Teaching teamwork during the Neonatal Resuscitation Program: a randomized trial.

OBJECTIVE: To add a team training and human error curriculum to the Neonatal Resuscitation Program (NRP) and measure its effect on teamwork. We hypothesized that teams that received the new course would exhibit more teamwork behaviors than those in the standard NRP course. STUDY DESIGN: Interns were randomized to receive NRP with team training or standard NRP, then video recorded when they performed simulated resuscitations at the end of the day-long course. Outcomes were assessed by observers blinded to study arm allocation and included the frequency or duration of six team behaviors: inquiry, information sharing, assertion, evaluation of plans, workload management and vigilance. RESULT: The interns in the NRP with team training group exhibited more frequent team behaviors (number of episodes per minute (95% CI)) than interns in the control group: information sharing 1.06 (0.24, 1.17) vs 0.13 (0.00, 0.43); inquiry 0.35 (0.11, 0.42) vs 0.09 (0.00, 0.10); assertion 1.80 (1.21, 2.25) vs 0.64 (0.26, 0.91); and any team behavior 3.34 (2.26, 4.11) vs 1.03 (0.48, 1.30) (P-values <0.008 for all comparisons). Vigilance and workload management were practiced throughout the entire simulated code by nearly all the teams in the NRP with team training group (100% for vigilance and 88% for workload management) vs only 53 and 20% of the teams in the standard NRP. No difference was detected in the frequency of evaluation of plans. CONCLUSION: Compared with the standard NRP, NRP with a teamwork and human error curriculum led interns to exhibit more team behaviors during simulated resuscitations.

Teamwork and quality during neonatal care in the delivery room.

OBJECTIVE: Experts believe good teamwork among health care providers may improve quality. We sought to measure the frequency of team behaviors during delivery room care and to explore how these behaviors relate to the quality of care. STUDY DESIGN: We video recorded neonatal resuscitation teams then used independent observers to measure teamwork behaviors and compliance with Neonatal Resuscitation Program (NRP) guidelines (a measure of quality of care). RESULTS: Observer agreement was either fair or good for all teamwork behaviors except workload management, vigilance, and leadership, for which agreement was slight. All teams (n=132) exhibited the behaviors information sharing and inquiry, and all but one team exhibited vigilance and workload management. Other behaviors were present less often: assertion in 19.9% of teams, teaching 16.7%, leadership 19.7%, evaluation of plans 12.9%, and intentions stated 9.1%. Factor analysis identified three fundamental components of teamwork: communication (comprised of information sharing and inquiry); management (workload management and vigilance); and leadership (assertion, intentions shared, evaluation of plans, and leadership). All three components were weakly but significantly correlated with independent assessments of NRP compliance and an overall rating of the quality of care. CONCLUSION: Most team behaviors can be reliably observed during delivery room care by neonatal resuscitation teams, and some are infrequently used. We found weak but significant and consistent correlations among these behaviors with independent assessments of NRP compliance and an overall rating of the quality of care. These findings support additional efforts to study team training for delivery room care and other areas of healthcare.

Translating teamwork behaviours from aviation to healthcare: development of behavioural markers for neonatal resuscitation.

Improving teamwork in healthcare may help reduce and manage errors. This paper takes a step toward that goal by (1) proposing a set of teamwork behaviours, or behavioural markers, for neonatal resuscitation; (2) presenting a data form for recording observations about these markers; and (3) comparing and contrasting different sets of teamwork behaviours that have been developed for healthcare. Data from focus groups of neonatal providers, surveys, and video recordings of neonatal resuscitations were used to identify some new teamwork behaviours, to translate existing aviation team behaviours to this setting, and to develop a data collection form. This behavioural marker audit form for neonatal resuscitation lists and defines 10 markers that describe specific, observable behaviours seen during the resuscitation of newborn infants. These markers are compared with those developed by other groups. Future research should determine the relations among these behaviours and errors, and test their usefulness in measuring the impact of team training interventions.

Culture and error in space: implications from analog environments.

An ongoing study investigating national, organizational, and professional cultures in aviation and medicine is described. Survey data from 26 nations on 5 continents show highly significant national differences regarding appropriate relationships between leaders and followers, in group vs. individual orientation, and in values regarding adherence to rules and procedures. These findings replicate earlier research on dimensions of national culture. Data collected also isolate significant operational issues in multi-national flight crews. While there are no better or worse cultures, these cultural differences have operational implications for the way crews function in an international space environment. The positive professional cultures of pilots and physicians exhibit a high enjoyment of the job and professional pride. However, a negative component was also identified characterized by a sense of personal invulnerability regarding the effects of stress and fatigue on performance. This misperception of personal invulnerability has operational implications such as failures in teamwork and increased probability of error. A second component of the research examines team error in operational environments. From observational data collected during normal flight operations, new models of threat and error and their management were developed that can be generalized to operations in space and other socio-technological domains. Five categories of crew error are defined and their relationship to training programs in team performance, known generically as Crew Resource Management, is described. The relevance of these data for future spaceflight is discussed.

Error, stress, and teamwork in medicine and aviation: cross sectional surveys.

