Routescore: Punching the Ticket to More Efficient Materials Development.

Self-driving laboratories, in the form of automated experimentation platforms guided by machine learning algorithms, have emerged as a potential solution to the need for accelerated science. While new tools for automated analysis and characterization are being developed at a steady rate, automated synthesis remains the bottleneck in the chemical space accessible to self-driving laboratories. Combining automated and manual synthesis efforts immediately significantly expands the explorable chemical space. To effectively direct the different capabilities of automated (higher throughput and less labor) and manual synthesis (greater chemical versatility), we describe a protocol, the RouteScore, that quantifies the cost of combined synthetic routes. In this work, the RouteScore is used to determine the most efficient synthetic route to a well-known pharmaceutical (structure-oriented optimization) and to simulate a self-driving laboratory that finds the most easily synthesizable organic laser molecule with specific photophysical properties from a space of ∼3500 possible molecules (property-oriented optimization). These two examples demonstrate the power and flexibility of our approach in mixed synthetic planning and optimization and especially in downselecting promising candidates from a large chemical space via an a priori estimation of the synthetic costs.

The Magic School Bus dilemma: How fantasy affects children's learning from stories.

Although children's books often include fantasy, research suggests that children do not learn as well from fantastical stories as from realistic ones. The current studies investigated whether the type of fantasy matters, in effect testing two possible mechanisms for fantasy's interference. Across two studies, 110 5-year-olds were read different types of fantastical stories containing a problem and then were asked to solve an analogous problem in a real lab setting. Children who were read a minimally fantastical version of the story, in which the story occurred on another planet "that looked just like Earth," were no more likely to transfer the solution than children who heard a story that was slightly more fantastical in that the story occurred on another planet and that planet looked different from Earth (e.g., orange grass, a green sky). In contrast, significantly higher rates of learning were observed when the story contained those elements and two physically impossible events (e.g., walking through walls). Furthermore, this improvement was obtained only when the impossible events preceded, and not when they followed, the educational content. Although fantasy may sometimes detract from learning (as other research has shown), these new studies suggest that minimal fantasy does not and that particular types of fantasy may even increase learning. We propose that the mechanism for this may be that a small dose of impossible events induces deeper processing of the subsequent events in the story.

Investigating the effectiveness of fantasy stories for teaching scientific principles.

Educational media often contain fantastical information. Although some prior research suggests that this information interferes with children's learning, other work shows that fantasy benefits learning under certain circumstances. To investigate this issue and to clarify how different types of fantastical events might affect children's learning, we presented preschoolers (N = 99 in Study 1; N = 101 in Study 2) with stories that contained events that violated real-world physical laws, violated real-world biological laws, or did not violate any real-world laws. Within each story, we embedded two pieces of educational information, one each from the domains of biology and physics, to test (a) whether there are benefits of fantastical information on learning and (b) whether such benefits are domain specific. Across both studies, we found that children generally learned both types of information best from the story with physical violations, suggesting that such events can bolster children's learning.

Does expertise moderate the seductive allure of reductive explanations?

Non-experts are unduly attracted to explanations of scientific phenomena that contain irrelevant reductive language (e.g., explanations of biological phenomena that mention chemistry; Hopkins, Weisberg, & Taylor, 2016). To determine if expertise would reduce this reasoning error, the current study recruited individuals with graduate-level training in six scientific fields and in philosophy (N = 580) and asked them to judge explanations for phenomena from those fields. Like the novices in Hopkins et al. (2016), scientists' ratings of bad explanations were influenced by reductive information when viewing phenomena from outside their field of expertise, but they were less likely to show this bias when reasoning about their own field. Higher levels of educational attainment did improve detection of bad explanations. These results indicate that advanced training in science or logic can lead to more accurate reasoning about explanations, but does not mitigate the reductive allure effect.

People's explanatory preferences for scientific phenomena.

Previous work has found that people are drawn to explanations of psychological phenomena when these explanations contain neuroscience information, even when that information is irrelevant. This preference may be due to a general preference for reductive explanations; however, prior work has not investigated whether people indeed prefer such explanations or whether this preference varies by scientific discipline. The current study asked 82 participants to choose which methods would be most appropriate for investigating topics in six scientific fields. Participants generally preferred methods that either matched the field of investigation (e.g., biology for biology) or that came from the immediately more reductive field (e.g., chemistry for biology). Both of these patterns were especially evident for the pairing of psychology and neuroscience. Additionally, participants selected significantly more methods as being useful for explaining neuroscience phenomena. These results suggest that people's sense of the relations among scientific fields are fairly well calibrated but display some general attraction to neuroscience.

Accessing the Inaccessible: Redefining Play as a Spectrum.

