ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Despite known adverse impacts on patients and health systems, 'incentive-linked prescribing', which describes the prescribing of medicines that result in personal benefits for the prescriber, remains a widespread and hidden impediment to quality of healthcare. We investigated factors perpetuating incentive-linked prescribing among primary care physicians in for-profit practices (referred to as private doctors), using Pakistan as a case study. METHODS: Our mixed-methods study synthesised insights from a survey of 419 systematically samples private doctors and 68 semi-structured interviews with private doctors (n=28), pharmaceutical sales representatives (n=12), and provincial and national policy actors (n=28). For the survey, we built a verified database of all registered private doctors within Karachi, Pakistan's most populous city, administered an electronic questionnaire in-person and descriptively analysed the data. Semi-structured interviews incorporated a vignette-based exercise and data was analysed using an interpretive approach. RESULTS: Our survey showed that 90% of private doctors met pharmaceutical sales representatives weekly. Three interlinked factors perpetuating incentive-linked prescribing we identified were: gaps in understanding of conflicts of interest and loss of values among doctors; financial pressures on doctors operating in a (largely) privately financed health-system, exacerbated by competition with unqualified healthcare providers; and aggressive incentivisation by pharmaceutical companies, linked to low political will to regulate and an over-saturated pharmaceutical market. CONCLUSION: Regular interactions between pharmaceutical companies and private doctors are normalised in our study setting, and progress on regulating these is hindered by the substantial role of incentive-linked prescribing in the financial success of physicians and the pharmaceutical industry employees. A first step towards addressing the entrenchment of incentive-linked prescribing may be to reduce opposition to restrictions on incentivisation of physicians from stakeholders within the pharmaceutical industry, physicians themselves, and policymakers concerned about curtailing growth of the pharmaceutical industry.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVES: Pharmaceutical incentivisation of physicians for profit maximisation is a well-documented health system challenge. This study examined general practitioners' (GPs) reactions to pharmaceutical incentivisation offers in one region in Pakistan. METHODS: We used the Standardised Pharmaceutical Sales Representative (SPSR) method and qualitative interviews with GPs. SPSRs were field researchers representing mock pharmaceutical companies who recorded their observations of 267 GPs' responses to pharmaceutical incentivisation offers. We triangulated SPSR data using qualitative interviews with a subset of the same GPs to gather information about how they interpreted different interaction outcomes. RESULTS: We found four major outcomes for GPs being offered incentives by pharmaceutical companies for prescribing medications. GPs might agree to make incentivisation deals, reject incentivisation offers, disallow PSRs to access them, or remain indeterminate with no clear indication of acceptance or rejection of incentivisation offers. GPs rejecting SPSRs' incentivisation offers indicated having active commitments to other pharmaceutical companies, not being able to work with unheard-of companies, and asking SPSRs to return later. CONCLUSIONS: The GP-pharmaceutical sales representative interaction that centres on profit-maximisation is complex as offers to engage in prescribing for mutual financial benefit are not taken up immediately. The SPSR method helps understand the extent of distortion of practices impacted by incentivisation. Such an understanding can support the development of strategies to control unethical behaviours.
ABSTRACT
Focus on profit-generating enterprise in healthcare can create conflicts of interest that adversely impact prescribing and pricing of medicines. Although a global challenge, addressing the impacts on quality of care is particularly difficult in countries where the pharmaceutical industry and physician lobby is strong relative to regulatory institutions. Our study characterises the range of incentives exchanged between the pharmaceutical industry and physicians, and investigates the differences between incentivisation practices and policies in Pakistan. In this mixed methods study, we first thematically analysed semi-structured interviews with 28 purposively selected for-profit primary-care physicians and 13 medical sales representatives from pharmaceutical companies working across Pakistan's largest city, Karachi. We then conducted a content analysis of policies on ethical practice issued by two regulatory bodies responsible in Pakistan, and the World Health Organization. This enabled a systematic comparison of incentivisation practices with what is considered 'prohibitive' or 'permissive' in policy. Our findings demonstrate that incentivisation of physicians to meet pharmaceutical sales targets is the norm, and that both parties play in the symbiotic physician-pharma incentivisation dynamics. Further, we were able to categorise the types of incentive exchanged into one of five categories: financial, material, professional or educational, social or recreational, and familial. Our comparison of incentivisation practices with policies revealed three reasons for such widespread incentivisation linked to sales targets: first, some clear policies were being ignored by physicians; second, there are ambiguous or contradictory policies with respect to specific incentive types; and third, numerous incentive types are unaddressed by existing policies, such as pharmaceutical companies paying for private clinic renovations. There is a need for policies to be clarified and updated, and to build buy-in for policy enforcement from pharmaceutical companies and physicians, such that transgressions on target-driven prescribing are seen to be unethical.
ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: The experiences of frontline healthcare professionals are essential in identifying strategies to mitigate the disruption to healthcare services caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. METHODS: We conducted a cross-sectional study of TB and HIV professionals in low and middle-income countries (LMIC). Between May 12 and August 6, 2020, we collected qualitative and quantitative data using an online survey in 11 languages. We used descriptive statistics and thematic analysis to analyse responses. FINDINGS: 669 respondents from 64 countries completed the survey. Over 40% stated that it was either impossible or much harder for TB and HIV patients to reach healthcare facilities since COVID-19. The most common barriers reported to affect patients were: fear of getting infected with SARS-CoV-2, transport disruptions and movement restrictions. 37% and 28% of responses about TB and HIV stated that healthcare provider access to facilities was also severely impacted. Strategies to address reduced transport needs and costs-including proactive coordination between the health and transport sector and cards that facilitate lower cost or easier travel-were presented in qualitative responses. Access to non-medical support for patients, such as food supplementation or counselling, was severely disrupted according to 36% and 31% of HIV and TB respondents respectively; qualitative data suggested that the need for such services was exacerbated. CONCLUSION: Patients and healthcare providers across numerous LMIC faced substantial challenges in accessing healthcare facilities, and non-medical support for patients was particularly impacted. Synthesising recommendations of frontline professionals should be prioritised for informing policymakers and healthcare service delivery organisations.
