Explaining contentious political issues promotes open-minded thinking.

Cognitive scientists suggest that inviting people to explain contentious political issues might reduce intergroup toxicity because it exposes people to how poorly they understand the issue. However, whether providing explanations can result in more open-minded political thinking remains unclear. On one hand, inviting people to explain a political issue might make them more impartial and open-minded in their thinking. On the other hand, an invitation to explain a contentious political issue might lead to myside bias-rationalization of one's default position. Here, we address these contrasting predictions in five experiments (N = 1884; three pre-registered), conducted across a variety of contexts: with graduate students interacting with an actor in a laboratory setting, with US residents at the peak of the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections, with UK residents before the highly polarized 2019 Brexit vote, and with gun-control partisans. Across studies, we found that explaining politically contentious topics resulted in more open-minded thinking, an effect that generalized across coded (Studies 1-4) and self-report (Studies 3-4) measures. We also observed that participants who were made to feel like their explanations were welcomed felt closer to their discussion partner (Studies 3-4), an effect that generalized to all outgroup members with whom they disagreed with about the politically contentious issue (Study 4). We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, and the potential for explanations to foster open-minded political engagement.

Attention spreads between students in a learning environment.

We propose a novel phenomenon, attention contagion, defined as the spread of attentive (or inattentive) states among members of a group. We examined attention contagion in a learning environment in which pairs of undergraduate students watched a lecture video. Each pair consisted of a participant and a confederate trained to exhibit attentive behaviors (e.g., leaning forward) or inattentive behaviors (e.g., slouching). In Experiment 1, confederates sat in front of participants and could be seen. Relative to participants who watched the lecture with an inattentive confederate, participants with an attentive confederate: (a) self-reported higher levels of attentiveness, (b) behaved more attentively (e.g., took more notes), and (c) had better memory for lecture content. In Experiment 2, confederates sat behind participants. Despite confederates not being visible, participants were still aware of whether confederates were acting attentively or inattentively, and participants were still susceptible to attention contagion. Our findings suggest that distraction is one factor that contributes to the spread of inattentiveness (Experiment 1), but this phenomenon apparently can still occur in the absence of distraction (Experiment 2). We propose an account of how (in)attentiveness spreads across students and discuss practical implications regarding how learning is affected in the classroom. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The Wisdom in Virtue: Pursuit of Virtue Predicts Wise Reasoning About Personal Conflicts.

Most people can reason relatively wisely about others' social conflicts, but often struggle to do so about their own (i.e., Solomon's paradox). We suggest that true wisdom should involve the ability to reason wisely about both others' and one's own social conflicts, and we investigated the pursuit of virtue as a construct that predicts this broader capacity for wisdom. Results across two studies support prior findings regarding Solomon's paradox: Participants ( N = 623) more strongly endorsed wise-reasoning strategies (e.g., intellectual humility, adopting an outsider's perspective) for resolving other people's social conflicts than for resolving their own. The pursuit of virtue (e.g., pursuing personal ideals and contributing to other people) moderated this effect of conflict type. In both studies, greater endorsement of the pursuit of virtue was associated with greater endorsement of wise-reasoning strategies for one's own personal conflicts; as a result, participants who highly endorsed the pursuit of virtue endorsed wise-reasoning strategies at similar levels for resolving their own social conflicts and resolving other people's social conflicts. Implications of these results and underlying mechanisms are explored and discussed.

Emotional complexity: Clarifying definitions and cultural correlates.

There is much debate about the notion of emotional complexity (EC). The debate concerns both the definition and the meaning of ostensible cultural differences in the construct. Some scholars have defined EC as the experience of positive and negative emotions together rather than as opposites, a phenomenon that seems more common in East Asia than North America. Others have defined EC as the experience of emotions in a differentiated manner, a definition that has yet to be explored cross-culturally. The present research explores the role of dialectical beliefs and interdependence in explaining cultural differences in EC according to both definitions. In Study 1, we examined the prevalence of mixed (positive-negative) emotions in English-language online texts from 10 countries varying in interdependence and dialecticism. In Studies 2-3, we examined reports of emotional experiences in 6 countries, comparing intraindividual associations between pleasant and unpleasant states, prevalence of mixed emotions, and emotional differentiation across and within-situations. Overall, interdependence accounted for more cross-cultural and individual variance in EC measures than did dialecticism. Moreover, emotional differentiation was associated with the experience of positive and negative emotions together rather than as opposites, but only when tested on the same level of analysis (i.e., within vs. across-situations). (PsycINFO Database Record