Defining play has plagued researchers and philosophers for years. From describing play as an inaccessible concept due to its complexity, to providing checklists of features, the field has struggled with how to conceptualize and operationalize "play." This theoretical piece reviews the literature about both play and learning and suggests that by viewing play as a spectrum - that ranges from free play (no guidance or support) to guided play and games (including purposeful adult support while maintaining playful elements), we better capture the true essence of play and explain its relationship to learning. Insights from the Science of Learning allow us to better understand why play supports learning across social and academic domains. By changing the lens through which we conceptualize play, we account for previous findings in a cohesive way while also proposing new avenues of exploration for the field to study the role of learning through play across age and context.

The seductive allure is a reductive allure: People prefer scientific explanations that contain logically irrelevant reductive information.

Previous work has found that people feel significantly more satisfied with explanations of psychological phenomena when those explanations contain neuroscience information-even when this information is entirely irrelevant to the logic of the explanations. This seductive allure effect was first demonstrated by Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, and Gray (2008), and has since been replicated several times (Fernandez-Duque, Evans, Christian, & Hodges, 2015; Minahan & Siedlecki, 2016; Rhodes, Rodriguez, & Shah, 2014; Weisberg, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2015). However, these studies only examined psychological phenomena. The current study thus investigated the generality of this effect and found that it occurs across several scientific disciplines whenever the explanations include reductive information: reference to smaller components or more fundamental processes. These data suggest that people have a general preference for reductive information, even when it is irrelevant to the logic of an explanation.

Ba3 v2 s4 o3 : a mott insulating frustrated quasi-one-dimensional s=1 magnet.

Through a solid-state reaction, a practically phase pure powder of Ba3 V2 S4 O3 was obtained. The crystal structure was confirmed by X-ray single-crystal and synchrotron X-ray powder diffraction (P63 , a=10.1620(2), c=5.93212(1) Å). X-ray absorption spectroscopy, in conjunction with multiplet calculations, clearly describes the vanadium in charge-disproportionated V(III) S6 and V(V) SO3 coordinations. The compound is shown to be a strongly correlated Mott insulator, which contradicts previous predictions. Magnetic and specific heat measurements suggest dominant antiferromagnetic spin interactions concomitant with a weak residual ferromagnetic component, and that intrinsic geometric frustration prevents long-range order from evolving.

Do children learn from pretense?

Pretend play presents an interesting puzzle. Children generally must keep pretense separate from reality or else pretend would confuse their real-world representations. Children spend a great deal of time pretending, and so failing to take any information from pretend scenarios would present a lost opportunity; however, little research has investigated whether it is possible or efficient for children to learn new information they encounter during pretend play. In two tightly controlled studies using blind testers, we taught children information of two types (labels and object functions) in a pretend or real context. Children learned the novel functions in the pretend condition, and they inferred that the novel object would be similar in appearance to the substitute used to represent it during pretense. These findings coincide with other recent work suggesting that children can learn new information in pretense contexts that they can then apply to the real world, although this learning may differ in important ways from learning in real contexts.

Concepts and theories, methods and reasons: Why do the children (pretend) play? Reply to Weisberg, Hirsh-Pasek, and Golinkoff (2013); Bergen (2013); and Walker and Gopnik (2013).

We greatly appreciate the astute comments on Lillard et al. (2013) and the opportunity to reply. Here we point out the importance of keeping conceptual distinctions clear regarding play, pretend play, and exploration. We also discuss methodological issues with play research. We end with speculation that if pretend play did not emerge because it was naturally selected (due to helping causal reasoning or some other developmentally important skill), perhaps it emerged as a by-product of 2 other selected behaviors: play fighting and language.

The impact of pretend play on children's development: a review of the evidence.

Pretend play has been claimed to be crucial to children's healthy development. Here we examine evidence for this position versus 2 alternatives: Pretend play is 1 of many routes to positive developments (equifinality), and pretend play is an epiphenomenon of other factors that drive development. Evidence from several domains is considered. For language, narrative, and emotion regulation, the research conducted to date is consistent with all 3 positions but insufficient to draw conclusions. For executive function and social skills, existing research leans against the crucial causal position but is insufficient to differentiate the other 2. For reasoning, equifinality is definitely supported, ruling out a crucially causal position but still leaving open the possibility that pretend play is epiphenomenal. For problem solving, there is no compelling evidence that pretend play helps or is even a correlate. For creativity, intelligence, conservation, and theory of mind, inconsistent correlational results from sound studies and nonreplication with masked experimenters are problematic for a causal position, and some good studies favor an epiphenomenon position in which child, adult, and environment characteristics that go along with play are the true causal agents. We end by considering epiphenomenalism more deeply and discussing implications for preschool settings and further research in this domain. Our take-away message is that existing evidence does not support strong causal claims about the unique importance of pretend play for development and that much more and better research is essential for clarifying its possible role.