OBJECTIVES: To survey operating theatre and intensive care unit staff about attitudes concerning error, stress, and teamwork and to compare these attitudes with those of airline cockpit crew. DESIGN: : Cross sectional surveys. SETTING: : Urban teaching and non-teaching hospitals in the United States, Israel, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Major airlines around the world. PARTICIPANTS: : 1033 doctors, nurses, fellows, and residents working in operating theatres and intensive care units and over 30 000 cockpit crew members (captains, first officers, and second officers). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: : Perceptions of error, stress, and teamwork. RESULTS: : Pilots were least likely to deny the effects of fatigue on performance (26% v 70% of consultant surgeons and 47% of consultant anaesthetists). Most pilots (97%) and intensive care staff (94%) rejected steep hierarchies (in which senior team members are not open to input from junior members), but only 55% of consultant surgeons rejected such hierarchies. High levels of teamwork with consultant surgeons were reported by 73% of surgical residents, 64% of consultant surgeons, 39% of anaesthesia consultants, 28% of surgical nurses, 25% of anaesthetic nurses, and 10% of anaesthetic residents. Only a third of staff reported that errors are handled appropriately at their hospital. A third of intensive care staff did not acknowledge that they make errors. Over half of intensive care staff reported that they find it difficult to discuss mistakes. CONCLUSIONS: Medical staff reported that error is important but difficult to discuss and not handled well in their hospital. Barriers to discussing error are more important since medical staff seem to deny the effect of stress and fatigue on performance. Further problems include differing perceptions of teamwork among team members and reluctance of senior theatre staff to accept input from junior members.

Analyzing cockpit communications: the links between language, performance, error, and workload.

The importance of communication on the flightdeck is discussed and the application of a new computer-based linguistic method of text analysis is introduced. Preliminary results from a NASA B727 simulator study indicate that specific language variables are moderately to highly correlated with individual performance, individual error rates, and individual communication ratings. Also, language use was found to vary as a function of crew position and level of workload during the flight. Use of the first person plural (we, our, us) increases over the life of a flightcrew, and Captains speak more in the first person plural than First Officers or Flight Engineers. Language use in initial flights was associated with performance and error in subsequent flights. These are preliminary data, in that this method of linguistic analysis is currently being developed and integrated with a content-coding method of communication analysis and models of threat and error.

The evolution of Crew Resource Management training in commercial aviation.

In this study, we describe changes in the nature of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training in commercial aviation, including its shift from cockpit to crew resource management. Validation of the impact of CRM is discussed. Limitations of CRM, including lack of cross-cultural generality are considered. An overarching framework that stresses error management to increase acceptance of CRM concepts is presented. The error management approach defines behavioral strategies taught in CRM as error countermeasures that are employed to avoid error, to trap errors committed, and to mitigate the consequences of error.

Managing human error in aviation.

NASA: Crew resource management (CRM) programs were developed to address team and leadership aspects of piloting modern airplanes. The goal is to reduce errors through team work. Human factors research and social, cognitive, and organizational psychology are used to develop programs tailored for individual airlines. Flight crews study accident case histories, group dynamics, and human error. Simulators provide pilots with the opportunity to solve complex flight problems. CRM in the simulator is called line-oriented flight training (LOFT). In automated cockpits CRM promotes the idea of automation as a crew member. Cultural aspects of aviation include professional, business, and national culture. The aviation CRM model has been adapted for training surgeons and operating room staff in human factors.^ieng

National culture and flight deck automation: results of a multination survey.

Attitudes regarding flight deck automation were surveyed in a sample of 5,879 airline pilots from 12 nations. The average difference in endorsement levels across 11 items for pilots flying automated aircraft in 12 nations was 53%, reflecting significant national differences in attitudes on all items, with the largest differences observed for preference and enthusiasm for automation. The range of agreement across nations was on average four times larger than the range of agreement across different airlines within the same nation, and roughly six times larger than the range across pilots of standard and pilots of automated aircraft. Patterns of response are described in terms of dimensions of national culture. Implications of the results for development of safety cultures and culturally sensitive training are discussed.

Research project evaluates the effect of national culture on flight crew behaviour.

NASA: The role of national culture in flight crew interactions and behavior is examined. Researchers surveyed Asian, European, and American flight crews to determine attitudes about crew coordination and cockpit management. Universal attitudes among pilots are identified. Culturally variable attitudes among pilots from 16 countries are compared. The role of culture in response to increasing cockpit automation is reviewed. Culture-based challenges to crew resource management programs and multicultural organizations are discussed.^ieng

Safety in the operating theatre--part 1: interpersonal relationships and team performance.

NASA: The authors examine the application of interpersonal human factors training on operating room (OR) personnel. Mortality studies of OR deaths and critical incident studies of anesthesia are examined to determine the role of human error in OR incidents. Theoretical models of system vulnerability to accidents are presented with emphasis on a systems approach to OR performance. Input, process, and outcome factors are discussed in detail.^ieng

Human factors and safety in emergency medicine.

A model based on an input process and outcome conceptualisation is suggested to address safety-relevant factors in emergency medicine. As shown in other dynamic and demanding environments, human factors play a decisive role in attaining high quality service. Attitudes held by health-care providers, organisational shells and work-cultural parameters determine communication, conflict resolution and workload distribution within and between teams. These factors should be taken into account to improve outcomes such as operational integrity, job satisfaction and morale.

Predicting astronaut effectiveness: a multivariate approach.

In this study, measures of astronaut effectiveness were administered to volunteers from the astronaut corps in order to validate psychological "select-in" criteria for long-duration space missions. Using a peer nomination format, astronauts rated their peers with whom they had either flown or trained. Factor analysis revealed two latent performance dimensions: job competence and group living. The job competence dimension measured the instrumental aspects relating to job knowledge and job performance. The group living dimension measured the interpersonal aspects relating to teamwork and desirability as a colleague on Space Station. Analyses revealed that the personality variables could explain a significant proportion of the variance in the group living performance dimension, but not the job competence performance dimension. The findings are not surprising since astronauts are highly screened on the basis of past attainment, but are not as highly screened on aspects relating to teamwork and interpersonal concerns.