Automaticity and depression: Daily mood-reactive rumination in people with and without depression history.

Depressive rumination has been conceptualized as a mental habit that is initiated automatically without conscious awareness, intent, or control in response to negative mood. However, it is unknown whether depression vulnerability is characterized by elevated levels of mood-reactive rumination at the level of short-term dynamics. Using mobile ecological momentary assessment, formerly depressed individuals with a recurrent history of depression (n = 94) and nonclinical controls (n = 55) recorded in-the-moment affect and rumination 10 times daily over 6 days, after completing baseline measures of trait ruminative brooding, early life stress, and habitual characteristics of negative thinking (e.g., automaticity, lack of conscious awareness, intent, and control). Momentary fluctuations in negative affect were prospectively associated with greater rumination at the next sampling occasion in formerly depressed participants whereas this pattern of mood-reactive rumination was not observed in nonclinical controls. In formerly depressed participants, habitual characteristics of negative thinking was associated with greater mood-reactivity of rumination, particularly among those with a history of early life stress. Mood-reactive rumination was not, however, associated with depression course nor with the frequency of trait ruminative brooding. Rumination may be triggered in response to negative affect with a high degree of automaticity, making it difficult to control. Greater mood-reactivity of rumination might be associated with increased depression risk, independent of the depressive course and may be exacerbated by early life stress. Future studies may need to go beyond frequency and focus on the role of mood-reactivity and automaticity of ruminative thinking in depression vulnerability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Do daily mood fluctuations activate ruminative thoughts as a mental habit? Results from an ecological momentary assessment study.

It has been suggested that mental habits may underpin a heightened disposition to engage in rumination in response to negative mood. The aim of the current study was to assess the role of habit in the dynamic interplay between affect and ruminative thinking in the flow of daily life experiences. Using mobile ecological momentary assessment, 97 participants recorded affect and rumination ten times daily over six days, after completing measures of trait ruminative brooding and habitual characteristics of negative thinking (e.g. automaticity, lack of conscious awareness, intent and control). Momentary fluctuations in negative (increased) and positive (decreased) affect was prospectively associated with greater rumination-levels at the next sampling occasion. The degree to which affect triggered a subsequent ruminative response was moderated by habitual characteristics of negative thinking in a theoretically consistent way. Stronger temporal pairing of negative affect and rumination was also associated with greater emotional inertia but less carry-over of rumination from one moment to the next. Depression vulnerability may be in the form of rumination being habitually triggered in response to momentary fluctuations in affect, with deleterious effect on mood. The findings may have clinical implications, as targeting the habitual nature of rumination might help reduce depression vulnerability.

Own-race and other-race face recognition problems without visual expertise problems in dyslexic readers.

Both intact and deficient neural processing of faces has been found in dyslexic readers. Similarly, behavioral studies have shown both normal and abnormal face processing in developmental dyslexia. We tested whether dyslexic adults are impaired in tests of own-race and other-race face recognition. As both face and word recognition rely considerably on visual expertise, we wished to investigate whether face recognition problems of dyslexic readers might stem from difficulties with experience-driven expert visual processing. We utilized the finding that people tend to be worse at discriminating other-race faces compared to own-race faces, the so-called other-race effect, thought to reflect greater experience with own-race faces. If visual expertise is compromised in dyslexic readers, so that their visual system is not effectively shaped by experience, then they might show a diminished other-race effect. Matched dyslexic and typical readers completed two tests of own- and other-race face recognition. The results show that dyslexic readers have problems with recognizing faces, and these difficulties are not fully accounted for by general problems with attention or memory. However, recognition is compromised for both own- and other-race faces, and the strength of the other-race effect does not differ between dyslexic and typical readers. There was individual variability in both groups, and an exploratory analysis revealed that while dyslexic readers with no university education showed deficits in face recognition, the dyslexic participants with higher education did not. We conclude that dyslexic readers as a group have face recognition problems. These are potentially modulated by educational level but compromised visual expertise cannot demonstrably account for the face recognition problems associated with dyslexia. We discuss the implications of these findings for theoretical accounts of dyslexia and for theories of word and face recognition.

Problems with visual statistical learning in developmental dyslexia.

Previous research shows that dyslexic readers are impaired in their recognition of faces and other complex objects, and show hypoactivation in ventral visual stream regions that support word and object recognition. Responses of these brain regions are shaped by visual statistical learning. If such learning is compromised, people should be less sensitive to statistically likely feature combinations in words and other objects, and impaired visual word and object recognition should be expected. We therefore tested whether people with dyslexia showed diminished capability for visual statistical learning. Matched dyslexic and typical readers participated in tests of visual statistical learning of pairs of novel shapes that frequently appeared together. Dyslexic readers on average recognized fewer pairs than typical readers, indicating some problems with visual statistical learning. These group differences were not accounted for by differences in intelligence, ability to remember individual shapes, or spatial attention paid to the stimuli, but other attentional problems could play a mediating role. Deficiencies in visual statistical learning may in some cases prevent appropriate experience-driven shaping of neuronal responses in the ventral visual stream, hampering visual word and object recognition.