ABSTRACT
Metamemory monitoring, study behavior, and memory are presumably causally connected. When people misjudge their memory, their study behavior should be biased accordingly. Remedying metamemory illusions should debias study behavior and improve memory. One metamemory illusion concerns source memory, a critical aspect of episodic memory. People predict better source memory for items that originated from an expected source (e.g., toothbrush in a bathroom) rather than an unexpected source (e.g., shampoo in a kitchen), whereas actual source memory shows the opposite: an inconsistency effect. This expectancy illusion biases restudy choices: Participants restudy more unexpected than expected source-item pairs. The authors tested the causal relationships between metamemory and source memory with a delay and a source-retrieval attempt between study and metamemory judgment to remedy the expectancy illusion and debias restudy choices. Debiased restudy choices should enhance source memory for expected items, thereby reducing the inconsistency effect. Two groups studied expected and unexpected source-item pairs. They made metamemory judgments and restudy choices immediately at study or after delay, restudied the selected pairs, and completed a source-monitoring test. After immediate judgments, participants predicted better source memory for expected pairs and selected more unexpected pairs for restudy. After delayed judgments, participants predicted a null effect of expectancy on source memory and selected equal numbers of expected and unexpected pairs. Thus, the expectancy illusion was partially remedied and restudy choices were debiased. Nevertheless, source memory was only weakly affected. The results challenge the presumed causal relationships between metamemory monitoring, study behavior, and source memory.
ABSTRACT
In schema-based source monitoring, people mistakenly predict better source memory for expected sources (e.g., oven in the kitchen; expectancy effect), whereas actual source memory is better for unexpected sources (e.g., hairdryer in the kitchen; inconsistency effect; Schaper et al., 2019b). In three source-monitoring experiments, the authors tested whether a delay between study and metamemory judgments remedied this metamemory expectancy illusion. Further, the authors tested whether delayed judgments were based on in-the-moment experiences of retrieval fluency or updating of belief due to experiences with one's source memory. Participants studied source-item pairs and provided metamemory judgments either at study or after delay. After delay, they made judgments either on the complete source-item pair (eliciting no source retrieval, Experiment 1) or on the item only (eliciting covert, Experiment 1, or overt source retrieval, Experiments 2 and 3). Metamemory judgments at study showed the established illusory expectancy effect, as did delayed judgments when no source retrieval was elicited. However, when participants retrieved the source prior to delayed judgments, they predicted an inconsistency effect on source memory, which concurred with actual memory. Thus, delaying judgments remedied the metamemory expectancy illusion. Results further indicate that in-the-moment experiences of retrieval fluency and updated general belief about the effect of expectancy on source memory jointly contributed to this remedial effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
