The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups.

Cooperation usually becomes harder to sustain as groups become larger because incentives to shirk increase with the number of potential contributors to collective action. But is this always the case? Here we study a binary-action cooperative dilemma where a public good is provided as long as not more than a given number of players shirk from a costly cooperative task. We find that at the stable polymorphic equilibrium, which exists when the cost of cooperation is low enough, the probability of cooperating increases with group size and reaches a limit of one when the group size tends to infinity. Nevertheless, increasing the group size may increase or decrease the probability that the public good is provided at such an equilibrium, depending on the cost value. We also prove that the expected payoff to individuals at the stable polymorphic equilibrium (i.e., their fitness) decreases with group size. For low enough costs of cooperation, both the probability of provision of the public good and the expected payoff converge to positive values in the limit of large group sizes. However, we also find that the basin of attraction of the stable polymorphic equilibrium is a decreasing function of group size and shrinks to zero in the limit of very large groups. Overall, we demonstrate non-trivial comparative statics with respect to group size in an otherwise simple collective action problem.

Batesian mimicry or general food deception? An evolutionary game between plants for pollinator services.

Floral food deception is a well-known phenomenon which is not thoroughly understood. Particularly, it is unclear what drives a plant towards Batesian mimicry or towards generalized food deception. We analysed the evolutionary game between a Model species with nectar-secreting flowers and a Deceiver species that provides no nectar who share pollinators for reproduction. We focused our analysis on the effect of similarity of floral signals between participating plants and on costs of nectar production. We defined payoffs in the game between Models and Deceivers as the stationary visitation frequencies to participating species with different signal similarities and nectar costs. Therefore, fitness payoff of each strategy was a product of complex interactions between plant species composing the community and the pollinators visiting them. Our model provides a unified framework in which consequences of Model species interaction with different deception modes can be compared. Our findings suggest that plant-pollinator systems, like other mutualistic systems, are prone to exploitation, and that exploitation may persist at a large range of conditions. We showed that floral similarity, and thus, pollinators' ability to discriminate between Model and deceptive species, governs the stability of Batesian mimicry, while pollinator switching and sampling behaviour enables the persistence of general food deception.

The disperser dilemma in cooperatively breeding birds.

In most cooperatively breeding birds, individuals do not breed with their natal group members. In order to breed, they have either to disperse into another group or wait for an opposite-sex individual to join their group. In most of these species, females disperse more than males. We develop a dynamic game-theoretic model to account for this asymmetry. When males are physically larger/heavier than females, this allows them to effectively welcome female immigrants into their natal group and overcome the local females' opposition more than vice versa. The model further assumes that the dispersal decision is not confined to a restricted time window, but is rather based on acquired information and responsive to opportunities. The model predicts that (i) females disperse more than males, and (ii) females are willing to tolerate more risks in dispersal than do males. The latter prediction is supported inter alia by the fact that in many cooperatively breeding birds, females disperse at a younger age, and further away from their natal group as compared to dispersing males.

The sentinel behaviour of Arabian babbler floaters.

The sentinel behaviour of 38 Arabian babbler adult floaters, who lived alone within a territory belonging to a foreign group, was studied and compared with their own sentinel behaviour in the past, when they were group members. All floaters acted as sentinels and uttered 'alarm calls'. This suggests that sentinel activity is due at least, in part, to selfish motives. Floaters sentinelled less than they did as group members, with the decrease in sentinel activity sharper for ex-dominants than for ex-subordinates. One possible explanation for these differences is that sentinel activity is aimed not only at detecting predators, but also at detecting foreign conspecifics. Within a group, the latter incentive is stronger for breeding dominants than for subordinates, whereas all floaters alike may be trying to detect the owners of the territory in which they were roaming but also to avoid being detected by them. Other possible explanations are that floaters have less time and energy for sentinel activity because they are weaker or because foraging is more difficult in a foreign territory. This may be especially so for dominants who used to enjoy privileged access to food in their group. No significant difference was found in the rate of sentinels' 'alarm calls' between floaters and group members, suggesting that their main purpose is predator-prey communication, of which warning groupmates may be a side benefit.