Epidemic parenteral exposure to volatile sulfur-containing compounds at a hemodialysis center.

OBJECTIVE: To determine the cause of acute illness on August 30, 2000, among patients at an outpatient dialysis center (center A). DESIGN: We performed a cohort study of all patients receiving dialysis on August 30, 2000; reviewed dialysis procedures; and analyzed dialysis water samples using microbiologic and chemical assays. SETTING: Dialysis center (center A). PATIENTS: A case-patient was defined as a patient who developed chills within 5 hours after starting hemodialysis at center A on August 30, 2000. RESULTS: Sixteen (36%) of 44 patients at center A met the case definition. All case-patients were hospitalized; 2 died. Besides chills, 15 (94%) of the case-patients experienced nausea; 12 (75%), vomiting; and 4 (25%), fever. Illness was more frequent on the second than the first dialysis shift (16 of 20 vs 0 of 24, P < .001); no other risk factors were identified. The center's water treatment system had received inadequate maintenance and disinfection and a sulfurous odor was noted during sampling of the water from the reverse osmosis (RO) unit. The water had elevated bacterial counts. Volatile sulfur-containing compounds (ie, methanethiol, carbon disulfide, dimethyldisulfide, and sulfur dioxide) were detected by gas chromatography and mass spectrometry in 8 of 12 water samples from the RO unit and in 0 of 28 samples from other areas (P < .001). Results of tests for heavy metals and chloramines were within normal limits. CONCLUSIONS: Parenteral exposure to volatile sulfur-containing compounds, produced under anaerobic conditions in the RO unit, could have caused the outbreak. This investigation demonstrates the importance of appropriate disinfection and maintenance of water treatment systems in hemodialysis centers.

Serratia marcescens bacteremia traced to an infused narcotic.

BACKGROUND: From June 30, 1998, through March 21, 1999, several patients in the surgical intensive care unit of a hospital acquired Serratia marcescens bacteremia. We investigated this outbreak. METHODS: A case was defined as the occurrence of S. marcescens bacteremia in any patient in the surgical intensive care unit during the period of the epidemic. To identify risk factors, we compared patients with S. marcescens bacteremia with randomly selected controls. Isolates from patients and from medications were evaluated by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The hair of one employee was tested for fentanyl. RESULTS: Twenty-six patients with S. marcescens bacteremia were identified; eight (31 percent) had polymicrobial bacteremia, and seven of these had Enterobacter cloacae and S. marcescens in the same culture. According to univariate analysis, patients with S. marcescens bacteremia stayed in the surgical intensive care unit longer than controls (13.5 vs. 4.0 days, P<0.001), were more likely to have received fentanyl in the surgical intensive care unit (odds ratio, 31; P<0.001), and were more likely to have been exposed to two particular respiratory therapists (odds ratios, 13.1 and 5.1; P<0.001 for both comparisons). In a multivariate analysis, receipt of fentanyl and exposure to the two respiratory therapists (adjusted odds ratio for one therapist, 6.7; P=0.002; adjusted odds ratio for the other therapist, 9.5; P=0.02) remained significant. One respiratory therapist had been reported for tampering with fentanyl; his hair sample tested positive for fentanyl. Cultures of fentanyl infusions from two case patients yielded S. marcescens and E. cloacae. The isolates from the case patients and from the fentanyl infusions had similar patterns on pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. After removal of the implicated respiratory therapist, no further cases occurred. CONCLUSIONS: An outbreak of S. marcescens and E. cloacae bacteremia in a surgical intensive care unit was traced to extrinsic contamination of the parenteral narcotic fentanyl by a health care worker. Our findings underscore the risk of complications in patients that is associated with illicit narcotic use by health care workers.