Functional fixedness in chimpanzees.

Differences in the tool use of non-human primates and humans are subject of ongoing debate. In humans, representations of object functions underpin efficient tool use. Yet, representations of object functions can lead to functional fixedness, which describes the fixation on a familiar tool function leading to less efficient problem solving when the problem requires using the tool for a new function. In the current study, we examined whether chimpanzees exhibit functional fixedness. After solving a problem with a tool, chimpanzees were less efficient in solving another problem which required using the same tool with a different function compared to a control group. This fixation effect was still apparent after a period of nine months and when chimpanzees had learned about the function of a tool by observation of a conspecific. These results suggest that functional fixedness in our closest living relatives likely exists and cast doubt on the notion that stable function representations are uniquely human.

Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions.

Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make-revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence.

Making sense of early false-belief understanding.

We address the puzzle about early belief ascription: young children fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but they demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Based on recent converging evidence, we articulate a pragmatic framework to solve this puzzle. Young children do understand the contents of others' false belief, but they are overwhelmed when they must simultaneously make sense of two distinct actions: the instrumental action of a mistaken agent and the experimenter's communicative action.