Towards causal mechanisms of consciousness through focused transcranial brain stimulation.

Conscious experience represents one of the most elusive problems of empirical science, namely neuroscience. The main objective of empirical studies of consciousness has been to describe the minimal sets of neural events necessary for a specific neuronal state to become consciously experienced. The current state of the art still does not meet this objective but rather consists of highly speculative theories based on correlates of consciousness and an ever-growing list of knowledge gaps. The current state of the art is defined by the limitations of past stimulation techniques and the emphasis on the observational approach. However, looking at the current stimulation technologies that are becoming more accurate, it is time to consider an alternative approach to studying consciousness, which builds on the methodology of causal explanations via causal alterations. The aim of this methodology is to move beyond the correlates of consciousness and focus directly on the mechanisms of consciousness with the help of the currently focused brain stimulation techniques, such as geodesic transcranial electric neuromodulation. This approach not only overcomes the limitations of the correlational methodology but will also become another firm step in the following science of consciousness.

Intrinsic Rivalry. Can White Bears Help Us With the Other Side of Consciousness?

Studies of consciousness have traditionally been based mainly upon the perceptual domains of consciousness. However, there is another side of consciousness, represented by various types of intrinsic conscious experiences. Even though intrinsic experiences can represent up to 50% of our conscious experiences, they are still largely neglected in conscious studies. We assume there are two reasons for this. First, the field of intrinsic conscious experiences is methodologically far more problematic than any other. Second, specific paradigms for capturing the correlates of intrinsic conscious experiences are almost nonexistent. Nevertheless, we expect the intrinsic side of consciousness to soon take its place in conscious studies, but first new experimental paradigms will have to be devised, which would be of a similar design to the paradigms used in studies of perceptual consciousness. In this hypothesis and theory article, we propose such a hypothetical paradigm, presenting the exploratory data of our proof-of-concept study, discussing its use, and addressing its shortcomings and their possible remediation.

Do Personality Features Influence Our Intuitions of the Mind-Body Problem? A Pilot Study.

The elusive relationship between the mental domain and the physical brain, known as the mind-body problem, is still a hot topic of discussion among philosophers and neuroscientists. Rather than solving this problem, our pilot study addresses the question as to whether personality features could influence intuitions of the mind-body problem, or more precisely, whether it is possible to identify a person's intuitive inclinations toward dualism or materialism and their inclinations toward reduction of the mind to the brain. For the purposes of this pilot study, we developed a questionnaire, which employed several theories of analytic philosophy of the mind, in order to determine which category the participants would belong to. These main categories were dualism, non-reductive materialism and reductive materialism. To test whether personality features affect preferences for these categories, the participants were investigated by Cloninger's Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI). We found significant differences in the self-transcendence dimension of the TCI between participants who were evaluated as dualists and those who were assessed as reductive materialists. Our data show that the personality dimension of self-transcendence correlates with intuitive inclination toward reductive materialism or dualism. In addition, our results suggest that ideas, theories, and hypothetical solutions of the mind-body problem and possibly even conclusions, acceptance, and disputations of thought experiments of philosophy of the mind can be biased by personality traits. This fact should be taken into account in future discussions of the philosophy of the mind and may also be important for empirical research and an empirical understanding of the mind.

Why and How. The Future of the Central Questions of Consciousness.

In this review, we deal with two central questions of consciousness how and why, and we outline their possible future development. The question how refers to the empirical endeavor to reveal the neural correlates and mechanisms that form consciousness. On the other hand, the question why generally refers to the "hard problem" of consciousness, which claims that empirical science will always fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why is there conscious experience at all. Unfortunately, the hard problem of consciousness will probably never completely disappear because it will always have its most committed supporters. However, there is a good chance that its weight and importance will be highly reduced by empirically tackling consciousness in the near future. We expect that future empirical endeavor of consciousness will be based on a unifying brain theory and will answer the question as to what is the function of conscious experience, which will in turn replace the implications of the hard problem. The candidate of such a unifying brain theory is predictive coding, which will have to explain both perceptual consciousness and conscious mind-wandering in order to become the truly unifying theory of brain functioning.

From Anomalies to Essential Scientific Revolution? Intrinsic Brain Activity in the Light of Kuhn's Philosophy of Science.

The first step toward a modern understanding of fMRI resting brain activity was made by Bharat Biswal in 1995. This surprising, and at first rejected, discovery is now associated with many resting state networks, notably the famous default mode network (DMN). Resting state activity and DMN significantly reassessed our traditional beliefs and conventions about the functioning of the brain. For the majority of the twentieth century, neuroscientists assumed that the brain is mainly the "reactive engine" to the environment operating mostly through stimulation. This "reactive convention" was very influential and convenient for the goals of twentieth century neuroscience-non-invasive functional localization based on stimulation. Largely unchallenged, "reactive convention" determined the direction of scientific research for a long time and became the "reactive paradigm" of the twentieth century. Resting state activity brought knowledge that was quite different of the "reactive paradigm." Current research of the DMN, probably the best known resting state network, leads to entirely new observations and conclusions, which were not achievable from the perspective of the "reactive paradigm." This shift from reactive activity to resting state activity of the brain is accompanied by an important question: "Can resting state activity be considered a scientific revolution and the new paradigm of neuroscience, or is it only significant for one branch of neuroscience, such as fMRI?"

Missing piece of the puzzle in the science of consciousness: Resting state and endogenous correlates of consciousness.

Consciousness still stands as one of the most interesting and the most elusive problems of neuroscience. Finding its correlates is the first step toward its satisfactory explanation. Several theories have proposed its correlates but none of them seem to be generally accepted even though most of them share some very similar elements. These elements are the activity of the thalamus, which is considered by some as the central region for consciousness, and gamma synchronization, which should be the general principal for the emergence of conscious experience. However, all of these proposed theories share one characteristic and that is that they do not take into consideration the recently discovered endogenous activity of the brain, which is generally associated with the default mode network. Although the activity of this large scale brain network is in correlation with various levels of consciousness it is still missing in discussions of consciousness. This review recognizes the importance of endogenous activity and points out the important discoveries of endogenous activity that could be an important step toward a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.