ABSTRACT
Several definitions of paternalism from the contemporary literature are examined. These are all found to be more or less defective when tested against various counterexamples. An alternative definition is subsequently developed using two necessary conditions which taken together are considered sufficient to define paternalistic actions. Those conditions are (1) the paternalistic action is primarily intended to benefit the recipient, and (2) the recipient's consent or dissent is not a relevant consideration for the initiator.
KIE: Definitions of paternalism found in the works of Gerald Dworkin, Allen Buchanan, Bernard Gert and Charles Culver, and James Childress are analyzed and found defective when tested against various counterexamples. Hershey then develops an alternative definition using two necessary conditions which, when taken together, are sufficient to encompass any and all cases of paternalism. An action, initiated by a human individual or group with regard to another human individual or group, is paternalistic if, and only if, (1) the action is primarily intended by the initiator to benefit the recipient, and (2) the recipient's consent or dissent is not a relevant consideration for the initiator.
