ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: The German fixed rate remuneration system in psychiatry and psychosomatics (PEPP) has been criticized by many specialty associations because negative effects on mental healthcare are expected through economic incentives. OBJECTIVE: Through analysis of performance data in the treatment of alcohol dependency at the Evangelical Hospital Bielefeld (Evangelisches Krankenhaus Bielefeld, EvKB) from 2014 and various simulations, the incentives of the PEPP (version 2015) were analyzed and its potential impact on patient care was evaluated. METHODS: Groups of cases were created based on the clinical data. Various parameters were evaluated, such as duration of treatment, PEPP coding, loss of income by merging cases and case remuneration. Additionally, changes in the duration of treatment, the intensity of treatment and the intensity of care were simulated. RESULTS: In the simulations a reduction in the duration of treatment by 16.1 % led to additional revenues of 1.9 % per treatment day. The calculated additional costs of 1:1 care and intensive nursing care were not completely covered by the additional revenues, whereas psychotherapeutic inpatient treatment programs showed positive profit contributions. Complicated cases with increased merging of cases showed lower revenues but with above average expenditure of efforts. CONCLUSION: The current version of the PEPP leads to misdirected incentives in patient care. This is caused, for example, by the fact that higher profit contributions can be realized in some patient groups and intensive nursing care of patients is insufficiently represented. It is not clear whether these incentives will persist or can be compensated in subsequent versions of the system.
