Gender balance in the workforce and abortion attitudes: A cross-national time-series analysis.

This article explores the relationship between gender balance in the workforce and attitudes towards abortion worldwide. Studies on macro-level conditions related to abortion attitudes overlook the role of gender balance in the workforce-specifically the degree of female representation in a country's workforce. There are strong reasons why this factor could shape abortion attitudes. We argue that such a gender balance creates necessary conditions to break with traditional, anti-abortion ideology and facilitates dissemination and public acceptance of pro-choice views. We test this argument with two different datasets - the Integrated Values Survey and three waves of the International Social Survey Programme-along with two outcomes: general tolerance towards abortion and tolerance towards abortion for pregnant women of low income. Using three-level random intercept models and multiple controls for individual and country-level conditions, the results support our hypothesis: In countries with higher gender balance in the workforce, individuals display higher tolerance towards abortion.

Societal religiosity and the gender gap in political interest, 1990-2014.

This manuscript examines the structural causes of the gender gap in political interest. In many countries, men are more interested in politics than women. Yet, in others, men and women prove equally interested. We explain this cross-national variation by focusing on the effects of societal religiosity. Since religion sustains the traditional gender order, contexts where societal religiosity is low undermine the taken-for-grantedness of this order, subjecting it to debate. Men then become especially interested in politics to try to reassert their traditional gender dominance, or to compensate for their increasingly uncertain social status. A secular environment thus increases political interest more among men than among women, expanding this gender gap. Using the World and European Values Survey, we estimate three-level regression models and test our religiosity-based approach in 96 countries. The results are consistent with our hypothesis.

Social mobility and demand for redistribution in Europe: a comparative analysis.

The literature on preferences for redistribution has paid little attention to the effect of social mobility on the demand for redistribution and no systematic test of the hypotheses connecting social mobility and preferences for redistribution has yet been done to date. We use the diagonal reference model to estimate the effect of origin and destination classes on preferences for redistribution in a large sample of European countries using data from the European Social Survey. Our findings are consistent with the logic of acculturation in the sense that newcomers tend to adapt their views to those of the destination class at early stages and that upward and downward mobility do not have distinctive effects on the formation of political preferences. However, even though social origins seem to have a limited impact on preferences for redistribution, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that mobile and non-mobile individuals are alike. We also find that the effect of social origin on preferences varies largely across countries. The empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the effect of social origin on preferences for redistribution increases in contexts of strong familism.

The impact of social expenditure on health inequalities in Europe.

Welfare states are assumed to play a fundamental role in the protection and promotion of the health and socioeconomic well-being of citizens. However, empirical evidence on the effect of the welfare state is still contradictory. The inconsistency of the results has led researchers to a lack of consensus in defining the mechanisms that might explain the relationship between the welfare state and health. To shed some light on the current debate, we rely on individual and country data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurostat to explore the direct and indirect effects of the welfare state on health inequalities in a sample of European countries. We use multilevel models to test the hypothesized impact of social expenditure on reducing health inequalities. Firstly, results show that health inequalities are lower in countries where social expenditure is higher. Secondly, the relationship between socio-economic status (SES) and health is moderated by social expenditure. The positive effect of SES on health decreases in countries where social expenditure is higher, while this effect is higher in countries with lower social expenditure. Our findings suggest that social spending has a positive impact on equalizing health conditions in Europe.

Collective religiosity and the gender gap in attitudes towards economic redistribution in 86 countries, 1990-2008.

What is the relationship between gender and the demand for redistribution? Because, on average, women face more economic deprivation than men, in many countries women favor redistribution more than men. However, this is not the case in a number of other countries, where women do not support redistribution more than men. To explain this cross-national paradox, we stress the role of collective religiosity. In many religions, theological principles both militate against public policies designed to redistribute income, and also promote traditionally gendered patterns of work and family involvement. Hence, we hypothesize that, in those countries where religion remains influential either through closer church-state ties or an intensely religious population, men and women should differ less in their attitudes towards redistribution. Drawing upon the World Values Survey, we estimate three-level regression models that test our religiosity-based approach and two alternative explanations in 86 countries and 175 country-years. The results are consistent with our hypothesis. Moreover, in further support of our theoretical approach, societal religiosity undermines pro-redistribution preferences more among women than men. Our findings suggest that collective religiosity matters more to the gender gap in redistributive attitudes than traditional political and labor force factors.