The effect of incentive policies on the diffusion of construction and demolition waste recycling: A government perspective.

Construction and demolition (C&D) waste recycling plays a significant role in waste reduction and carbon reduction, which is critical for sustainable development. However, due to various limitations such as financial problems, C&D waste recycling industry is not well developed in developing countries. To address this problem, this study combines complex network theory and evolutionary game theory to analyse the diffusion of C&D waste recycling behaviour among enterprises under governmental incentive policies within a complex network context. The results demonstrate that the size of the network has limited effects on behaviour diffusion in Watts-Strogatz small-world network. Additionally, the study highlights the clear impact of governmental incentive probability, initial rate and connection degree on the diffusion path. By quantitatively investigating the effects of incentive tools, this study contributes to the knowledge of C&D waste management and provides valuable implications for stakeholders seeking to promote the diffusion of C&D waste recycling.

Technology adoption path of construction and demolition waste recycling under governmental subsidy: a theoretical model.

To achieve sustainable development, waste recycling is regarded as an ideal method to dispose of construction and demolition (C&D) waste. The economy is seen as the priority factor influencing recycling technology adoption. Hence, the subsidy is generally used to cross the economic barrier. To illustrate the recycling technology adoption path under governmental subsidy, this paper constructs a non-cooperative game model to investigate the impact of governmental subsidy on the C&D waste recycling technology adoption. By taking adoption profit, opportunity cost, and initial adoption marginal cost into consideration, the best time to adopt recycling technology and adoption behavior is discussed in detail in four scenarios. Results show that the governmental subsidy has a positive impact on C&D waste recycling technology adoption, and the subsidy could advance the adoption time of recyclers. If the subsidy proportion can reach 70% of the cost, recyclers will adopt recycling technology at the initial time. The results could contribute to a deeper understanding of C&D waste management by promoting the development of C&D waste recycling projects and also provide references to governments.

Promoting construction and demolition waste recycling by using incentive policies in China.

In the recent two decades, construction and demolition (C&D) waste is becoming a major source of municipal waste which causes severe damage to the environment. To solve the problem, waste recycling measures are gradually used to turn waste into treasures. Meanwhile, several kinds of policies such as waste disposal charging fees have been issued to stimulate stakeholders' behavior to take waste recycling measures to promote the C&D waste recycling industry. However, the C&D waste recycling rate is still too low in China. In order to promote C&D waste recycling industrial development, this paper aims at introducing subsidy and environmental tax policies to promote C&D waste recycling. Based on system dynamics method, this study establishes a model to determine the proper subsidy and environmental tax range. According to the simulation results, three kinds of incentive policies are obtained, namely, single subsidy policy, single environmental tax, and combined incentive policies. Optimal single subsidy and environmental tax are in the interval, [10, 30] and [20, 60], respectively. The best combination strategy is subsidy = 10 yuan/ton and environmental tax = 20 yuan/ton. The results from this paper could be a foundation for government to establish incentive policies to promote C&D waste recycling.

Efficient supervision strategy for illegal dumping of construction and demolition waste: A networked game theory decision-making model.

While the construction industry has brought substantial economic benefits to society, it has also generated substantial construction and demolition waste (CDW). Illegal dumping, which refers to dumping CDW in an unauthorized non-filling location, has become widespread in many countries and regions. Illegally dumping CDW destroys the environment, causing groundwater pollution and forest fires and causing significant economic impacts. However, there is a lack of research on the decision-making behaviours and logical rules of the main participants, construction contractors and the government in the illegal CDW dumping process. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model on a small-world network considering government supervision to portray the decision-making behaviours of illegal dumping participants and conducts a numerical simulation based on empirical equations to propose an effective supervision strategy for the government to manage illegal CDW dumping efficiently. It is found that the illegal dumping behaviours of contractors are mainly affected by the intensity of government supervision, the cost of fines and the income of illegal dumping; while for government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and a supervision intensity of approximately 0.7 is the optimal supervision probability given supervision efficiency. Notably, under a low-level supervision probability, increasing the penalty alone does not curb illegal dumping, and a certain degree of supervision must be maintained. The results show that in addition to setting fines for illegal dumping, the government must enforce a certain level of supervision and purify the market environment to steadily reduce illegal dumping.