Word valence, attention, and hemispheric activity in depressed, remitted, and nondepressed controls.

Clinically depressed (n = 20), previously depressed (n = 28), and nondepressed control (n = 27) individuals, classified according to a structured clinical diagnostic interview, participated in a study employing a modified prior entry (Titchener, 1908) procedure to investigate interrelationships among word (adjective) valence, visual attention, and cerebral hemispheric activity. Overall, positive words were selected more quickly when presented to the right, versus left, visual field (RVF, LVF); the opposite pattern was observed for negative words. While there was no significant group X Valence X Visual Field interaction, planned comparisons revealed that the aforementioned Valence X Visual Field interaction was significant only for the nondepressed control group. Although the remitted group exhibited an overall pattern similar to the control group, the depressed group evinced a pattern in the opposite direction for positive words (i.e., quicker in the LVF than the RVF).

The cognitive neuroscience paradigm: a unifying metatheoretical framework for the science and practice of clinical psychology.

The emerging discipline of cognitive neuroscience (CN) enjoins the efforts of cognitive psychologists, neuroscientists, computer scientists, clinical neurologists, neurophilosophers, and many others working collaboratively across traditional disciplinary boundaries to elucidate the manner in which the physical operations of the brain give rise to the vast panoply of human mental and behavioral events. The present article describes the foundational tenets of the CN metatheoretical framework and contends that the CN framework is capable of providing a coherent, unifying scientific paradigm for the discipline of clinical psychology. Clinical psychology's adoption of the CN paradigm would facilitate (a) its consilient linkage with the natural sciences, (b) resolution of long-standing internecine theoretical schisms, and (c) enhanced understanding and treatment of numerous forms of psychopathology. Nevertheless, psychology's historically influential radical behavioral (RB) perspective is not easily reconciled with the CN paradigm. However, unlike CN, RB (a) is not fully consilient with the natural sciences, (b) fails to articulate the proximal causal mechanisms that mediate environment-behavior relations, and (c) engages in "greedy reductionism" in its disavowal of informational levels of complexity in the patterning of neural activity. The article concludes with a discussion of the possibility of theoretical rapprochement between CN and RB.

On mental events, disciplinary boundaries, and reductionism: a reply to Plaud.

Plaud's (2001) radical behavioral manifesto suggests that a psychological science based exclusively upon the study of environment-behavior functional contingencies would yield a discipline unencumbered by mentalism, vaguely delineated disciplinary boundaries, or inappropriate reductionism. In reply, we note that: (a) mental events-e.g., thoughts and feelings-are increasingly accessible to objective investigation, and provide an observable proximal causal mechanism for the environmental selection of behavior; (b) the call for pristine disciplinary boundaries is anachronistic, inasmuch as progress in the natural sciences has engendered disciplinary boundaries that are increasingly porous; (c) cognitive neuroscience facilitates a comprehensive understanding of complex human behavior by mapping out the relationship between such behavior and underlying brain events, thereby engaging in an appropriate form of reductionism (constitutive reductionism) that has become a hallmark of the natural sciences; and (d) ironically, it is radical behaviorism, in its disavowal of the informational level of complexity instantiated in brain events, that engages in inappropriate eliminative reductionism (i.e., reducing neural information to "nothing but" its underlying bring states).

Validity of the Devereux Scales of Mental Disorders with adolescent psychiatric inpatients.

Tested the validity of the Devereux Scales of Mental Disorders (DSMD; Naglieri, LeBuffe, & Pfeiffer, 1994) in a sample of 108 adolescent psychiatric inpatients. DSMD scales were compared to parent-report, interview-based, self-report and diagnostic measures. DSMD measures of conduct problems and delinquency were significantly associated with the predicted parent-report, interview-based, and diagnostic measures of conduct disorder and substance abuse and not with any measures of anxiety or depression. DSMD measures of anxiety and depression were related to other parent-report ratings of internalizing symptoms but had more limited convergent and discriminant validity. The DSMD was compared to the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach, 1991) for diagnostic classification accuracy. The two measures were comparable in classifying oppositional or conduct disorder. The CBCL was superior for classification of major depression. The DSMD was superior for classification of substance abuse.

The relationship between personality pathology and dysfunctional cognitions in previously depressed adults.

Multivariate and univariate regression models were used to examine the relationship between Axis II personality pathology and dysfunctional cognitions in a follow-up study of 40 formerly depressed inpatients. A dimensionalized measure of overall Axis II pathology was significantly and positively related to dysfunctional attitudes (Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale [DAS]) and maladaptive negative event attributions (Attributional Style Questionnaire-Negative Composite [ASQ-N]); the Axis II measure accounted for approximately 29% of the variance in DAS and 14% of the variance in ASQ-N, after controlling statistically for subsyndromal depressive symptoms (Beck Depression Inventory [BDI]). Axis II pathology was not significantly associated with positive event attributions, and no significant Axis II x BDI interaction effects were observed. A secondary canonical analysis of Axis II clusters was largely consistent with a hypothesized general personality pathology factor associated with dysfunctional cognitions, though a more specific association between Axis II Cluster C pathology and dysfunctional attitudes was also observed.

Modeling relapse in unipolar depression: the effects of dysfunctional cognitions and personality disorders.

Survival analytic models were used to determine the effects of Axis II pathology and dysfunctional cognitions on depressive relapse in a sample of 50 depressed inpatients followed 33 to 84 months (M = 49.9) postdischarge. In analyses based on follow-up interview measures, expected remission duration among patients without personality disorders was approximately 7.4 times longer than among patients with Axis II comorbidity. Attributional style also accounted for unique variance in the relapse model, with adaptive positive event attributions inversely related to relapse probability. Neither dysfunctional attitudes nor negative event attributions were significantly related to relapse. Dimensional Axis II Cluster B and C pathology ratings were associated with decreased survival time, whereas Cluster A pathology was associated with increased survival. Among measures obtained during index hospitalization, only the dimensional rating of Axis II pathology was significantly predictive, with a cumulative 8% decrease in expected survival for each Axis II criterion item met.