Parallel developmental changes in children's production and recognition of line drawings of visual concepts.

Childhood is marked by the rapid accumulation of knowledge and the prolific production of drawings. We conducted a systematic study of how children create and recognize line drawings of visual concepts. We recruited 2-10-year-olds to draw 48 categories via a kiosk at a children's museum, resulting in >37K drawings. We analyze changes in the category-diagnostic information in these drawings using vision algorithms and annotations of object parts. We find developmental gains in children's inclusion of category-diagnostic information that are not reducible to variation in visuomotor control or effort. Moreover, even unrecognizable drawings contain information about the animacy and size of the category children tried to draw. Using guessing games at the same kiosk, we find that children improve across childhood at recognizing each other's line drawings. This work leverages vision algorithms to characterize developmental changes in children's drawings and suggests that these changes reflect refinements in children's internal representations.

Visual explanations prioritize functional properties at the expense of visual fidelity.

Visual explanations play an integral role in communicating mechanistic knowledge about how things work. What do people think distinguishes such pictures from those that are intended to convey how things look? To explore this question, we used a drawing paradigm to elicit both visual explanations and depictions of novel machine-like objects, then conducted a detailed analysis of the semantic information conveyed in each drawing. We found that visual explanations placed greater emphasis on parts of the machines that move or interact to produce an effect, while visual depictions emphasized parts that were visually salient, even if they were static. Moreover, we found that these differences in visual emphasis impacted what information naive viewers could extract from these drawings: explanations made it easier to infer which action was needed to operate the machine, but more difficult to identify which machine it represented. Taken together, our findings suggest that people spontaneously prioritize functional information when producing visual explanations but that this strategy may be double-edged, facilitating inferences about physical mechanism at the expense of preserving visual fidelity.

Mind-bending geometry: Children's and adults' intuitions about linearity on spheres.

Humans appear to intuitively grasp definitions foundational to formal geometry, like definitions that describe points as infinitely small and lines as infinitely long. Nevertheless, previous studies exploring human's intuitive natural geometry have consistently focused on geometric principles in planar Euclidean contexts and thus may not comprehensively characterize humans' capacity for geometric reasoning. The present study explores whether children and adults can reason about linearity in spherical contexts. We showed 48 children (age range: 6-8 years) and 48 adults from the U.S. Northeast two different paths between the same two points on pictures of spheres and asked them to judge which path was the most efficient for an actor to get from a starting point to a goal object. In one kind of trial, both paths looked curved in the pictures, and in another kind of trial, the correct curved-looking path was paired with an incorrect straight-looking path. Adults were successful on both kinds of trials, and although children often chose the incorrect straight-looking path, they were surprisingly successful at identifying the efficient path when comparing two that were curved. Children thus may build on a natural geometry that gives us humans intuitions that are not limited to the formal axioms of Euclidean geometry or even to the Euclidean plane. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Preschoolers decide who is knowledgeable, who to inform, and who to trust via a causal understanding of how knowledge relates to action.

Preschoolers are discerning learners, preferring to trust people who are accurate, reliable, and appropriately-informed. Do these preferences reflect mental-state reasoning, where children infer what others know from their behavior, or do they reflect a reliance on simple cues? In Experiment 1 we show that four- and five-year-olds can infer knowledge from others' behavior when superficial cues and actions are matched across agents. Experiments 2a and 2b further suggest that children track how agents acquired their knowledge, and may use this to determine what different agents will (and will not) know. Finally, Experiment 3 shows that children independently make these knowledge inferences when deciding whom to trust. Our findings suggest that by age four, children have expectations about how knowledge relates to action, use these expectations to infer what others know from what they do, and rely on these inferences when deciding whom to trust.

Social Pragmatics: Preschoolers Rely on Commonsense Psychology to Resolve Referential Underspecification.

Four experiments show that 4- and 5-year-olds (total N = 112) can identify the referent of underdetermined utterances through their Naïve Utility Calculus-an intuitive theory of people's behavior structured around an assumption that agents maximize utilities. In Experiments 1-2, a puppet asked for help without specifying to whom she was talking ("Can you help me?"). In Experiments 3-4, a puppet asked the child to pass an object without specifying what she wanted ("Can you pass me that one?"). Children's responses suggest that they considered cost trade-offs between the members in the interaction. These findings add to a body of work showing that reference resolution is informed by commonsense psychology from early in childhood.