Conceptual anchoring dissociates implicit and explicit category learning.

Categorization researchers have long debated the possibility of multiple category-learning systems. The need persists for paradigms that dissociate explicit-declarative category-learning processes (featuring verbalizable category rules) from implicit-procedural processes (featuring stimulus-response associations lying beneath declarative cognition). The authors contribute a new paradigm, using perfectly matched exclusive-or (XOR) category tasks differing only in the availability or absence of easily verbalizable conceptual content. This manipulation transformed learning. The conceptual task alone was learned suddenly, by insightful rule discovery, producing explicit-declarative XOR knowledge. The perceptual task was learned more gradually, consistent with associative-learning processes, producing impoverished declarative knowledge. We also tested participants under regimens of immediate and deferred reinforcement. The conceptual task alone was learned through processes that survive the loss of trial-by-trial reinforcement. All results support the idea that humans have perceptual-associative processes for implicit learning, but also an overlain conceptual system that under the right circumstances constitutes a parallel explicit-declarative category-learning system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Exploring Explicit Learning Strategies: A Dissociative Framework for Research.

To explain learning, comparative researchers invoke an associative construct by which immediate reinforcement strengthens animal's adaptive responses. In contrast, cognitive researchers freely acknowledge humans' explicit-learning capability to test and confirm hypotheses even lacking direct reinforcement. We describe a new dissociative framework that may stretch animals' learning toward the explicit pole of cognition. We discuss the neuroscience of reinforcement-based learning and suggest the possibility of disabling a dominant form of reinforcement-based discrimination learning. In that vacuum, researchers may have an opportunity to observe animals' explicit learning strategies (i.e., hypotheses, rules, task self-construals). We review initial research using this framework showing explicit learning by humans and perhaps by monkeys. Finally, we consider why complementary explicit and reinforcement-based learning systems might promote evolutionary and ecological fitness. Illuminating the evolution of parallel learning systems may also tell part of the story of the emergence of humans' extraordinary capacity for explicit-declarative cognition.

Launch! Self-agency as a discriminative cue for humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca Mulatta).

Self-agency is a crucial aspect of self-awareness. It is underresearched given the phenomenon's subjectivity and difficulty of study. It is particularly underresearched comparatively, given that animals cannot receive agency instructions or make agency declarations. Accordingly, we developed a distinctively new self-agency paradigm. Humans and rhesus macaques learned event categories differentiated by whether the participant's volitional response controlled a screen launch. They learned by trial and error after minimal instructions with no agency orientation (humans) or no instructions (monkeys). After learning, humans' verbalized category descriptions were coded for self-agency attributions. Across three experiments, humans' agency attributions qualitatively improved discrimination performance-participants not invoking self-agency rarely exceeded chance performance. It also produced a diagnostic latency profile: classification accuracy depended heavily on the temporal relationship between the button-press and the launch, but only for those invoking agency. In our last experiment, monkeys performed the launch task. Their performance and latency profiles mirrored that of humans. Thus, self-agency can be self-discovered as a frame organizing discrimination. And it may be used as a discrimination cue by some nonhuman animals as well. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) learn two-choice discriminations under displaced reinforcement.

To explain animal learning, researchers invoke a dominant associative construct. In contrast, researchers freely acknowledge humans' explicit-declarative learning capacity. Here, we stretched animals' learning performance toward the explicit pole of cognition. We tested four macaques (Macaca mulatta) in new discrimination-learning paradigms. Monkeys learned a series of two-choice discrimination tasks. But immediate reinforcement was denied. Instead, reinforcement was lagged-monkeys received feedback for trial N only after seeing and responding to the N + 1-trial stimulus. Theory suggests that lagged reinforcement will eliminate a dominant form of implicit discrimination learning. Yet monkeys still learned successfully. Thus, monkeys may have alternative learning algorithms usable when reinforcement is displaced and reinforcement learning undermined. This learning may, as in humans, take a more explicit form. This and related methods that disable associative learning-fostering a possible transition to explicit cognition-could have empirical utility and theoretical significance within comparative psychology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Simultaneous versus prospective/retrospective uncertainty monitoring: The effect of response competition across cognitive levels.

Early animal-metacognition researchers singled out simultaneous metacognition paradigms for theoretical criticism, because these paradigms presented concretely rewarded perceptual responses and the metacognitive response simultaneously. This method potentially introduced associative cues into the situation that could confound the interpretation of the metacognitive response. Evaluating this possibility, we compared humans' metacognitive performances in simultaneous and nonsimultaneous (prospective, retrospective) paradigms that were otherwise identical. Results show that the metacognition response in these tasks is not prompted by associative cues arising from the simultaneous task format. To the contrary, the metacognitive response is used more robustly and accurately when it is removed from direct competition with the primary perceptual responses. Thus, early researchers were correct to judge that the nonsimultaneous paradigms tap metacognition more robustly and sensitively. However, this is probably true because the simultaneous paradigm mingles responses adjudicated on two different cognitive-processing levels. And, in that case, the metacognitive response can be outcompeted and suppressed by the salient presence of primary, concretely rewarded perceptual responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Breaking the perceptual-conceptual barrier: Relational matching and working memory.

Cognitive, comparative, and developmental psychologists have long been interested in humans' and animals' ability to respond to abstract relations, as this ability may underlie important capacities like analogical reasoning. Cross-species research has used relational matching-to-sample (RMTS) tasks in which participants try to find stimulus pairs that "match" because they both express the same abstract relation (same or different). Researchers seek to understand the cognitive processes that underlie successful matching performance. In the present RMTS paradigm, the abstract-relational cue was made redundant with a first-order perceptual cue. Then the perceptual cue faded, requiring participants to transition from a perceptual to a conceptual approach by realizing the task's abstract-relational affordance. We studied participants' ability to make this transition with and without a working-memory load. The concurrent load caused participants to fail to break the perceptual-conceptual barrier unless the load was abandoned. We conclude that finding the conceptual solution depends on reconstruing the task using cognitive processes that are especially reliant on working memory. Our data provide the closest existing look at this cognitive reorganization. They raise important theoretical issues for cross-species comparisons of relational cognition, especially regarding animals' limitations in this domain.

The Cognitive Architecture of Uncertainty.

The authors consider theory in the animal-metacognition literature. Theoretical interpretation was long dominated by associative descriptions, as illustrated in the 2009 special issue. We suggest that this approach risks a self-limiting understanding of animal mind, and an imprecise understanding of the cognitive requirements inherent in metacognition tasks. In fact, some tasks self-entail the need for higher-level decision-making processes, processes that-in humans-we would call explicit, declarative, and conscious. These points are illustrated using the inaugural study on dolphin metacognition. We urge researchers to turn more toward illuminating the cognitive architecture of capacities like metacognition, including illuminating the depth, and structure, the learning/memory systems, the cognitive levels, and the declarative awareness possibly present in animals' minds. The empirical development of this literature demonstrates that researchers are now prepared to do so. This study can produce strong synergies across the allied fields of biopsychology, comparative and cognitive psychology, and neuroscience.