodies (or Leiber) and the meaning structures of their everyday worlds. A phenomenologically informed and oriented bioethics would seek to take those life worlds into account when considering what should be done in a particular ethically challenging situation.Svenaeus reminds us that there is generally more to an illness than just a malfunction of the body that can be causally explained and treated accordingly. The fundamental insight that Svenaeus develops in his new book is that our illnesses are often, if not always, crises of meaning.

Is It Desirable to Be Able to Do the Undesirable? Moral Bioenhancement and the Little Alex Problem.

It has been argued that moral bioenhancement is desirable even if it would make it impossible for us to do what is morally required. Others find this apparent loss of freedom deplorable. However, it is difficult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil can plausibly be regarded as worse than a world in which people are not only free to do evil, but also where they actually do it, which would commit us to the seemingly paradoxical view that, under certain circumstances, the bad can be better than the good. Notwithstanding, this view is defended here.

Clipping the angel's wings: why the medicalization of love may still be worrying.

This is a critique of Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu's argument in support of a possible future neuromodulation of love and love-related relationships. I argue that, contrary to what is suggested by Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu, we do have good reason to be concerned about that possibility as well as about the medicalization of love that its pursuit would bring about.

Believing in the dignity of human embryos.

After showing that despite being inherently flawed the concept of dignity cannot be replaced without loss by ethical principles such as "respect for persons," it is argued that, if dignity be not understood as dignitas, but as bonitas, which emphasizes connectedness rather than excellence and to which the proper response is not respect, but awe, there is no reason not to ascribe it to the human embryo. The question whether or not human embryos have dignity can then be answered in the affirmative on the same pragmatist grounds that ultimately lead us to respect other human persons as possessors of dignity, that is, a special moral worth.

Telos: The Revival of an Aristotelian Concept in Present Day Ethics.

Genetic engineering is often looked upon with disfavour on the grounds that it involves 'tampering with nature'. Most philosophers do not take this notion seriously. However, some do. Those who do tend to understand nature in an Aristotelian sense, as the essence or form which is the final end or telos for the sake of which individual organisms live, and which also explains why they are as they are. But is this really a tenable idea? In order to secure its usage in present day ethics, I will first analyze the contexts in which it is applied today, then discuss the notion of telos as it was employed by Aristotle himself, and finally debate its merits and defend it, as far as possible, against common objections.